The Dollar (again)

Any country selling its goods abroad could price and collect payment for them in its own currency. Foreign purchasers would have to buy the sellers currency in the foreign exchange market (a whole nether story) in order to make such payments.

To communicate with each other they could also learn each other’s language. To communicate with everyone in their own language would require learning 7,000 languages. The economy of everyone adding English as a second language to their own is self-evident.

Rather than each trader dealing with several hundred currencies, there is huge economy in everyone dealing in one intermediary (so called vehicle) currency for pricing and payments of their cross-border transactions. But what currency?

When an exporter gives up pricing its products in the currency it pays its workers, it takes on a valuation risk. The choice of its invoicing currency and currency of payment needs to be attractive to potential buyers and of minimal risk to itself. The currency needs to have a relatively stable value for a large number of goods. The U.S. economy is large, and its goods are priced in dollars, which has a relatively good track record of price stability.

But to pay for imports with someone else’s currency the importer must have some of it. He must either take the risk of buying it in the foreign exchange market at whatever its current exchange rate might be or keeping some in reserve. Keeping a reserve of the international pricing and payment currency requires having safe assets with stable values in that currency, with deep and liquid markets in which they can be bought and sold. Currently the US dollar wins hands down. The Empire and the Dollar – Warren’s space (wcoats.blog)

The militarization of the dollar to serve U.S. foreign policy objectives increases the risk to others of holding and using dollars. How much that potentially undermines the dollar’s reserve currency status depends on how broadly the foreign policy objectives of the U.S. are shared and how well alternative currencies measure up to the value and market advantages of the dollar.

Resolution of First Republic Bank

JPMorgan Chase’s purchase of First Republic Bank appears to be a standard purchase and assumption resolution of a failing bank. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has organized hundreds of such bank resolutions there by painlessly purging bad banks for the banking system. The only mistake in my view was selling it to the country’s largest bank.

Purchase and assumption resolutions involve the simultaneous purchase of a failing bank’s good assets and the assumption of its deposit liabilities by a good bank and putting what’s left into bankruptcy (wiping out its shareholders and some or all of its corporate debt). Its the risk of loss to shareholders that provides the market scrutiny of bank risk taking. “Institutional and Legal Impediments to Efficient Insolvent Bank Resolution And Ways to Overcome Them”

Money (currency and demand deposits) should not be at risk of a bank failure. Depositors should not need to evaluate the safety and soundness of the bank they chose to hold their money in. So the FDIC insures deposits up to $250,000. But all deposits in the last three banks to fail were made whole whether insured or not and there is talk that all deposits should be explicitly (rather than just implicitly) insured. Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDCs) would provide such total protection to those holding it (retail CBDCs would be issued/administered by commercial banks and fully backed by an equivalent amount at the central bank).

Public “runs” on banks in order to move vulnerable deposits to cash or a safer bank, result from the fact that banks can fund long term loans with callable deposits. They can lend your deposit to someone buying a house with a 30-year mortgage. This works as long as banks keep enough cash or quickly liquidated assets on hand to cover any deposit withdrawals their depositors might want to make. An alternative to deposit insurance for all deposits is to isolate demand deposits from bank lendable resources by requiring that they be 100% back at the central bank (as with CBDCs) and not available to cover any losses on other bank activities.

It is time to take so called narrow banking (or The Chicago Plan) seriously. CBDCs are the natural vehicle for this restructuring of our money and credit systems.  “Protecting bank deposits”

Reducing CHIP Supply Risks

When semiconductors where invented in the U.S. in the late 1950 and began to replace vacuum tubes in electronic circuits, the world of electronic circuitry changed dramatically forever (from the computer I am composing this note on, to the mobile phone on which I might discuss it with you or the electronics in the car I might drive to meet you while listening to the radio these chips made possible, not to mention of submarines, planes, and satellites they empower).

American companies continue to lead the world in the design of the most sophisticate chips and semiconductor circuits. However, they have increasingly found it more economical to outsource their manufacture to facilities in foreign countries. Almost all the most sophisticated chips (still designed in the US) are now produced in Taiwan by TSMC, which produces about 56% of world output of semiconductors.  Especially given the increasing suggestion, even by the President of the United States, that the U.S. might renounce its acceptance of China’s claim to Taiwan, such reliance on TSMC for our most advanced chips is an economic and security risk we should reduce.

What is the best way to reduce the risk of our heavy dependance on Taiwan’s supply of such Chips? The rest of this note briefly compares the market approach with the government (socialist/industrial planning) approach to reducing that risk.

American and other firms concentrated the manufacturing of the chips they designed and/or needed where it was cheapest to produce (and deliver) them. Where China violated the WTO rules of fair trade via state subsidies, importing countries are allowed by WTO rules to impose tariffs at levels designed to neutralize such artificial advantages. WTO rules also allow the use of tariffs to diminish the risk to national security of dependance on foreign supplies.

The opposite approach is for a government to subsidize the otherwise uneconomical manufacture of semiconductors (or whatever) in their own country.  In the U.S., the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 appropriated $280 billion in part to subsidize factories to produce such chips in the U.S. Why was so much needed to get firms to produce chips in the U.S.? “’It’s much cheaper to build the chips and the factories in Taiwan than it is in the United States,’ former Google CEO Eric Schmidt told Semafor. ‘Similarly, the workforce quality is not as good as it is in Taiwan.’” “Chip war-US-Taiwan”

The Biden administration’s industrial policy approach suffers all the well-known disadvantages of industrial policy. First, like China’s subsidies, it violates WTO trading rules, which the U.S. seems all too willing to do when it is the violator rather than someone else. Second, it, rather than market factors, must decide who gets the subsidies (and tax breaks), either by establishing the rules for access or by outright picking winners. Governments’ records at picking winners, especially picking technologies, have historically been poor compared with the search for profit by entrepreneurs, most of whom fail and quietly fade away without further cost or waste. Third, when governments pick winners, they establish an economic incentive for corruption by those seeking to be “picked”. Governments, like everyone else, tend to bend to such temptations.

Rather than paying hundreds of billions of American taxpayer’s money for more costly Made in American products, imposing tariffs on imported chips sufficient to reflect the existing sole source risk would leave it to the market to find the best alternative and more diversified sources (India, Korea, Japan, Viet Nam, etc.). The full cost of lower living standards from industrial policies will only be felt in the longer run. “The slippery slope”

The same economic forces and arguments apply to slowing or preventing further global warming. A carbon tax reflecting the global warming externality of carbon producing activities leaves to the market the search for the best technologies for reducing carbon emissions without loss or with minimal loss of output.

The Slippery Slope

Beyond defining and protecting property rights, most governments dip into the private market for one reason or another (e.g., national defense) to some extent.  In doing so, they reward (e.g., subsidize) or penalize (e.g., tax) specific firms and/or industries. These firms have a MUCH stronger incentive to protect their interests than do the general public with regard to these activities. As a result of this asymmetry, firms spend more (fight harder) to protect their privileges than do the general public to protect a fair and competitive marketplace. As a result of these incentives, government privileges tend to grow over time and are hard to reverse. Governments keep getting bigger and bigger. Worse yet, if taxes do not match these increases in government costs, i.e., if the government borrows to finance them, these asymmetric incentives are even stronger.

These realities are now being confronted by the Republican Party as it attempts to agree on which government budget items to cut in order to reduce the fiscal deficit without raising taxes. As Steve Clemons reported in this morning’s Semafor Principles: “When Speaker Kevin McCarthy only has four votes of wiggle room in passing GOP legislation, the corn caucus can be as powerful as the Freedom Caucus. After a proposed repeal of biofuels subsidies prompted a rebellion by Midwestern lawmakers, leadership is making changes to a bill they presented as non-negotiable”

The Chips Act of 2022 provides an even costlier example that will be almost impossible to get rid of. The Act provides $52 billion in manufacturing grants and research investments and establishes a 25% investment tax credit to incentivize semiconductor manufacturing in the U.S.”  It makes financially attractive what was on its own an inefficient and costlier way to acquire these produces than buying them abroad. It makes us poorer as do other “Buy American” requirements.

Especially now with a labor shortage (we should increase legal immigration), moving workers to subsidized areas means taking them away from producing what the market found more profitable. It reduces overall output and our standard of living. If we insist on producing our own tanks and airplanes for national security reasons, that is a cost we should probably bare.  But for 5G phone service, Tik Toc, steel from Canada, or whatever???? Tell your congressman to stop subsidizing these special interests. And if they are really justified by national security, pay the cost properly with tax revenue.

Buy American

In recent years the U.S. government has become more protectionist (protecting its domestic firms from foreign competition). Last year it even provided billions of dollars to subsidize chip production and other designated products in the U.S., an example of industrial policy (state directed development). The CHIPS Act passed last year will shell out over $200 billion over the next five years to subsidize domestic chip production.

To add insult to injury, the so called “Inflation Reduction Act” may violate World Trade Organization rules: “We have concerns about a number of discriminatory elements in this Inflation Reduction Act which puts requirement for local content, for local production,” Dombrovskis, who also is a European Commission vice president, told Bloomberg in Prague.” EU Is Assessing If US Inflation Act in Breach of WTO Rules – Bloomberg Did we really think that we could cheat and Europe and the rest of the world would just roll over and play dead.

President Biden has proclaimed that these expensive policies are needed to create jobs in American. This is bazar given that we are currently suffering from a labor shortage.  Manufacturing output in the U.S. is at an all-time high. U.S. employment in manufacturing has gradually declined in recent decades because our workers have become more productive. But that is surely a good thing, resulting in an increase in our standard of living. President Biden has taken steps to lower our standard of living in order to create American job. Take a deep breath. If we don’t significantly increase legal immigration, you can count on the continuation of long waits on the phone to talk to a real service person.

Where does the “Buy American” impulse come from? It seems that some people see American nationalism as keeping everything at home whatever the cost, while I see it as enjoying the fruits of our largely free society to work and innovate and flourish as we each see fit for the benefit of all.

Several years ago, Ito and I celebrated the 4th of July at the American Embassy in Roma at the invitation of our friend David Zimov, at that time Counselor for Economic Affairs at the U.S. Embassy in Rome. It was really a fun event overflowing with hot dogs and hamburgers. While listening to the Marine Band and waving the little American flags we were all given, I noticed that the flag had been Made in China (clearly tagged). I am guessing that the American nationalists I referred to above were appalled. I, on the other hand, was grateful that my tax dollars were being spent as carefully and wisely as possible—on this occasion at least.  https://wcoats.blog/2023/01/22/trade-once-again/

Protecting bank deposits

Following the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank last week there has been considerable discussion about whether and how the regulatory regime might be strengthened (or actually more effectively implemented) to prevent such collapses (yet again) in the future. Raising deposit insurance coverage to 100% of all deposits is being suggested (and was provided ad hoc to SVB and Signature Bank this week). Econ 101: SVB and bank runs – Warren’s space (wcoats.blog)

Insuring all deposits and adopting the Chicago Plan represent two very different approaches to removing all risk of loss to depositors and thus any incentive to run from a bank. In the search for regulatory or market checks on excessive bank risk taking or poor management, the expectation that depositors would carefully monitor the behavior and condition of their banks was never realistic. Thus, removing any financial incentive for such due diligence by raising deposit insurance to cover all deposits would have little to no impact on bank behavior. Such scrutiny by bank shareholders and managers is much more realist and thus important. US bank bankruptcy procedures do not spare shareholders, who in the case of SVB have lost everything. However, more might be done to impose losses on managers of insolvent banks.

Following the bankruptcy of SVB considerable attention has rightly focused on the speed with which facts or rumors of a bank’s weakening financial condition can spread over the Internet. What might have taken weeks as depositors began to line up outside their banks to withdraw their deposits while the funds lasted, now takes minutes, dramatically accelerating the speed with which a bank must try to liquidate enough of its assets to fund the withdrawals.

Full deposit insurance and the Chicago Plan of 100% reserve banking (deposits at the central bank, which are always safe and instantly available) eliminate any incentive for bank runs. But the difference between them deserves more attention. The full deposit insurance approach puts the cost of bailing out the depositors of a failed bank on the rest of the banking system (on the “good” banks) who finance the insurance fund.  The cost of the Chicago Plan, if indeed it is a cost at all rather than a benefit, is the need for banks to fund their credit operations with equity or long-term debt, rather than with potentially volatile deposits. We should move to the Chicago Plan and fully separate money from credit.

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Econ 101: SVB and bank runs

What is a bank run and how can we prevent them? A bank run, as I am sure you all know, is a rush by depositors to withdraw their deposits for fear that the bank will not have the money to give them. But there is a lot to unpack there in order to understand what is going on and how runs might be prevented.

It is important to understand the difference between debt and equity—between lending a specific amount of money with specific terms and investing an amount of money in exchange for a share of the earnings (or losses) of the recipient. When you buy shares in a company, it has no obligation to return your money. If you no longer want to invest in that company, you can sell your shares to someone else or the company might, at its discretion, buy them back. Its failure to “return” your money cannot be the cause of a company’s bankruptcy (take over by creditors to collect what the company is no longer able to return).

The deposits that we make in our banks are a special case of debt finance of whatever the banks do with our money. As we know, they lend much of it to people and companies for one thing or another and invest some in hopefully safe assets like Treasury bills and keep a tiny bit on hand for when you need cash. But the deposit contract says that you have the right to withdraw (or pay to someone else) any or all of it whenever you want to. Thus, banks must keep sufficient liquid assets in order to satisfy such withdrawals by selling them in the market when you demand your money back. The Federal Reserve, our lender of last resort, also has facilities for lending to banks needing cash against the collateral of bank assets.

The difference between illiquidity and insolvency is critical as well. A bank is solvent when the value of its assets match or exceed the value of its liabilities (such as your deposits). But having sufficient good assets doesn’t mean that that bank can always honor your deposit withdrawal demand. That is a question of liquidity. Does the bank have enough of its assets backing your deposit in forms that it can pay out immediately (cash in its vault, deposits at the Federal Reserve that it can transfer to another bank or use to buy cash, or assets it can quickly sell such as t-bills, or credit lines with other banks or the Fed, etc.)?  “The difference between bank liquidity and capital” Thus, even a solvent bank (positive capital) might fail to honor your withdrawal demand if it doesn’t have sufficient liquid assets. “The big bailout-what next?”

Usually, a bank becomes insolvent when more of its loan assets default than the bank has capital to cover such losses. But as we will see in the case of Silicon Valley Bank, insolvency can also result from a decline in the current market value of a “good” asset.  When depositors suspect that their bank might be insolvent, they will withdraw their money while they still can. This tends to use up the bank’s liquid assets compounding the risk of default. As the word spreads the classical bank run takes off (electronically these days rather than long lines outside the bank as in the old days).

The SVB, which specialized in financial services to start-ups and technology companies, enjoyed a huge increase in its deposits over the last four years, increasing from $49 billion in 2018 to $189.2 billion in 2021 dropping back to $175.4 billion at the end of 2022. It invested most of those deposits in “safe” long term government and similar debt. While the default risk for these assets was negligible, the risk of a loss in current market value if market interest rates increased was high. No one will pay the face value of a 3% ten-year bond while current market rates for the same maturity are 4%. The rapid increase in interest rates as the Federal Reserve reversed money growth to fight inflation tanked the current market value of a large share of SVB’s assets making it impossible for it to come up with the cash depositors might demand if they “ran”. That is how runs work. On March 10 SVB was put into receivership.

The original sin of modern banking is financing long term loans/investments with money (demand and savings deposits). Islamic banking, what uses equity investing, is wiser in this regard. During the Savings and Loan crisis in the U.S. in the 1980s and early 90s (financing mortgages with deposits) more than 1000 S&Ls failed when interest rates increased. But in fact, the U.S. bank regulation regime has some good features. While bank risk taking is subject to many, often costly, regulations, the ultimate check on risk taking comes from the knowledge of bank owners that they will lose their entire stake if their bank becomes insolvent. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which oversees America’s deposit insurance scheme, has developed effective bank bankruptcy and resolution procedures that allow it to take over and resolve insolvent banks with barely a ripple. A favorite tool is the so-called purchase and assumption transaction by which a healthy bank buys the assess of the insolvent one and assumes its liabilities (deposits), usually over a weekend. Thousands of insolvent banks have been resolved by the FDIC in the last fifty years.  See “Institutional and Legal Impediments to Efficient Insolvent Bank Resolution and Ways to Overcome Them” by Warren Coats and Arno Liuksilo “Warren Coats-17”

Most bank depositors pay no attention to the financial condition of their bank because their deposits are insured against losses, which until last week had been raised to $250,000. But the government has now implicitly extended such insurance to all deposits via accounting and other tricks, thus removing any remaining check on bank risk taking from all depositors. On Monday, President Biden announced that no depositors in SVB (and Signature Bank of New York) would lose any of their deposits.  Following the banking crisis of 2008, the Dodd-Frank law further strengthened financial sector regulations. The most important and helpful provisions of this 2,300 page law provided for significant increases and strengthening of bank capital requirements.  

The overuse of debt rather than equity financing is a more general weakness in our economy. The IRS should stop subsidizing it. Interest on borrowing is deductible from taxable income while dividends on equity financing are not. While increasing bank capital makes them less run prone, a simpler and easer to regulate approach is to remove the cause of runs all together by eliminating any risk that your bank can’t honor its obligation to return your money on demand. Another few thousand pages of laws and regulations might catch the last mistakes (though it is hard to see why regulators didn’t address the obvious duration risks taken by SVB), but there is an easier, less costly solution. Bank failures result from the mistakes of banks (their owners and managers) and the failure of depositors to more carefully evaluate the soundness of the bank in which they deposit their money. But depositors have little competence to evaluate bank soundness, and why should they be expected to?

Money (bank deposits) should be fully separated from credit. Deposits should not finance loans. Those financing investments should share in its risks (and rewards) via equity financing. “More than decade ago Professor Kotlikoff and [John Goodman] proposed “limited purpose banking” in The New Republic and in Investment News. The idea is that credit market institutions should be intermediaries between savers and investors and should not themselves use depositors’ money to make risky investments.”

When we deposit money in banks for safekeeping and making payments there should never be any doubt about the bank’s ability to return it on demand and thus no reason to “run” on the bank to protect our deposits. This is the essence of the Chicago Plan which would replace so call fractional reserve banking with 100% reserves (deposits at the central bank). When my bank deposit is backed totally by my bank’s deposits at the Fed, I would know with certainty that they were 100% safe and instantly available.  The “Chicago Plan” and New Deal Banking Reform | Levy Economics Institute (levyinstitute.org) Narrow banking schemes have a similar motivation. “A proposal for the feds balance sheet”

The District of Columbia

A foreigner dropping into “The District” from wherever, would be flabbergasted by the local debate over Statehood, home rule, etc. for the District.

The powers of Congress enumerated in Article 1, Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution include the power to govern a federal district:

  • “Clause 17: To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings;”

The Residence Act passed by Congress on July 17, 1790, established what is now called the District of Columbia, or Washington D.C., as the capital of the United States. Maryland and Virginia ceded between them 100 square miles of their territory for this purpose.  Congress moved from its first capital in Philadelphia to Washington in December 1800. On February 27, 1801, 212 years ago today, the so-called Organic Act was approved giving control of the District to Congress “and took away the right of residents to vote in federal elections.” District of Columbia retrocession – Wikipedia

And in 1812 our British friends burned down the White House forcing James Madison to live in what is now the Arts Club of Washington (of which Ito and I are members).

In March 1847, Congress and Virginia’s General Assembly approved the return (“retrocession”) of Virginia’s contribution to the District of Columbia but the retrocession of Maryland’s contribution failed to pass Congress. Turning Maryland’s part of the district into a new state makes no sense to me at all. But neither does Congress’s continued control over all of Maryland’s portion of the District.

The provisions of the Constitution giving Congress legislative power over the lands needed for and occupied by its facilities would be fully met by returning most of the District to Maryland (thus restoring full voting and other citizen rights to its residents). Virginia did it and so can (and should) Maryland.

Saving Social Security

I recently received a petition for my signature to save social security from an expected Republican attack. To save it we must understand what it was meant to be and what it now is and what problems it faces.

Initially the Social Security program was meant to be a savings financed retirement fund to which employers would be required to contribute half of what was deducted from worker paycheck and put in the Social Security Trust Fund (a fully funded life insurance program). This is (or was supposed to be) like our personal IRAs but with the employer contribution (though many employers offer retirement programs for their employees to which they also contribute in addition to Social Security contributions). But from the beginning, current worker/employer contributions to the Trust Fund were used to finance current retiree benefits rather than being saved for the contributor’s future retirement, i.e., it was pay-as-you-go.

Three factors undermined this pay-as-you-go model. First, benefits were indexed to wages rather than inflation and as real wages have raise over time so have benefits. Second, the average life expectance of retirees has increased dramatically. When the Social Security scheme was launched in 1935, life expectancy in the US was a bit under 60 years (the average retiree received SS benefits for only a year or two). It is now 77.3, down a bit from 78.8 in 1919. Third, population growth has slowed and the number of workers taxes for this growing number of retirees has been and will continue to fall fast.  “Saving Social Security”

The simplest, and in my view most sensible, solution to this financing problem is to: a) increase the retirement age at which SS starts paying; b) increase the number of working age immigrates to help pay for the retired; and c) continue to encourage private pensions and IRAs. Unless you are French most of us continued working beyond normal retirement ages because we wanted to continue using our skills longer. We enjoyed what we did for more than just the money.

Adopting the above reforms would not reduce what a retiree SS beneficiary receives each month.  But it would reduce what she receives over her life time because would be retired for fewer years. Some people are calling this increase in the retirement age cutting Social Security.  What ever.

As I have argued elsewhere, I would replace Social Security with a Universal Basic Income.  “Our social safety net”

Trade once again

Everyone understands that without trade they would be dirt poor. If everyone had to be self-sufficient, they would be lucky to survive. It’s almost as obvious that the wider we can trade the more we can specialize in our comparative advantage raising the incomes of everyone. Where many stumble is at their national borders (though within national borders of large countries some regions restrict trade with other national regions to protect otherwise less efficient enterprises thus lowering incomes in general).

Why should trade be restricted across national borders? Three reasons stand out: two legitimate and one not. A potentially legitimate reason concerns national security. Requiring that products necessary for defense be domestically produced, even at greater cost, reduces the risk of supply chain disruptions. The risk is that this excuse is easily abused to the extent that such protection can turn illegitimate or corrupt.

A second legitimate reason also concerns resilience. The most efficient allocation of productive resources must take account of the risks of disruption to supply chains. We buy insurance for many assets and activities, thus incurring a certain cost, to protect our incomes from risks (large or small) of interruption and potentially larger losses. When buying goods or inputs from cheaper producers located far away, we are exposed to larger risks of supply interruptions. American manufacturers, for example, take these risks into account in deciding where to produce and purchase inputs to their products sold in the U.S.

A government bestowed financial favor on a firm or industry (trade protection, industrial policy) is always part of a quid pro quo. The firm delivers favors to the politicians who favor it.  Government protection of otherwise uncompetitive firms increases their viability and profits but at the expense of lower income for the rest of us. Countries that heavily indulge in such protection have suffered lower levels of income. “Trade protection and corruption”

Following World War II, and the establishment of what became the World Trade Organization, barriers to trade (domestic protectionism) were gradually reduced via bilateral and multilateral trade agreements. In the 62 years from 1959 to2021, real United States’ per capita personal income, when measured in constant 2012 dollars to adjust for inflation, increased 297.1%, from $13,971 in 1959 to $55,477 in 2021. This huge increase is the result of increased productivity per worker. But such productivity gains are only possible because of trade (within or across national borders).  “The case for trade”

Weaknesses in government programs to facilitate worker adjustments that are a necessary part of a dynamic, growing economy and other geopolitical factors are undermining the freest and most efficient trade (domestic and global) that our prosperity has depended on. “Geo Economic Fragmentation and the Future of Multilateralism”  “End globalization?”

The Economist magazine has argued that: “One problem [with protectionism and industrial policies] is their extra economic costs. The Economist estimates that replicating the cumulative investments of firms in the global tech-hardware, green-energy and battery industries would cost $3.1trn-4.6trn (3.2-4.8% of global gdp). Reindustrialisation will raise prices, hurting the poor most. Duplicating green supply chains will make it costlier for America and the world to wean themselves off carbon. History suggests that vast amounts of public money could go to waste…. Yet rescuing the global order will require bolder American leadership that once again rejects the false promise of zero-sum thinking. ”  “The destructive new logic that threatens globalisation”

Misinformation and corruption are undermining the basis of our incredible prosperity just when we need to pull together to deal with global warming. We must resist and fight back to restore and preserve our efficient market economies.  They would not exist without trade.