Tag: regulation

Crony Capitalism

The standard of living of the median income family in the United States has risen to heights that could not have been imagined just a hundred years ago ($73,891 in 2017). All other industrial countries have had similar experiences.  “As measured in 2011 U.S. dollars, the global income per person per day in the first year of the Common Era stood at $2. That’s also where it stood when William the Conqueror set sail in 1066 to claim the crown of England…. In 1800, the average income was $2.80. In the 18 centuries that separated the emperorship of Caesar Augustus and the presidency of Thomas Jefferson, per capita income rose by less than 40 percent….

“Then industrialization changed everything. Between 1800 and 1900, GDP per person per day doubled. In other words, income grew over twice as much in one century as it had over the preceding 18 combined. By 2016, the number…in the United States… stood at $145…. In other words, global and American standards of living rose twelve-fold and 24-fold respectively over the course of the last two centuries….  These and other fascinating data are presented by Marian Tupy in: https://humanprogress.org/article.php?p=1906

How was this miracle possible? It resulted from each worker on average becoming dramatically more productive and being able to trade his or her products for the other goods and services he or she wanted. But what was the source of such an amazing increase in productivity?  Workers developed and or were provided with tools and equipment (capital) that made it possible.  These machines, cooperative production structures and worker skills (so called “human capital”) were developed because “capitalists” creating and investing in them had protected property rights in them and shared in the profits from their use. In short, it was because people had an incentive to invent and learn that was lacking in feudal or earlier social structures.  Bill Gates, for example, became a billionaire from selling us the computer products and services that Microsoft invented and produced. We happily paid Microsoft these billions for its tools that greatly enhanced our own productivity in both production, household management, and play. In the win-win world of private property and trade, we gained from Microsoft as much or more than Bill Gates did.

Interestingly, there is more to this story. As industrialization took hold, and the incomes of the lower and middle classes rose, income inequality declined. The monopolies of feudal Lords were eroded.  More recently “global inequality is declining as developing countries catch up with the developed world. Between 1990 and 2017, argues Branko Milanovic from City University of New York, the global Gini coefficient, which measures income inequality among all of the world’s inhabitants, decreased from 0.7 to 0.63” i.e., became more equal (zero equals perfect equality). [Tupy]

In the U.S. after years of gradual decline, the Gini coefficient rose from 0.35 in 1979 to 0.49 in 2018, slightly less than China’s (0.47). What is going on? Though still more equal than the world on average, why is income distribution widening modestly over the last forty years in the U.S.?

A widely held explanation is that industries have become more concentrated and have exploited their quasi monopolistic market power to extract noncompetitive, i.e. monopoly, rents. Two hundred forty-four years ago, Adam Smith wrote that, “People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.” [Wealth of Nations Book I, Chapter X.] What prevents such conspiracies from succeeding is the competition from other firms seeking to exploit these attractive prices. When faced with competition, a person or firm can only profit by satisfying customers better than the competition.

But why have American firms, and those of many other industrial countries, become more concentrated and protected from competition?  Largely via state capture. As he reluctantly increased U.S. military spending as the “Cold War” heated up, President Dwight D. Eisenhower worried that it would be hard to avoid a mutually self-serving relationship between the government paying the bills and the defense industry supplying the goods. In his famous Farewell Address on January 16, 1961, Eisenhower warned that: “In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes.”

When government becomes involved or increases its involvement with private firms, the door (and the revolving door) is opened for firms to exploit the relationship to their advantage. It is not just the military-industrial complex (or the military-industrial-congressional complex as Eisenhower stated it in the first draft of his Farewell Address) that enjoys government favor and protection. President Trump’s tariffs on imported steel and aluminum are not for the benefit of American’s generally but are protectionist favors to America’s uncompetitive steel and aluminum firms. Protectionism is just another word for corruption.

Some products and industries need to be regulated to protect consumers and insure honesty and transparency. But larger firms increasingly accept, if not welcome, overly burdensome regulations because they are better able to devote resources to complying with them and thus absorbing their cost than are smaller firms. Such regulations protect them from competition from new, smaller firms. Professional licensing has increasingly been used to protect professionals from hairdressers to real estate agents to lawyers from competitors thus enjoying higher fees than would result in a more competitive market for their services.

The quasi monopoly rents firms are able to extract as the result of government protection against competition grow with the size of government involvement with the economy. The increase in income inequality (a reflection of shrinking competition) of recent decades (the increase in America’s Gini coefficient) have followed the large increases in the size of government, whether measured by expenditures, employment, or regulations.  https://wcoats.blog/2008/09/06/how-to-measure-the-size-of-government/

“• In 1900 the federal government consumed less than 5 percent of total output.

  • In 1950 the federal government consumed roughly 15 percent of total output.
  • In 1992 the federal government consumed almost 25 percent of total output.”

https://fee.org/articles/the-growth-of-government-in-america/

Bernie Sanders, a self-proclaimed Socialist, and Elizabeth Warren, a self-proclaimed defender of capitalism (I am not joking), argue that to fix industrial concentration, to prevent or unwind monopolies, the government needs to be bigger and more active in the economy. This is backward in terms of logic and experience. I don’t question that overwhelmingly most public servants work for the government out of the desire to serve the public. However, the interface between government and the private sector creates opportunities and incentives (resisted by most I am sure) for corruption. By corruption I mean the exploitation of government regulations and contracts to reduce market competition for (i.e. to protect) established firms.

Political lobbying by firms and trade organizations can provide useful industry input to congressional legislation or executive rule making but it is generally the prospective of established firms rather than of potential competitors or the general public. “Since the 1970s, there has been explosive growth in the lobbying industry, particularly in Washington DC.  By 2011, one estimate of overall lobbying spending nationally was $30+ billion dollars. An estimate of lobbying expenses in the federal arena was $3.5 billion in 2010, while it had been only $1.4 billion in 1998.” “Lobbying_in_the_United_States – A_growing_billion_dollar_business”

In 2010 the Supreme Court ruled in a 5-4 decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, “that the free speech clause of the First Amendment prohibits the government from restricting independent expenditures for political communications by corporations, including nonprofit corporations, unions and other associations.” “Citizens_United_v._FEC – Super_PACs”  This opened the door to direct corporate and union “donations” to political candidates and parties, providing a powerful tool in achieving government cooperation with what these groups consider their special interest.

The competitiveness, and whatever the lack of it contributes to income inequality, of American businesses will not be served by expanding the government’s role in the economy, quite the opposite. Competition is rarely stifled by natural market phenomena. Rather it is much more often blocked or restrained by government regulations that favor the established, dominant firms, who are able to gain the government’s favor. The political forces of expanding government regulation and interference in the economy promote every increasing state capture by dominant firms.  Crony capitalism will be the death of the real thing if it is not continuously resisted. As we should all well know, the price of liberty is eternal vigilance.

New tools require new rules?

A hammer can hit a nail on the head, or it can hit you (or your enemy) on the head. Most, if not all, tools have multiple uses, some good and some bad.  Societies adopt rules to promote the beneficial uses of technologies and discourage harmful uses. New tools/technologies necessitate a discussion of what the rules for their proper uses should be. We are now having that discussion for the uses of social media to promote and propagate ideas and information (some true and some false).

Free speech is revered in America for good reason. Like many other aspects of our preference for self-reliance (personal freedom), it requires that we take responsibility for sorting out what is true from what is false rather than giving over that task to government (and whoever leads it at the time). This can be a challenging task.  We must sort out who we trust to help us. Those of you my age will appreciate that we no longer have Walter Cronkite, and Huntley and Brinkley to help us filter real from fake news.

Our commitment to free speech is so fundamental to the character of America that I have written about it a number of times. https://wcoats.blog/2012/09/14/american-values-and-foreign-policy/    https://wcoats.blog/2012/09/15/further-thoughts-on-free-speech/ https://wcoats.blog/2012/09/29/freedom-of-speech-final-thoughts-for-a-while-at-least/

Various social media platforms present us with another new tool and the need to sort out how best to use it. The answer(s) will take the form of social conventions and government regulations. It is important to get the balance right.

Facebook, Twitter, Google, YouTube, Instagram, Tiktok and other platforms do not generate or provide content. They provided a very convenient and powerful means for you and me to share the content we produce. What responsibility should Mark Zuckerberg, Jack Dorsey, Larry Page, Sergey Brin, etc. have for regulating the content we post to their own platforms, which are after all private. As you saw in my earlier blogs on this subject, publishing and broadcasting our words are limited when they endanger or slander others. But these limits do not and should not limit our advocacies for policies and political beliefs as I am doing now.

The big issue today is fake news (out right lies). If you create or repeat lies, you must be responsible for what you do (but we don’t generally punish lying unless under oath). You are allowed, for example, to state on Twitter or Facebook that you believe Obama was born in Kenya despite thorough documentation that he was born in Hawaii. Perhaps you are gullible enough to actually believe it though it is false. But should Facebook and other platforms have a responsibility to block clearly fake news? What if their own biases lead them to block more Democratic Party “fake news”, or vice versa?

As a private company Facebook can more or less do what it wants but it has a strong business/financial incentive to build a reputation of fairness and to provide a platform that attracts as many users as possible. Here are their rules from their website:

“To see the full list and learn more about our policies, please review the Facebook Community Standards.  Here are a few of the things that aren’t allowed on Facebook:

  • Nudity or other sexually suggestive content.
  • Hate speech, credible threats or direct attacks on an individual or group.
  • Content that contains self-harm or excessive violence.
  • Fake or impostor profiles.
  • Spam.”

The debate at the moment is focused on political ads. Facebook has said that it will not fact check political ads and Tweeter has said that it will not run them at all.  A Washington Post editorial stated the issue this way: “Politicians should, for the most part, be able to lie on Facebook, just as anyone else is, and the public should be able to hold leaders to account. But that’s a different question from whether politicians should be able to pay to have their lies spread, based on unprecedentedly precise behavioral data, to the voters who are most likely to believe their lies.”  “Google’s reply has been more nuanced. The company will limit the criteria campaigns can use to “microtarget” ads to narrow audiences based on party affiliation or voter record. The aim is to increase accountability by letting more people see ads….”  “Tech-firms-under-fire-on-political-ads”

No one, thank heavens, wants the government to vet ads for truthfulness. Some facts are obvious and some are less so. The potential danger to free speech is illustrated by Singapore’s “fake news” law.  Singapore claimed that a post by fringe news site States Times Review (STR) contained ‘scurrilous accusations’.  Giving in to the law, Facebook attached a note to the STR post that said it “is legally required to tell you that the Singapore government says this post has false information”.  “Facebook’s addition was embedded at the bottom of the original post, which was not altered. It was only visible to social media users in Singapore.” https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-50613341

However, the government should provide the broad framework of a platforms responsibilities.  For example, the U.S. government requires transparency of who pays for ads in print and TV ads. The same requirement should be imposed on Internet political ads. To qualify for Facebook’s say whatever you want in a political ad policy, the candidate being supported should be required to attach his/her name as approving the ad. Limiting the use of micro targeted ads broadens the exposure and thus discipline on truth telling.  According to The Economist: “To the extent that these moves make it harder for politicians to say contradictory things to different groups of voters without anybody noticing, they are welcome. “Big-tech-changes-the-rules-for-political-adverts”

Knowing what sources of news to trust is no trivial matter. Knowing the source is helpful. Rather than fact checking the content of posts, Facebook attaches an easily viewed statement of the source.  Establishing standards for and establishing boundaries between categories of posts sound easier than they really are, but insuring transparency of who has posted something should play an important role. Flagging questionable sources, without changing the content of a post, as Facebook does, is also helpful. I hope that the discussion of the best balance (and not every platform needs to adopt the same approach) will be constructive.

Net Neutrality

The issue of net neutrality is almost as complicated as the Internet (the network of networks) itself. As with so many topics, the debate over how best to maximize the development of and benefits from the Internet (email, World Wide Web, and all of the rest) broadly divides between those who support prescriptive rules to guide and govern its operations and those who support a more permissive role for the government stepping in only to correct actual problems. To overstate it a bit, it divides the statists from the free marketers.

The history of what we now call the Internet is quite amazing. History of the Internet. Though governments provided the seed money that got it going (in the U.S. it was the Department of Defense’s ARPANET and later the National Science Foundation’s CSNET and in the U.K. it was the National Physical Laboratory), the U.S. gradually stepped back and allowed the unregulated development of commercial and private uses of the connectivity that was developing and allowed private Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to develop the gateways (access) for almost all users (both content providers and consumers) to the Internet. This policy was imbedded in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 signed by President Clinton. That legislation, affirmed that the policy of the United States was: “to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet . . . unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”

From the beginning of its break away from its narrow military and scientific uses, all involved in the Internet’s development were committed to it being free and open. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) promulgated guidelines to preserve this principle in November 2011. “The FCC’s rules focus on four primary issues:

  • Transparency. Fixed and mobile broadband providers must disclose the network management practices, performance characteristics, and terms and conditions of their broadband services;
  • No blocking. Fixed broadband providers may not block lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices; mobile broadband providers may not block lawful Web sites, or block applications that compete with their voice or video telephony services; and
  • No unreasonable discrimination. Fixed broadband providers may not unreasonably discriminate in transmitting lawful network traffic.
  • Reasonable network management. ISPs may engage in reasonable network management to maintain a high quality of service for broadband Internet access.” FCC Openness Principles

In this permissive environment the Internet flourished, developing in directions and ways no one could have imagined only a few decades earlier. “But two years ago, the federal government’s approach suddenly changed. The FCC, on a party- line vote, decided to impose a set of heavy-handed regulations upon the Internet. It decided to slap an old regulatory framework called “Title II”—originally designed in the 1930s for the Ma Bell telephone monopoly—upon thousands of Internet service providers, big and small. It decided to put the federal government at the center of the Internet.” Ajit Pai’s Newseum Internet Freedom Speech

What happened? Were the principles of an open Internet with fair access to all suddenly being violated or under threat in 2015? Is the proposed return to the status quo before 2015 really a threat to the principles of net neutrality?

Like all other economic activities, every aspect of the Internet costs money that someone has to pay. Those who built and maintain the Internet Backbone (NTT, Cogent, GTT, etc.), the facilities and networks of the ISPs (Verizon, AT&T, Comcast, etc.), and the content providers (Netflix, Facebook, Snapchat, HBO, etc.) did so to make money (or at the very least to cover their costs). We all know about content and service providers who thought first about how to attract users and only later how to get them to pay (e.g., Facebook and Amazon). They gradually developed their business models over time and some worked and others didn’t. What worked best (most cost efficient use of Internet resources, etc.) was not and could not have been foreseen in the beginning of the Internet’s development. Had the regulations imposed in 2015 been imposed two decades earlier, it is very unlikely we would be enjoying the Web we have today. Freezing or constraining the business models of the key players with very prescriptive regulations is neither necessary nor wise. As Mike Montgomery put it in The Hill: “The digital world moves at the speed of light. To slow that growth to the speed of bureaucracy would have serious negative effects on the burgeoning tech industry which is creating jobs faster than almost any other industry out there.” (see the link below)

Markets function best when profits are maximized by providing the best service at the lowest cost. In such cases, which is the general case, incentives are aligned, i.e. what best serves the supplier/producer also best serves the general public/consumers. Two forces operate to insure that the Internet is open to all. The first was a broad public consensus that the Internet should be open to all on fair terms (no discrimination against—filtering out or blocking—any one or any idea or point of view). The second is that discriminating in any way blocks some customers and thus reduced profits. The incentives for ISPs to provide fair access to all aligned with the public’s expectations of and desires to have fair access.

Ideology enters the discussion when people disagree over the meaning of fairness. Some people think that some classes of users (the poor, IT startups, etc.) should have the cost of their use of the Internet paid by someone else (tax payers, cross subsidies from larger, established users/suppliers, etc.). ISPs, the gateways to the Internet, have no profit incentive to provide such subsidies. Fairness for most economists is when each user pays the marginal cost of their use (plus a small profit margin).

The primary legitimate concern with respect to the net neutrality I want to see is that industry consolidation has reduced the number of ISPs to the point that over half of the country has only one (i.e. no) choice. The only competition in some areas comes from your cell phone plan. Thus there is a legitimate concern with the possibility that an ISP might charge different prices for fundamentally the same service and that those ISPs that are beginning to produce their own content might favor it over competitors’ content with faster lanes or worse.

There were indeed a few problems during the long era of light touch regulation prior to 2015. Verizon’s dispute with Netflix over download speeds and AT&T’s blocking Facetime video but not Skype on iPhones (not even an Internet issue), for example. This occurred before and were resolved before the 2015 FCC regulations on the basis of existing legislation. Excessive concentration and abuses of market power can be and have been dealt with via existing anti trust laws and state and individual civil suits.

The United States has generally allowed markets to develop fairly freely, only applying regulations to deal with real problems when they occur. I represented the IMF as an observer at a G10 Deputies Working Group on E-money meeting at the BIS in Basel Switzerland in December of 1996. The G10 Deputies are the Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors of the ten largest economies in the world. The meeting was chaired by a young Tim Geithner, then the Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Monetary and Fiscal Policy in the U.S. Treasury Department. The meeting was to determine the regulatory approach to the prospective emergence of Electronic Money, now referred to as Cyber money. We considered reports on developments to date and took the wise decision to stand back and watch how things developed before formulating regulatory advice.

More recently the Federal Reserve’s Faster Payments Task Force project and the Federal Reserve’s cautious approach to bitcoin and other digital currencies reflects a similar attitude. That attitude, to repeat, is that no one knows for sure the direction that the development of new technologies will take in the search for maximizing their benefits thus profits. Government can at best play a supportive role of providing a flexible legal and regulatory framework within which new products and services can be explored. If problems arise, the government can review with consumers and producers how best to deal with them. The approach to regulating bitcoin and other digital currencies is still evolving.

A counter example to the above enlightened approach is the U.S. approach to Anti Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT), which has imposed enormous regulatory costs on payments of all sorts with no discernable benefits.

Those who believe that private sector behavior and the development and use of technology can be carefully and successfully regulated by government suffer what I have called hubris in other contexts. See, for example: https://works.bepress.com/warren_coats/38/. Nonetheless, in the case of so called net neutrality greater certainty about the legal and regulatory environment in which the Internet must operate would help further its development and evolution, especially if the light touch regulation under which it has developed is restored. Congress should write net neutrality into law.

An excellent discussion of these issues can be heard in this podcast on the Future of Internet regulation with FCC chairman Ajit Pai

Economics Lesson: Income Inequality

French economist Thomas Piketty’s bestselling book on wealth inequality, “Capital in the Twenty-First Century,” has become the focus of a debate over increasing income inequality in the US and many other countries. I have not read the book, which apparently presents lots of interesting data, the use and interpretation of which is also being debated. A recent paper on Piketty worth reading is by a young PhD candidate at MIT: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2015/03/19/meet-the-26-year-old-whos-taking-on-thomas-pikettys-ominous-warnings-about-inequality/

The issue that interests me in this note is the great divide in attitudes toward inequality and thus the policies proposed to address it. Some people think income inequality, or at least too much of it, is bad per se. Thus taxing the rich and redistributing the proceeds to middle and lower income families is the solution. For me, and many others, the issue is whether the wealthy (to simplify) earned their income fair and square (to be explained below) and is thus a just reward for their contributions to the economy providing an important incentive for their efforts. To the extent that they have not (monopoly power, government favors, etc.) the solution is to attack and remove the policies and impediments to competitive markets that made their exorbitant incomes possible.

If it is not desirable (fair) for some people to be wealthy when others are not, the collateral damage from income redistribution may be a price worth paying. This collateral damage is well known. If the wealthy cannot keep the income they get from their efforts and/or from their investments in innovative technology, miracle drugs, or the companies that produce what we want and provide our jobs, they will reduce their efforts and investments, thus reducing the income available to us all and available to redistribute. At the other end—recipient—of the redistribution, if the programs through which middle and lower income families receive such income are not well designed they will reduce incentives to work and or misallocate resources further reducing the income available to redistribute. The policy issues become how to design such programs and what is the optimal balance between the “good” effect of more equal income distribution and the bad effects of lower income.

In my book of moral principles, disapproval of the higher incomes of others per se is due to envy, and envy is not a virtue and should be resisted. There is some evidence that many people care both about their absolute income and their income relative to others. Such envy should be discouraged in my view. My standard of morality in this area is that people deserve what they fairly earn but this requires an understanding and agreement on what income is fair. Economists have a straightforward definition of “fair” income. Profits (revenue in excess of costs) earned without artificial government help (subsidies, regulations that keep out or discourage competitors, or state sanctioned monopolies) are fair because they are the (ultimately) competitive return on providing something people value. With competition, profits will be normal, what economists call a normal rate of return on investment.

Unless the government interferes, excessive profits (those above a normal rate of return) will ultimately be competed away as others enter the field to grab some of the high return. While the inventor and developer of a new technology or product may enjoy a quasi monopoly return initially, as long as there are no artificial impediments to competition, i.e. as long as the monopoly is contestable, returns will ultimately become normal. George Will provides some relevant and interesting cases drawn from a new book by John Tamny. “With the iPod, iPhone and iPad, unique products when introduced, Jobs’ Apple created monopolies. But instead of raising their prices, Apple has cut them because ‘profits attract imitators and innovators.’ Which is one reason why monopolies come and go.” “Since 2000, the price of a 50-inch plasma TV has fallen from $20,000 to $550.” “Henry Ford doubled his employees’ basic wage in 1914, supposedly to enable them to buy Fords. Actually, he did it because in 1913 annual worker turnover was 370 percent. He lowered labor costs by reducing turnover and the expense of constantly training new hires.” http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-income-inequality-benefits-everybody/2015/03/25/1122ee02-d255-11e4-a62f-ee745911a4ff_story.html

There are many examples of profits that are not normal or contestable, which by definition are unfair. Those on my side of this issue would look for the government favors or interferences that made them possible and seek to remove them. There is no doubt, for example, that US monetary and regulatory policies have made possible lopsided returns from one-sided risk taking by Wall Street (the moral hazard of tax payer bail outs when excessive bank risk taking goes wrong). These policies need to be reformed in order to make the economy fairer and more efficient. See my Letter from the Editorial Board in the next issue of the Cayman Financial Review.

A very large political/policy battlefield in America today is between those who wish to redistribute income to make it more equal and those who want to make income distribution more equal by reducing or removing the economic rents generated by excessive and inappropriate government regulations and subsidies. They are each motivated by dramatically different philosophies and conceptions of what is fair and what is good. We might call these positions “egalitarianism” and “capitalism.” The motivation of an egalitarian to redistribute income from the rich to the poor is dramatically different than the desire of virtually all American’s to provide what Ronald Reagan called an adequate social safety net for the truly disadvantaged and those who have fallen off the ladder. I am on the side of capitalism.

FREE MARKETS UBER ALLES

World per capita income didn’t change much from the time of Christ to the founding of the United States ($444 to $650 in 1990 dollars), a period of 1,790 years. But in the following 320 years it jumped to $8,080. And about half of that jump came over the last 50 years. What explains this fairly recent explosion of well being? Many things, of course, but central to this explosion of wealth was trade. Only when people could specialize, which requires relying on others to produce part of what they need or want, i.e. to trade, was it possible to dramatically increase the productivity of individuals. The prospect of selling to others also carried the incentive to innovate and develop new technologies, etc.

Trading requires some level of trust in the person you are trading with and mutual acceptance of the rules of the game (contracts). This is relatively easy when you trade with your neighbors and fellow villagers face to face. But as trade extended over longer distances—as it expanded from personal to impersonal dealings— the development of trust became more challenging but no less essential. Product standardization, for example, allowed even greater efficiency and productivity but also facilitated the development of trust in the quality of what we are buying. Companies invested in building and preserving their reputations, which became associated with brand names. As trade expanded, the need for trust was satisfied in more innovative ways.

In today’s rapidly expanding Internet world, where virtually anything under the sun (virtual or real) can be traded via the impersonal Internet, the old brand name reputation approach to establishing trust continues to be useful. Thus we trust the level of quality of products marketed by Sears, or Nieman Marcus on their website to match what we find in their physical locations. However, “the customer review” is rapidly becoming an important source of trust, whether looking for a plumber, a restaurant, a hotel room, or buying a new car.

Government’s have long facilitated trade via providing security (Feudal Lords providing Sheriffs to hunt down highway robbers) and enforcement of contracts. At some point governments began to think that they could establish (or replace) trust more effectively than did competitive markets by imposing regulations to inform or protect consumers. Standard product information, for example, the contents and their nutritional values on the labels of food products, help consumers decide which product best meets their needs. Licensing practitioners of various professions—from cab drivers to physicians—became a widespread form of vetting minimum professional competence or standards. In many if not most professions the regulators tended to be captured by the industry they regulated resulting in protection of the practitioners from competition rather than protection of the customers from poorly trained service providers. Medical doctors fought, often successfully for a long time, competition from providers of alternative medical services (chiropractors, acupuncturists, Internet medical service providers, etc.). Licensed taxi companies obtained exclusive rights to serve specific areas and limit their number in order to boost fares in the name of consumer protection.

The medallions required to operate a taxi in New York City are a famous example of a government created monopoly. The following is from the website of the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission announcing the auction of 89 medallions on May 2, 2008:

New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC) Commissioner/Chairman Matthew W. Daus has determined that the Minimum Upset (Bid) Price for each of the 43 available lots of two Minifleet (Corporate) Accessible Medallions that will be auctioned on May 2, 2008 will be $700,000. One Individual Accessible Medallion will likewise be available for bid on that date at a Minimum Upset Price, also set by the Chairman, of $189.000, as will two Individual Alternative-Fuel Medallions at a Minimum Upset Price of $300,000.

The Minimum Upset Price is the minimum amount that will be considered valid. The highest valid bids will be named apparent winners.

Such systems of licensing are meant to insure minimum quality of service (both of the car and of the driver). They are meant to establish trust on the part of customers that when a yellow car pulls up, he will not over charge or rape or rob you. These issues are explored in an interesting paper by Christopher Koopman, Matthew Mitchell, and Adam Thierer: “The Sharing Economy and Consumer Protection Regulation: The Case for Policy Change” Mercatus Center, George Mason University

Click to access Koopman-Sharing-Economy.pdf

“Under the traditional ‘public interest theory’ of regulation, regulation is sought to protect consumers from externalities, inadequate competition, price gouging, asymmetric information, unequal bargaining power, and a host of other perceived ‘market failures’.”

Unfortunately, as economists Mark Steckbeck and Peter J. Boettke observe, regulators often ignore ‘the dynamism of markets and the incentive mechanism driving entrepreneurs to discover ways to ameliorate problems associated with market exchange.’” page 6

“Writing in 1920, Arthur C. Pigou cautioned against contrasting ‘the imperfect adjustments of unfettered private enterprise with the best adjustment that economists in their studies can imagine.’ Instead, he noted that in the real world, policymakers may not implement policy as scholars think they ought to: For we cannot expect that any public authority will attain, or will even whole-heartedly seek, that ideal. Such authorities are liable alike to ignorance, to sectional pressure and to personal corrup¬tion by private interest. A loud-voiced part of their constituents, if organised for votes, may easily outweigh the whole.” Page 7

“Because rent-seeking is used to contrive exclusive privileges rather than to create value for customers, these efforts cost society forgone productive opportunities. To compound the problem, rent-seeking changes the way people allocate their talents. Rather than keeping a focus on devising new and innovative ways to create value, entrepreneurs turn their efforts toward devising new ways to acquire these regulatory privileges.” Page 10

So how has NYC’s medallion system worked? Ask a New Yorker. In 2006 there were only 12,799 licensed taxicabs in New York City, compared with 21,000 in 1931, when the city had about 1 million fewer inhabitants.

Koopman, et al, explore the implication of the choice (or mix) between market and government regulation for the area of what they call the “sharing economy.” The trading facilitated by Craigslist, Uber, and Airbnb has existed for centuries, but the use of the Internet by some clever entrepreneurs has transformed the business model.

Most of us in years past have taken advantage of a limousine driver between official jobs passing by slowly and offering a relatively cheap fare. Unauthorized drivers hang around airports and Theaters to pick up extra fares illegally. My favorite experiences were in the former Soviet Union in the first few years after its collapse. Most everyone wanted free markets but didn’t have a very clear idea how they were organized. We came to realize that virtually any car on the road was potentially an informal taxi. We could flag down almost any car and if we could communicate where we wanted to go and agree on a price, we had a ride. Uber has provided a high tech means of connecting such drivers with customers. “The company says it is not a transport or taxi service; it is a technology company whose product is not car rides but the phone application used to arrange them. Its UberX service relies on partnerships with thousands of independent contractors who use their own vehicles. Drivers find passengers using Uber’s phone app and then remit a percentage of the fare to the company.” uber-pressures-regulators-by-mobilizing-riders-and-hiring-vast-lobbying-network/2014/12/13/Washington Post

But what about trust? Those of you who have used Uber have probably experienced, as I have, an easier, faster, more polite, and cheaper ride. But how can we trust that the car will be safe and the driver competent and honest? The success of Uber and other web based services rests on their being able to satisfy these concerns. Will the dictates of market success do a better job than government regulation in satisfying these customer concerns?

“Reputation systems are arguably the unsung heroes of the social web. In some form or another, they are an integral part of most of today’s social web applications.” Chrysanthos Dellarocas, “Designing Reputation Systems for the Social Web,” in The Reputation Society: How Online Opinions Are Reshaping the Offline World, ed. Hassan Masum and Mark Tovey (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011), 3. To gain and keep the public’s trust, Uber has established internal standards for the private drivers and their cars that it signs up to connect with customers through Uber. The failure of any driver or car to live up to those standards (and they have several car types) hurts Uber’s reputation and thus its bottom line. It has a strong incentive to get it right. Uber also uses easy to provide customer reviews of each ride experience as do a growing number of web based trading serves.

But what about dishonest reviewers, perhaps working for a competitor (the world is a harsh and cynical place)? The presence of dishonest people lowers the standard of living in any society whatever its system of government or economy. Societies heavily dominated by honest people, are more prosperous. But some people will be dishonest and we need ways to deal with them and minimize their damage. Waze, the very popular GPS based car destination app, provides up to the minute information on traffic conditions on your route provided by users on the spot. It harnesses the desire of most people to be helpful. The information provided by users (their reviews, if you will) is rated for accuracy by other users (in the form of an easily delivered “thank you”). I have no doubt that services traded via the Internet will continue to explore better ways of establishing trust in the products and services traded there.

The recent alleged rape of a young woman in New Delhi, India by an Uber driver raises this issue in a dramatic way that the rape of a young woman in Fort Lauderdale two months earlier by a Yellow cab driver didn’t seem to. A foolish, careless comment by an Uber official about how he might use travel information on Uber’s customers, also raises questions about the safety and uses of such information. Are these problems better handled by regulation or by market competition?

The answer in my view is that the government should provide the foundation for trade provided by contract law and its enforcement, and minimal requirements that are generally applicable (a driver’s license and appropriate insurance). But the Uber’s of the world should be required by free competition to prove themselves and their service to the satisfaction of their potential customers rather than to regulators. If you want to know the standards of safety Uber has set for its self as it seeks customers, check its website, for example: http://blog.uber.com/driverscreening.

Liberal societies vs top down (centrally planned) societies

Michelle Obama is absolutely correct to criticize food served in many school cafeterias as contributing to an epidemic of obesity. I grew up knowing that white bread, especially enriched white bread, was bad for me. My mother, who like all mothers loved her children and wanted them to be healthy, had read every word of Adelle Davis three times over. Moreover, compared to whole wheat and multigrain breads, white bread has no taste. So why are some kids today—fat kids no doubt—throwing whole wheat bread and fruit in the trash? “Michelle Obama’s school lunch agenda faces backlash from some school nutrition officials” WP/2014/05/29/

I believe it is ignorance, which the First Lady wishes to help overcome, and rebellion. The ignorance is a bad thing to be over come, and the rebellion, if that is what it is, is fundamentally a good thing—resistance to being dictated to from above. If loving mothers and their children understood the importance of nutritious food to their well-being, do we really believe they would throw it in the trash? These are children we are talking about, who must be taught everything they know. If on the other hand, the government and school administrators simply try to impose healthier food on them, they will resent having their candy taken away from them and will rebel.

This all speaks directly to a frequent theme of mine—the sanctity of the individual vs. the power of the state. If the government thinks it knows better than Johnny and Betty what is good for them to eat, what should it do? The top down, central planning mentality calls for better food standards imposed on schools. After all, pizzas etc. are cheaper and easier to prepare as well as more fun to eat and the government shouldn’t allow these shortsighted considerations to dominate. Respect for individuals, even children, suggests a very different approach. It suggests improved education (the same arguments I have made against the war on drugs). If mothers, and through them their children, understood better what food was good for them and the implications of eating or not eating healthier food, most would choose it. The companies that make it are interested in selling their products and if there is demand for healthier food, then that is what they will make money producing.

Cyprus: Bailing in and capital controls

Three European countries with oversized banking sectors have suffered major bank failures. Two of them are in the Euro Zone (Ireland and Cyprus) and one has its own currency (Iceland). Iceland and Cyprus imposed temporary capital controls, while Ireland did not. Iceland imposed losses on the foreign depositors in its large, failed banks while Ireland, under EU pressure bailed out everyone (even bond holders) except the shareholders.

The jargon used to describe much of this—“bail outs,” “bail ins,” “haircuts,” “good bank bad bank splits,” etc.—can be confusing. In this note I attempt to clarify the key concepts and their importance via the examples of Iceland, Ireland and Cyprus.

Market discipline vs. supervision and regulation

Incentives always matter. Banks, like any other business, are in business to make money. But the amount of risk they take (more risk more return—ON AVERAGE) depends on who regulates their behavior. Fundamentally, the market can regulate bank risk taking—by the willingness of investors to lend to banks and of depositors to place their money there—or the government can.

The last century has seen a steady shift away from market regulation toward government regulation. Deposit insurance is an important factor contributing to that shift by removing any concern by smaller depositors of the condition of their bank. Thus deposit insurance requires a substitution of the due diligence that used to be performed by small depositors with increased government regulation of bank risk taking. In the United States, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) provides much of that supervision and regulation.

However, increasingly countries became unwilling to allow banks to fail. While shareholders might be wiped out when a bank became insolvent (i.e., when the value of its assets fell below that of its deposits and other liabilities), country after country have “bailed out” all other bank creditors, including uninsured depositors. Bailing out depositors and other creditors means giving taxpayers’ money to the bank to make up for its losses and thus cover its liabilities (other than shareholders).  For large, “systemically important” banks (meaning banks whose failure could cause fatal losses in other banks or firms), most countries are not willing to let them fail at all, thus bailing out shareholders as well in order to allow the banks to continue to operate. Hence the problem of banks that are “too big to fail.” Bailing out uninsured depositors made deposit insurance redundant and pointless. Market discipline was pushed aside all together. The safety and soundness of banks came to rest almost completely on the adequacy of regulations and the skills of supervisors. Bank owners, the only ones who care any more, now have a financial incentive to take big risks for potential big gains. If they lose, as they do from time to time, the government, i.e., tax payer, will pick up the bill.

It is desirable to shift more of the discipline of bank risk taking back to the market by convincingly putting bondholders and large, uninsured depositors at risk of loss if their bank becomes insolvent. They have a financial incentive to get it right that supervisors do not.

Resolution of insolvent banks

Best practice when a bank becomes insolvent is to resolve it quickly and fully and to put a large part of the cost of its losses on uninsured creditors (shareholders, bond holders and uninsured depositors in that order).  Normal company bankruptcy can take the form of shutting down, locking the doors, and selling off anything of value (normally taking a few years) and distributing the proceeds to the creditors in the order of the legal priority of their claims. It is a transparent and objective, but slow process. In many instances the highest value for a failing company is obtained by selling it whole or in part to another company that is able to run it more efficiently. The recent bankruptcy of Sara Lee and sale of its best products to other companies is an example.

The bankruptcy and resolution of an insolvent bank is more challenging because of the ease with which depositors can run when they sense trouble. Thus the weekend sale of such banks in whole or in part to another bank is the norm for small or medium-sized banks in the U.S.  The good bank bad bank split, as occurred recently in Cyprus, is a recent example. Laiki became the bad bank that was closed and is being liquidated and the Bank of Cyprus became the good bank. After wiping out its shareholders and bondholders and administering a large haircut to the uninsured depositors, it acquired the insured deposits of Laiki and an equivalent value of good Laiki assets. Such bank resolutions, which freeze depositors’ funds only for very short periods (a few days), require special bankruptcy laws for tailored for banks. As the surviving good bank must continue to operate with little to no interruption, more judgment and uncertainty is involved in valuing the assets that it acquires from the bad bank.

It is instructive to look more closely at the resolution process used in Cyprus. First, the two major banks in Cyprus, Laiki and Bank of Cyprus, incurred large losses on their holdings of Greek sovereign debt when all banks were required to “voluntarily” write off about 75% of its value. The magnitude of this loss was clear and well-known from October 2011. The only issue was who would pay for it, the Cypriot government, the EU, or the creditors (depositors) of these banks. Depositor’s obviously thought that they would be bailed out (i.e. that the Cypriot government or the EU would pay for the losses of Laiki and Bank of Cyprus) as had been all depositors in Europe before them, though the deposit liabilities of the Bank of Cyprus fell from 37.1 billion Euros at the end of 2010 to 32.1 billion at the end of 2011 to 28 billion at the end of September 2012 (the latest available).

After a terrible false start in which the Cyprus government attempted to pay for the losses by levying a wealth tax on all depositors (of good and bad banks), Cyprus choose to impose the entire loss on the respective banks’ owners and creditors, and to undertake the good bank bad bank split briefly described above (see my earlier blog on the subject: https://wcoats.wordpress.com/2013/03/27/the-cyprus-game-changer/). This was a dramatic change in approach that shifted the risk of bank behavior back to uninsured depositors. Many were shocked.

This approach is relatively easy for known losses and should have been undertaken a year and a half earlier when the Greek debt write off occurred. But many of the losses a bank has or is incurring are less clear. Of the currently delinquent mortgage loans, for example, how many will actually default and what will be the market value of the mortgage collateral. The recapitalization of insolvent Irish banks suffered from underestimation of the ultimate losses resulting in three separate injections of state money to recapitalize them, which weakened market confidence in the process. In part to deal with this uncertainty but to restore market confidence in the solvency of the surviving good bank (Bank of Cyprus), known losses were totally written off while the additional but uncertain further losses were covered by replacing an equivalent amount of deposits with equity claims on the BOC (shares). If losses turn out to be smaller than was provided for, these claims will have value and will thus reduce the size of the initial haircuts to deposits.

So “bailing out” a bank refers to covering its losses with someone else’s money (tax payers somewhere) and “bailing in” a bank’s creditors refers to covering its losses (after its capital is used up) with bondholders and uninsured depositors’ money via “haircuts” (writing off part of their value). The former “socializes” losses while leaving any gains from successful bets to the private owners and creates a serious moral hazard leading to excessive risk taking by banks. The latter makes depositors financially responsible for excessive bank losses and restores the market’s discipline of bank risk taking. This is very desirable as market discipline is more effective than regulatory discipline, but the dramatic change in the implicit rules in Cyprus was very large and abrupt.

Capital controls

As part of their respective bank resolutions, both Iceland and Cyprus imposed temporary capital controls, which, however, served very different purposes. Iceland has its own currency while Cyprus is part of the Euro zone.

At the time of Iceland’s banking crisis in 2008 its three largest banks had assets 11 times the total annual output of the economy. About half of their assets (largely loans) and their funding were outside of Iceland. Landsbanki, for example, funding its lending with roughly the same amount of borrowing and deposits (a highly risky strategy). When the borrowed funding of these three banks dried up, their size made it impossible for the Icelandic Central Bank (ICB) to provide their needed liquidity (much of which was in the Euro, a foreign currency), resulting in the failure of all three banks in the second week of October 2008.

Iceland honored all insured deposits domestically and abroad but moved all domestic deposits into newly established “good” banks from the three now bad banks, while leaving their overseas, uninsured deposits in these three banks in receivership. To the extent that these banks failed because of illiquidity (the cut off of their borrowed funding), the receivership should be able to recover all losses to depositors from the liquidation of the banks’ remaining assets.

The UK and Netherland’s objected to the unequal treatment of the uninsured deposits of Icelanders and of foreigners. While Iceland’s decision to bail out all of its domestic depositors may be questioned because of the moral hazard it perpetuated, they had no legal obligation to do the same for Euro deposits by foreigners. The UK and the Netherlands stepped in and followed the same policy adopted by Iceland by guaranteeing the deposits of their citizens. They then tried to collect the cost of these guarantees from Iceland, a very questionable claim.

As the three new “good” banks were fully capitalized, they should have been able to withstand any level of deposit withdrawal as long as the ICB was able to provide any liquidity needed against the good but illiquid assets of these banks. The return of depositor confidence to the banks invariably takes time and some depositors wanted to withdraw their funds. However, because Iceland has its own currency, nervous Icelandic depositors wanting to move their bank deposits abroad, would need first to convert them into Euros or U.S. dollars, which would have depreciated the international value (exchange rate) of the Icelandic króna, and depleted ICB’s international reserves. A depreciation of the króna would raise the cost of imports and reduce the standard of living in Iceland. To protect the exchange rate from excessive devaluation, the ICB imposed temporary limits on the amount of money its residents could move out of the country. These capital controls are still in effect.

Lucky Cyprus is in the Euro zone.  After recapitalizing its banks, in part by writing down their deposit liabilities, they should have sufficient assets to cover all of their deposit liabilities and thus to cover any deposit withdrawals. The only issue would be whether the BOC’s assets were sufficiently liquid to cover the withdrawals. Within the Euro zone payments outside the country are made via the Target Payment System. A transfer of deposits from the BOC in Cyprus to a bank in any other Euro zone country is made by debiting the BOC’s clearing balance with the Central Bank of Cyprus (CBC) and crediting the recipient bank’s clearing account with its central bank via Target. If the BOC does not have sufficient funds in its clearing account with the CBC and is unable to sell sufficient assets to increase that balance, it can borrow the funds from the CBC using its good but illiquid assets as collateral. The CBC is able to do the same by borrowing from the European Central Bank (ECB), which is prepared to lend unlimited amounts against good collateral now that Cyprus has undertaken the measures required for the troika’s financial support (i.e., from the EU/ECB/IMF). There is no exchange rate issue or concern. It is purely a matter of the solvency and liquidity of Cypriot banks.

However, establishing sufficient liquidity to fund large deposit withdrawals may take a few weeks or months and thus Cyprus has imposed temporary capital controls that limit the amount of money that may be withdrawn each day as cash or by transfer. If the arrangements enjoy sufficient public confidence in the soundness and viability of the surviving Bank of Cyprus, the deposit withdrawals should be modest. The period of limits on withdrawals should be measured in weeks rather than months or years.

Conclusion

The resolution of Cyprus’s insolvent banks ultimately, after a false start, was achieved by bailing in its creditors. The resolution was relatively quick and seems complete. While Cyprus’s economy is likely to suffer its abrupt adjustment for some time, its banks should now be sound. The dramatic shift of the responsibility of regulating the risk taking of banks to their uninsured depositors, should, if it is maintained throughout Europe despite nervous claims that it is one-off and not a model, restrain excessive risk taking by banks and lead over time to a stronger banking system. In the interim, there may be some disruptive deposit shifts as previously reckless banks are forced by the market to clean up their acts.