Resolution of First Republic Bank

JPMorgan Chase’s purchase of First Republic Bank appears to be a standard purchase and assumption resolution of a failing bank. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has organized hundreds of such bank resolutions there by painlessly purging bad banks for the banking system. The only mistake in my view was selling it to the country’s largest bank.

Purchase and assumption resolutions involve the simultaneous purchase of a failing bank’s good assets and the assumption of its deposit liabilities by a good bank and putting what’s left into bankruptcy (wiping out its shareholders and some or all of its corporate debt). Its the risk of loss to shareholders that provides the market scrutiny of bank risk taking. “Institutional and Legal Impediments to Efficient Insolvent Bank Resolution And Ways to Overcome Them”

Money (currency and demand deposits) should not be at risk of a bank failure. Depositors should not need to evaluate the safety and soundness of the bank they chose to hold their money in. So the FDIC insures deposits up to $250,000. But all deposits in the last three banks to fail were made whole whether insured or not and there is talk that all deposits should be explicitly (rather than just implicitly) insured. Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDCs) would provide such total protection to those holding it (retail CBDCs would be issued/administered by commercial banks and fully backed by an equivalent amount at the central bank).

Public “runs” on banks in order to move vulnerable deposits to cash or a safer bank, result from the fact that banks can fund long term loans with callable deposits. They can lend your deposit to someone buying a house with a 30-year mortgage. This works as long as banks keep enough cash or quickly liquidated assets on hand to cover any deposit withdrawals their depositors might want to make. An alternative to deposit insurance for all deposits is to isolate demand deposits from bank lendable resources by requiring that they be 100% back at the central bank (as with CBDCs) and not available to cover any losses on other bank activities.

It is time to take so called narrow banking (or The Chicago Plan) seriously. CBDCs are the natural vehicle for this restructuring of our money and credit systems.  “Protecting bank deposits”

Econ 101: SVB and bank runs

What is a bank run and how can we prevent them? A bank run, as I am sure you all know, is a rush by depositors to withdraw their deposits for fear that the bank will not have the money to give them. But there is a lot to unpack there in order to understand what is going on and how runs might be prevented.

It is important to understand the difference between debt and equity—between lending a specific amount of money with specific terms and investing an amount of money in exchange for a share of the earnings (or losses) of the recipient. When you buy shares in a company, it has no obligation to return your money. If you no longer want to invest in that company, you can sell your shares to someone else or the company might, at its discretion, buy them back. Its failure to “return” your money cannot be the cause of a company’s bankruptcy (take over by creditors to collect what the company is no longer able to return).

The deposits that we make in our banks are a special case of debt finance of whatever the banks do with our money. As we know, they lend much of it to people and companies for one thing or another and invest some in hopefully safe assets like Treasury bills and keep a tiny bit on hand for when you need cash. But the deposit contract says that you have the right to withdraw (or pay to someone else) any or all of it whenever you want to. Thus, banks must keep sufficient liquid assets in order to satisfy such withdrawals by selling them in the market when you demand your money back. The Federal Reserve, our lender of last resort, also has facilities for lending to banks needing cash against the collateral of bank assets.

The difference between illiquidity and insolvency is critical as well. A bank is solvent when the value of its assets match or exceed the value of its liabilities (such as your deposits). But having sufficient good assets doesn’t mean that that bank can always honor your deposit withdrawal demand. That is a question of liquidity. Does the bank have enough of its assets backing your deposit in forms that it can pay out immediately (cash in its vault, deposits at the Federal Reserve that it can transfer to another bank or use to buy cash, or assets it can quickly sell such as t-bills, or credit lines with other banks or the Fed, etc.)?  “The difference between bank liquidity and capital” Thus, even a solvent bank (positive capital) might fail to honor your withdrawal demand if it doesn’t have sufficient liquid assets. “The big bailout-what next?”

Usually, a bank becomes insolvent when more of its loan assets default than the bank has capital to cover such losses. But as we will see in the case of Silicon Valley Bank, insolvency can also result from a decline in the current market value of a “good” asset.  When depositors suspect that their bank might be insolvent, they will withdraw their money while they still can. This tends to use up the bank’s liquid assets compounding the risk of default. As the word spreads the classical bank run takes off (electronically these days rather than long lines outside the bank as in the old days).

The SVB, which specialized in financial services to start-ups and technology companies, enjoyed a huge increase in its deposits over the last four years, increasing from $49 billion in 2018 to $189.2 billion in 2021 dropping back to $175.4 billion at the end of 2022. It invested most of those deposits in “safe” long term government and similar debt. While the default risk for these assets was negligible, the risk of a loss in current market value if market interest rates increased was high. No one will pay the face value of a 3% ten-year bond while current market rates for the same maturity are 4%. The rapid increase in interest rates as the Federal Reserve reversed money growth to fight inflation tanked the current market value of a large share of SVB’s assets making it impossible for it to come up with the cash depositors might demand if they “ran”. That is how runs work. On March 10 SVB was put into receivership.

The original sin of modern banking is financing long term loans/investments with money (demand and savings deposits). Islamic banking, what uses equity investing, is wiser in this regard. During the Savings and Loan crisis in the U.S. in the 1980s and early 90s (financing mortgages with deposits) more than 1000 S&Ls failed when interest rates increased. But in fact, the U.S. bank regulation regime has some good features. While bank risk taking is subject to many, often costly, regulations, the ultimate check on risk taking comes from the knowledge of bank owners that they will lose their entire stake if their bank becomes insolvent. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which oversees America’s deposit insurance scheme, has developed effective bank bankruptcy and resolution procedures that allow it to take over and resolve insolvent banks with barely a ripple. A favorite tool is the so-called purchase and assumption transaction by which a healthy bank buys the assess of the insolvent one and assumes its liabilities (deposits), usually over a weekend. Thousands of insolvent banks have been resolved by the FDIC in the last fifty years.  See “Institutional and Legal Impediments to Efficient Insolvent Bank Resolution and Ways to Overcome Them” by Warren Coats and Arno Liuksilo “Warren Coats-17”

Most bank depositors pay no attention to the financial condition of their bank because their deposits are insured against losses, which until last week had been raised to $250,000. But the government has now implicitly extended such insurance to all deposits via accounting and other tricks, thus removing any remaining check on bank risk taking from all depositors. On Monday, President Biden announced that no depositors in SVB (and Signature Bank of New York) would lose any of their deposits.  Following the banking crisis of 2008, the Dodd-Frank law further strengthened financial sector regulations. The most important and helpful provisions of this 2,300 page law provided for significant increases and strengthening of bank capital requirements.  

The overuse of debt rather than equity financing is a more general weakness in our economy. The IRS should stop subsidizing it. Interest on borrowing is deductible from taxable income while dividends on equity financing are not. While increasing bank capital makes them less run prone, a simpler and easer to regulate approach is to remove the cause of runs all together by eliminating any risk that your bank can’t honor its obligation to return your money on demand. Another few thousand pages of laws and regulations might catch the last mistakes (though it is hard to see why regulators didn’t address the obvious duration risks taken by SVB), but there is an easier, less costly solution. Bank failures result from the mistakes of banks (their owners and managers) and the failure of depositors to more carefully evaluate the soundness of the bank in which they deposit their money. But depositors have little competence to evaluate bank soundness, and why should they be expected to?

Money (bank deposits) should be fully separated from credit. Deposits should not finance loans. Those financing investments should share in its risks (and rewards) via equity financing. “More than decade ago Professor Kotlikoff and [John Goodman] proposed “limited purpose banking” in The New Republic and in Investment News. The idea is that credit market institutions should be intermediaries between savers and investors and should not themselves use depositors’ money to make risky investments.”

When we deposit money in banks for safekeeping and making payments there should never be any doubt about the bank’s ability to return it on demand and thus no reason to “run” on the bank to protect our deposits. This is the essence of the Chicago Plan which would replace so call fractional reserve banking with 100% reserves (deposits at the central bank). When my bank deposit is backed totally by my bank’s deposits at the Fed, I would know with certainty that they were 100% safe and instantly available.  The “Chicago Plan” and New Deal Banking Reform | Levy Economics Institute (levyinstitute.org) Narrow banking schemes have a similar motivation. “A proposal for the feds balance sheet”

Who Decides?

Who decides what we eat, drink, and how to go about being merry? Societies range from those that rely heavily on government determination to those that leave most choices to individuals. At one end of the spectrum, the government determines what it is healthy or safe for us to consume and do and at the other end each person freely makes their own decisions about most aspects of their life.  Neither of these extremes is absolute, of course. At the freedom end we are not free to violate the freedom of others (steal their property, assault their bodies, etc.).  At the cradle-to-the-grave -government-protection end we safely eat, drink, and enjoy the activities the government allows us to.

America flourished economically and culturally because we were largely free to make our own decisions. Government largely enforced property rights and public safety and provided information on which we could make better informed private choices. We innovated and took calculated risks with the deployment of our ideas and flourished.

In recent decades the government has increasingly restricted our choices to what it determined was good or safe.  The superiority of our private choices depends on how well informed and responsible we are. While we and the government may both think we are motivated to act in our personal best interest, the incentive to get it right is stronger for the individual actor.  And incentives always matter.

Take but one example—the “War on Drugs.”  Despite this war, 11,712 people died from drug overdoses in 2000 rising in two decades to 83,558 in 2020 (from 6,190 to 64,183 for opioids). “Drug overdose deaths-fentanyl-Greenville NC” I believe, with many others, that ending the drug war (legalizing the purchase and consumption of them) and instead educating the public about their effects (honest, fact-based information) would reduce such deaths.

The growing, selling and consuming of Cannabis is now legal in 21 states. When I gave into the social pressure in college to take a drag as a joint was passed around, I learned that it makes me less social. Wine was my better option. Not only do I enjoy wine, but I appreciate its socializing properties.  So, it has probably been 50 years since I have smoked marijuana. Its not clear whether its legalization along with better information and education on its pros and cons will increase or decrease or leave unchanged its consumption. The destructive prohibition of alcohol and the organized crime syndicates that grew up to circumvent it and its subsequent repeal did not eliminate the damage that alcoholism visited on some people.  However, Americans have generally benefited from the reliance on education and persuasion rather than government coercion.  Rather than crime syndicates to distribute illegal booze, we have AA and health facilities to help those who have not been able to resist overusing it.

Challenging and sensitive examples concern racial, sexual and religious discrimination.  The Civil Rights Law of 1964 attempted to address racial discrimination but in some ways overreached. The case of same sex marriage and the cake baker come to mind. We are still struggling to find the best balance between potentially conflicting individual rights.  I fail to see how the refusal of a baker to cook for the marriage of two men (which violates his religious beliefs), interferes with their right and ability to marry —an arrangement society has always seen as beneficial and important (and thus not to be denied to homosexuals).

The case of affirmative action also provides a challenging example of addressing a problem with social attitudes vs coercion. The Supreme Court decided in 1978 that the prohibition against racial discrimination could be violated for a temporary period in the interest of greater racial diversity and balance.  Harvard University chose to discriminate against Asian students, who would have been overrepresented if admitted on the basis of academic merit only, in order to admit a larger number of African Americans.  Asian students have challenged Harvard’s policy and the Supreme Court is expected to rule next year in “STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC., Petitioner, v. PRESIDENT & FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE, Respondent” on the question “Should this Court overrule Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), and hold that institutions of higher education cannot use race as a factor in admissions?”

I believe that a public discussion of the benefits of diversity to schools and other institutions as well its contribution toward overcoming earlier and existing negative discrimination against African Americans is the more promising and flexible approach to this issue than government coercion. I find it interesting that many federal court judges take race into account in hiring their clerks.  “Appeals court judges consider race of their clerks”  This is also an interesting perspective: “How liberals lost their way on affirmative action”

The times are changing

In 1978 China began to free up and open its economy to move its economic policies toward ours. Although the Communist Party of China remained in complete control of the political domain, the growth in China’s economy was dramatic. “According to the World Bank, more than 850 million Chinese people have been lifted out of extreme poverty; China’s poverty rate fell from 88 percent in 1981 to 0.7 percent in 2015, as measured by the percentage of people living on the equivalent of US$1.90 or less per day in 2011 purchasing price parity terms.” “Poverty in China”

As I wrote 11 years ago: “Chinese people strike me as more like us than most any other people (including Europeans) I have met. And who do I mean by “us?” I don’t mean just Anglo Saxons like myself. I mean the hard working, innovative, entrepreneur types who are creating most of the wealth in this country like Google founders, Larry Page (American born Jew) and Sergey Brin (Russian born Jew), or Steve Jobs, who was born in San Francisco to a Syrian father and German-American mother, as well as many Anglo Saxons like myself.” ‘My G20 trip to China”

Sadly, Xi Jinping has been reversing this free market trend with very damaging results to economic growth and personal privacy and freedom in China.  

Sadder still, the United States has reversed direction since 9/11 as well, though more slowly. Not only has our government increasingly intruded into our privacy (it didn’t end with Edward Snowden’s revelations:  “Civil rights-Brennan-domestic terror-white supremacy”), but it has flooded the economy with excessive regulations, increasing trade restrictions and even the launch of industrial policies and subsidies that violate WTO rules. “US chip war to hit allies as hard as it does China”   “Competing with China” Our championing of the rule of law is growing increasingly hollow. Asset forfeiture provides but one example: Coats on the abuse of civil forfeiture”  and George Will on civil forfeiture nightmare”

How can this be? Why do we seem to want to be more like China? Many of today’s voters had not been born when the Berlin Wall fell in 1989. We must make the case for free markets and limited government again and again, but in a way that is understood by, and appeals to the concerns and sensitivities of, generations X and Z and our future children.   “Global protests-democracy-autocracy”

The difference between Bitcoin and FTX

Bitcoin is a digital currency (cryptocurrency) that can be paid to another bitcoin user willing to accept it via a blockchain account.  It is backed by nothing and promises nothing. Its US dollar value has fallen from $65,496 on November 14, 2021, to $15,630 on November 21, 2022.

“FTX Exchange was a leading centralized cryptocurrency exchange specializing in derivatives and leveraged products. Founded in 2018, FTX offered a range of trading products, including derivatives, options, volatility products, and leveraged tokens. It also provided spot markets in more than 300 cryptocurrency trading pairs such as BTC/USDT, ETH/USDT, XRP/USDT, and its native token FTT/USDT.12 In early November 2022, the exchange and the companies in its orbit began a steep fall from grace….  According to its bankruptcy filing, FTX, which was once valued at $32 billion and has $8 billion of liabilities it can’t pay, may have as many as 1 million creditors…. On November 16, a class-action lawsuit was filed in a Florida federal court, alleging that Sam Bankman-Fried created a fraudulent cryptocurrency scheme designed to take advantage of unsophisticated investors from across the country. ” “FTX exchange”

The difference between Bitcoin and FTX is that Bitcoin is a digital coin/token that some believe might achieve wide adoption as money and thus a stable demand that could stabilize its price. In my opinion, this is HIGHLY unlikely. I explained this potential eight years ago: “Cryptocurrencies the bitcoin phenomena”   “The future of bitcoin exchanges”  But most people buying Bitcoin are gambling that they can sell it for a higher price than they paid for it (first cousins to slot machine addicts).

On the other hand, FTX and its related products and services promised real things and to play by known rules (contracts). On November 11, FTX and its affiliated firms were put into bankruptcy. Billions of dollars where missing? Founder Sam Bankman-Fried (SBF) claims that he was just careless. It appears more likely that he was a lying fraudster. “An attorney also said the firm had been run as a ‘personal fiefdom’ of Bankman-Fried with $300 million spent on real estate such as homes and vacation properties for senior staff.” “Crypto lender genesis says no plans to file bankruptcy imminently”  Presumably to promote himself as a good guy and to win influential friends, SBF also contributed millions to charities and politicians. 

Most crypto product and service providers want regulations that will give potential investors and customers more confidence in their products but that will not stifle the potential creativity of a dynamic industry.  Hopefully congress will get on with it — carefully. “Crypto bill criticized”

“Sam Bankman-Fried, the founder of the FTX exchange and Alameda Research, a cryptocurrency trading platform, seemed to confuse his bank and his companies. According to John Ray, the new CEO in charge of the restructuring of his empire which went bankrupt on November 11, Bankman-Fried received a personal loan of $1 billion from Alameda. He is not alone: ​​the firm, which is a kind of cryptocurrency hedge fund, has also lent $543 million in personal loan to Nishad Singh, an associate of Bankman-Friend, and $55 million to Ryan Salame, the co-CEO of FTX Digital Markets, one of FTX’s affiliates.  

“’Never in my career have I seen such a complete failure of corporate controls and such a complete absence of trustworthy financial information as occurred here,’ Ray wrote. ‘From compromised systems integrity and faulty regulatory oversight abroad, to the concentration of control in the hands of a very small group of inexperienced, unsophisticated and potentially compromised individuals, this situation is unprecedented.’”  “Bankman-Fried received 1bn in personal loan from his company”

“Bankman-Fried’s net worth peaked at $26 billion.[11] In October 2022, he had an estimated net worth of $10.5 billion.[12] However, on November 8, 2022, amid FTX’s solvency crisis, his net worth was estimated to have dropped 94% in a day to $991.5 million, according to the Bloomberg Billionaires Index, the largest one-day drop in the index’s history.[13][10] By November 11, 2022, the Bloomberg Billionaires Index considered Bankman-Fried to have no material wealth.[14]”  “Sam Bankman-Fried”

I assume that jail is next, perhaps in the cell previously used by Bernie Madoff.

If you subscribe to The Economist you can read fascinating details here: “The failure of ftx and Sam Bankman-Fried will leave deep scars”

Lockdown Lessons Learned During Covid

We are two and a half years into the Covid-19 pandemic. Data has accumulated on the effectiveness of lockdowns in reducing deaths and of the costs associated with lockdowns. The overall effectiveness of lockdowns must consider both aspects. Moreover, lockdowns took different forms in different places—total, targeted, etc.  Dyani Lewis has provided a very careful review of the major studies of these data in Nature  “What Scientist have Learnt from Covid Lockdowns

To overcome issues of correctly attributing deaths to Covid, excess deaths is generally used (excess from all causes each period over the recent—usually five year– average for the same period). “The pre-vaccine period of the pandemic does show that countries that acted harshly and swiftly — the ‘go hard, go fast’ approach — often fared better than those that waited to implement lockdown policies. China’s harsh lockdowns eliminated COVID-19 locally, for a time.” But the economic and public moral costs in China are very large and continue to mount. “The most effective measures were policies banning small gatherings and closing businesses and schools, closely followed by land-border restrictions and national lockdowns. Less-intrusive measures — such as government support for vulnerable populations, and risk-communication strategies — also had an impact. Airport health checks, however, had no discernible benefit….

“The impacts of lockdowns also differed from one pandemic wave to the next. By the time second waves emerged, so much had been learnt about the virus that people’s behaviour was quite different…. These changes dampened the extent to which countries benefited from lockdowns” because people adjusted on their own.

“There’s a fundamental difficulty with analysing the effects of COVID-19 lockdowns: it is hard to know what would have happened in their absence…. [Many studies] could have overstated the size of the benefit because it assumes that without lockdown mandates, people wouldn’t have reduced their social contacts. In reality, rising deaths would probably have changed people’s behaviour….

“And lockdown policies did bring costs. Although they delayed outbreaks, saving lives by allowing countries to hang on for vaccines and drugs, they also brought significant social isolation and associated mental-health problems, rising rates of domestic violence and violence against women, cancelled medical appointments and disruption to education for children and university students. And they were often (although not always) accompanied by economic downturns….

“Pure economic analyses of whether lockdowns were worth it generally try to estimate the value of lives saved and compare that with the costs of economic downturns. But there is no consensus on how to make this comparison…. Not all harms can be [objectively measured]. Loss of education because of school closures might indirectly harm children in the long run, potentially decreasing their future earnings and placing them at greater risk of poorer health outcomes…. Such harms are so far off — decades, in some cases.”

Learning the lessons that experience teaches us is very important when formulating public policy. But extracting those lessons can be difficult. Lewis’s summary is the best I have read, and I urge you to read it. I continue to believe that when we are provided the best understanding available (which obviously grows over time) we will each make the best decisions for ourselves and our families, striking the balance that is best for each of us.

Affirmative Action

Like most Americans I believe that our laws should be color blind. That means that race should not be a factor in who to hire or who to admit to college. But put aside what is required by the law for a moment and ask: what is good admission policy for a university? What we consider “good policy” itself depends on the purpose or objective of the policy.

Let me focus on private universities and colleges that are not benefiting from taxpayer (our) money, if there are any, who are thus free to determine what they consider “good policy.” Such universities are likely to want to provide the best educational experience for their students possible.  Having smart, motivated students is an important component of an enriching intellectually stimulating environment.  Diversity of ideas, personalities, and ethnic backgrounds is also a good component of such an environment.

Basing student admissions solely on SAT scores or such metrics will, unfortunately, over-represent Asians and underrepresent blacks. The goal would not necessarily be exact proportionality of the share of these groups in the population (U.S. population or global population??), but it might well be sensible given the desire for diversity, to shade admissions a bit toward more blacks and fewer Asians. Enlightened university admissions officers might well operate this way. Catholic and Hebrew schools have a different purpose, but it is expressed more on the side of applicants than admissions officers. My point is that there can be a good and proper place for such judgements in a “good” society.

“In 2003, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, writing the majority opinion upholding affirmative action in Grutter v. Bollinger, expressed the hope that race-conscious admissions would be unnecessary 25 years hence.”  “Harvard UNC affirmative action admissions before Supreme Court”  Because of earlier discrimination against blacks, in part through inferior elementary and secondary education, it was accepted as OK to temporarily discriminate modestly in favor of blacks when admitting students to a college or university. Such “affirmative action” has increased black college enrollment considerably. “Affirmative action-supreme court cases”

But 40 years of affirmative action (the waving of equal treatment under the law) is stretching the notion of temporary and the SC is likely to end it. In many respects it is about time. However, it also illustrates that the rigidity of a legal remedy in place of more nuanced judgement can be second best. This is a dilemma.

While enjoying an intellectually stimulating time in college may help attract good students, the real test of a college’s success is the extent to which the experience promotes a richer (in all senses) life after graduation. This requires admitting students who will benefit most from what the college offers, whatever their starting point. It requires looking deeper than such indicators as SAT scores. Prof. Roland Fryer’s experience suggests possible approaches. “Affirmative action-Supreme Court and college admissions”

As he often does, George Will confronts us with the frequent contradictions in our thinking on such tricky issues: “College racial discrimination and affirmative action”

The Role of Social Media

With Elon Musk’s purchase of Twitter, the discussion of whether and how to regulate such platforms is intensifying.  “Social media and false information”  Francis Fukuyama, Barak Richman, and Ashish Goel have reviewed this issue in the current issue of Foreign Affairs:  “Fukuyama-How to save democracy from technology”  Their review is well worth reading. They offer a new suggestion for shifting control from Facebook, Twitter, etc. to their users (us) that deserves attention.

“If regulation, breakup, data portability, and privacy law all fall short, then what remains to be done about concentrated platform power? One of the most promising solutions has received little attention: middleware. Middleware is generally defined as software that rides on top of an existing platform and can modify the presentation of underlying data…. Middleware could allow users to choose how information is curated and filtered for them. [Middleware] would step in and take over the editorial gateway functions currently filled by dominant technology platforms whose algorithms are opaque.”

There are many issues to resolve with this approach, but they should be explored. I already rely on a service that reports on the trustworthiness of news sources (does the source adhere to high journalistic standards, etc.)  https://www.newsguardtech.com/. The proposed middleware would put what we see on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, etc. in our own hands where it belongs. But, as we must never forget, our freedom produces results no better than how wisely we use it.  If we chose to see only comments and articles with views we agree with, we will remain in the bubble these social media platforms already put us in.  

Young people (and old) should be taught the importance of checking “other” views along with what they already believe.  I am reminded of the left-wing dad who complained that his kids graduated from college with all the “right” views but having heard nothing else they were totally unable to defend any of them.   “Social media and fake news”

Econ 101: The Value of Money

During a discussion of Bitcoin with friends, it became clear to me that it might be helpful if I explained some fundamentals of how the value of money is determined. Like most everything else, money’s value is ultimately determined by its supply and demand.

Demand for money reflects the public’s need to keep an inventory of it in order to use it for making payments.  Bitcoin are generally held as a speculative asset rather than for payments as almost no one will accept them in payment. “Cryptocurrencies-the bitcoin phenomena”

The supply of money is determined by those who created it, generally central banks. Generally central banks issue their currency, thus increasing its supply, by lending it (generally to banks) or by buying assets, generally their government’s debt.  When anyone holding that currency no longer wants it and has the right to redeem it, the central bank takes it back in exchange for the asset it purchased in the first place, thus reducing the money supply.  Under the gold standard, currency was redeemed for gold.  The rules governing a central bank’s issuing and redeeming its currency defines the nature of its monetary regime.  That is the topic of this econ 101 lesson.

As none of us has ever redeemed our currency, it is understandable that my friends confused spending their money with redeeming it.  Spending it transfers it to someone else without changing its supply, while redeeming it reduces its supply.  Cryptocurrencies add a new category to our discussion of money.  As noted by “a billionaire hedge-fund manager… cryptocurrencies are a ‘limited supply of nothing.’”  “Crypto skeptics growing”

As discussed further below, the supply of Bitcoin increases slowly and steadily over time as determined by an unchangeable formula and Bitcoin cannot be redeemed for anything.  The U.S. dollar and virtually every other national currency in the world grow at more erratic rates as determined by their issuing central banks.  So what makes the value of the dollar relatively stable over long periods of time?  The fall in its value by about 8% over the last month is nothing compared to bitcoin’s fall of 23% over the same period and over 50% over the last half year.  Over the past 15 years the dollar’s value has declined less than 2% each year.  Unlike Bitcoin, dollars are widely accepted for payments that are denominated in dollars, including our taxes, and thus held (demanded) to make such payments.  Almost no Bitcoins are held to make payments as almost no one will accept them for payments.  But I want to focus on a currency’s supply.

There are fundamentally three broad approaches to determining the supply of a currency.  Historically, the supply of most currencies were determined by fixing their price to what they could be redeemed for, such as gold or silver. I have called such a system for regulating money’s supply, a hard anchor. “Real SDR Currency Board”  The value of a currency can be fixed (the price set) to something real such as gold or a basket of goods.  A country with a strict gold standard, which the U.S. never really had, issues its currency (dollars) whenever anyone wants to pay the fixed gold price for more of them.  If the dollar price of gold in the market rises above its official price, there would be an arbitrage profit from buying gold from the central bank at its lower official price.  Such gold could be resold in the market at the higher price.  But the key point is that this mechanism (what I call currency board rules) of redeeming currency reduces its supply and thus reduces prices in this currency in the market (deflation).  Several of the monetary systems I helped establish, work in this way (Bulgaria and Bosnia and Herzegovina). “One Currency for Bosnia”

The most common system of monetary control today is for the central bank to determine its currency’s supply by buying or selling it in the market (the Federal Reserve can buy treasury bills, etc. to increase the supply of dollars).  Most central banks today adjust their money supplies in an effort to achieve an inflation target (a much more complicated subject). “Czech National Bank: Inflation Targeting in Transition Economies”  Generally they do so by setting an intermediate target for a short-term interest at which market participants (banks) can borrow from the central bank.  Such fiat currencies, such as the U.S. dollar, are not redeemable but are widely accepted in payment for goods, services and debts.

This brings us to Bitcoin.  The supply of Bitcoin is determined by a formula that predetermines its gradual growth to 21 million by 2140.  There are currently about 19 million in existence.  The supply is increased by giving them to successful miners for verifying the legitimacy of each transaction (another complicated subject).  Thus, the issuer (the formula) received services (protection against double spending the same coin) but no assets such as gold or treasury bills for creating and issuing new Bitcoins.  Once created, an issued bitcoin can never be redeemed (i.e. the outstanding supply can never be reduced).  When you spend or give away your Bitcoins you are circulating them to other holders, not redeeming them.

When my imaginary aunt Sally discusses Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies more generally, she tends to mix up the marvelous new payment technologies for paying my dollars all over the world with private money such as Bitcoin and Tether.  She also doesn’t seem to quite understand that most money has always been privately produced including the U.S. dollars that we spend in various ways (occasionally even by handing over cash).  “A shift in monetary regimes”

But these distinctions are critical when considering what role the government should play in our monetary system.  The truly amazing technical progress we have experienced and the dramatic increase in the standard of living of the average person it has delivered over the last century was made possible by a government that provided a general framework in which we, the consuming beneficiaries of this progress, could make informed choices.  Our government, wisely, generally did not make such decisions for use.

With that in mind consider “a letter addressed to Senate Majority Leader Charles E. Schumer (D-N.Y.), Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) and other congressional leaders, [from 26 influential technology personalities that] outlined what it described as potentially grave dangers of cryptocurrencies.” They are absolutely correct to expose and condemn the technical and economic weaknesses of blockchain technology—the distributed ledger with which Bitcoin claims to avoid the need for trusted third parties to record and document payment transaction (as happens on a centralized ledger when you pay from your bank deposit). 

But the fact that foolish people invest in Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies does not justify our government prohibiting and restricting them from doing so.  The government requires the banks in which we put our money to publish properly audited financial statements of the assets backing our deposits and to set minimum capital requirements to protect against the possible loss of bank asset value (e.g., loan defaults).  Cryptocurrencies claiming redeemability at a stable value (so called stable coins) should similarly be required to disclose the rules by which they operate and the composition and value of the assets backing their digital coins.  In short, government regulations should help us decide what we want to buy and/or hold without restricting the ability of fintech pioneers to explore and innovate products to offer.

Overly restrictive regulations create incentives for incumbents to create barriers to competition.  Large and intrusive governments tend toward corruption.  The Federal Reserve System seems quite aware of these risks as it cautiously explores whether to compete with the private sector in developing a central bank digital currency.  “Econ 101-Central  Bank digital currency-CBDC”

So when considering the government’s role in money and payments be sure to clearly distinguish money from payment technology and limit government to setting the rules of the game that maximize the ability of private consumers to make wise choices. But perhaps the biggest policy decision of all is how the government should determine/regulate the supply of its currency, most of which is privately created.  I support a currency whose value is fixed to something real (a hard anchor) and whose supply is determined by the market via currency board rules.  “A libertarian money”  

Social Media and Fake News

People’s political, cultural, and religious views can be partitioned by differing attitudes and preferences. One of these is whether a person looks first to the government or to themselves to solve their problems. Any society requires both, but where do you look first?

An important debate is currently raging over what to do about misinformation and fake news spread on social media. I have shared my views earlier that the rules for what can be posted and shared on a social media platform should be largely up to Facebook, Twitter, etc. “Social media and false information”  But what would we like them to do to solve this problem?

The right to state and promote any point of view should be defended at all costs. But what about lies, deliberately invented or foolishly believed and propagated? The government (ours or anyone else’s) is the last place to empower to determine what is true or not. I am also not thrilled at the idea of Facebook, etc., making such determinations. “What to do with social media?”  As one of those who look first to myself and my neighbors for help with problems, in this short note I want to put the spotlight on what can and should be done to better enable each of us individually to evaluate the accuracy of the information we read and especially information we might chose to pass on.

I spotlight (no more than that here) three areas. The first is education. Schools should provide our children with the critical thinking tools to evaluate the accuracy of the information we are reading or hearing. I don’t think that the importance of this can be over emphasized.

The second area is the importance of news reporting standards and related institutions that promote those standards and the importance of choosing information sources that we can trust. Jonathan Rauch has a very useful discussion of these points in The Constitution of Knowledge: a defense of truth“The sources of trust”

The third area is what social media itself does. It can best help our individual assessments of truth by supplementing posts with information on their source and perhaps with warnings of possible inaccuracy with links to other sources.  It is better for business for social media platforms to detect and block trolls and robo accounts and they should certainly be encouraged to do so. But they should not block former Presidents of the U.S. from saying what they want despite a well documented history of lying. They should and do have the right to do so, though in our traditional commitment to free speech, they should not do so. The government might require platforms to disclose their algorithms for how they direct traffic in order to benefit from public discussion of such internal rules. Taking down posts should be a rare last resort.

In short, we need better training in how to evaluate information however we encounter it. And the social media platforms should be as transparent about what is posted there and what is done with it as possible.

With that we more or less get what we deserve.

Roe v. Wade Part II

My previous blog on Roe v. Wade argued that the laws on abortion should reflect the democratic will of the public. “Roe vs Wade” I have personally always been pro-choice but also believed that that case needed to be made democratically. Before joining the Supreme Court judge Ginsburg stated that: “Roe v. Wade sparked public opposition and academic criticism, in part, I believe, because the Court ventured too far in the change it ordered and presented an incomplete justification for its action.” “Scholarship Law, UNC.edu” She added, “Roe v. Wade, in contrast, invited no dialogue with legislators. “Ruth Bader Ginsburg-Roe vs Wade”

Conservative columnist George F. Will wrote that rather than end the debate about abortion with Roe: “Instead, it inflamed the issue and embittered our politics — because the court, by judicial fiat, abruptly ended what had been a democratic process of accommodation and compromise on abortion policy . . . .   Before the court suddenly discovered in the Constitution a virtually unlimited right to abortion, many state legislatures were doing what legislatures are supposed to do in a democracy: They were debating and revising laws to reflect changing community thinking.” “George Will on Roe”

I also argued, quoting Justice Alito, that revoking Roe would not endanger the Obergefell v. Hodges decision, which legalized same-sex marriages, the Loving v. Virginia decision, which legalized interracial marriages, the Griswold v. Connecticut decision, which ban restrictions on contraception, and several other cases. These decisions were also based (in part) on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.  I argued that my right to marry a man was protected by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A lawyer friend, Jack Nadler, has raised some interesting challenges to this assertion and clarified for us non-lawyers the fuller meaning of applying the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.

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Jack Nadler is a Retired Partner in the Washington DC office of Squire Patton Boggs.  While at Squire, Jack served as outside counsel for SAGE (formerly Services and Advocacy for Gay Elders), which represents the interest of LGBT older adults.  Jack led the team that drafted the extensive friend of the court (amicus) brief that SAGE filed in Obergefell v. Hodges, the case in which the Supreme Court struck down State restrictions on same-sex marriage.  Jack previously taught law at American University’s Washington College of Law in Washington, DC and the China University of Political Science and Law in Beijing, and served as a Law Clerk to the Hon. Joel M. Flaum on the United State Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Chicago.  He is a graduate of Columbia Law School, the Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs, and Vassar College. 

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A Response:  Why Overruling Roe v. Wade Threatens Marriage Equality

Jack Nadler  

I disagree with my friend Warren’s contention that a decision to overrule Roe v. Wade, based on the rationale in Justice Alito’s draft opinion in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, would not threaten the right of same-sex couples to marry.  In particular, I do not agree that, even if the Court adopts the reasoning in the draft opinion, the courts would be likely to continue to uphold marriage equality under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.

The rights of same-sex couples to marry, recognized by the Supreme Court in Obergefell, just like the right to abortion recognized in Roe, is grounded on the Due Process Clause, which provides that no State may “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”  Specifically, the right of same-sex couples to marry is based on the doctrine of substantive Due Process, which provides that the Due Process Clause’s protection of “liberty” precludes a State from infringing on certain “fundamental rights” that individuals possess, regardless of what procedures the State uses.

Justice Alito’s draft opinion in Dobbs is a direct repudiation of the doctrine of substantive Due Process.  The express rationale for overruling Roe is that the Constitution only protects rights that are expressly granted in its text or that are “deeply rooted in our nation’s history and tradition.” Because the Constitution does not expressly grant women the right to have an abortion, and because, prior to Roe, the United States did not have a long “history and tradition” of permitting abortion, the draft opinion concludes that the Constitution does not provide this right.

The same rationale is fully applicable to Obergefell, which held that the Due Process Clause precludes the States from depriving same-sex couples of their fundamental right to marry.  Indeed, in his dissenting opinion in Obergefell, Justice Alito applied the exact same standard and concluded that, because “[t]he Constitution says nothing about a right to same-sex marriage,” and because “it is beyond dispute that the right to same-sex marriage is not among those rights . . . deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and traditions,” the Court erred when it found that the Due Process Clause grants same-sex couples the right to marry. 

Warren’s reliance of Justice Alito’s assertion that the Court’s decision to over-rule Roe does not affect “any other right that this Court has held fall within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of ‘liberty’” – including the right of same-sex couples to marry – is misplaced.  The binding part of a court decision is not what the court says; it is what the court actually does and the reasoning essential to support that action.  The rest of the court’s opinion is non-binding dicta.  The reality is that Obergefell rests on the same substantive Due Process foundation as Roe.  The Court cannot demolish that foundation in the abortion context while simultaneously preserving it in all other contexts.  The Constitution either does – or does not – allow the Court to identify judicially enforceable rights beyond those expressly enumerated in the text or “deeply rooted in our nation’s history and tradition.”

I also disagree with Warren’s contention that overruling Roe and thereby “return[ing] the determination of the rules of abortion to the elected representatives in each state” is desirable because “policy in a democracy should be determined by voters and their representatives.”  This is precisely the argument that the marriage equality opponents made in Obergefell.  Indeed, in his dissenting opinion, Justice Alito contended that “[a]ny change on a question so fundamental [as the definition of marriage] should be made by the people through their elected officials.”  The Court rejected this argument, observing  that, “[w]hile the Constitution contemplates that democracy is the appropriate process for change, individuals who are harmed need not await legislative action before asserting a fundamental right.”  Had the Court left the question of whether same-sex couples should be allowed to marry to the States, then even now the right of same-sex couples to marry likely would still be denied in many States.

The impact on marriage equality of the Court’s decision to overrule Roe must be seen in the larger judicial context.  At the same time the Court is contracting the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment’s restriction on governmental infringement on personal liberty, it is also expanding the scope of the First Amendment protections for the free exercise of religion.  A clash is inevitable.  Indeed, in a 2020 concurring opinion, Justice Alito joined Justice Thomas in declaring that Obergefell has had “ruinous consequences for religious liberty.” 

In order to address the perceived threat to freedom of religion, several of the Justices appear to believe that in any conflict between a religious person’s right to free exercise of religion and a same-sex couple’s right to marry, the “express” free exercise right must trump any “judge made” liberty right.  This could have significant adverse consequences for same-sex couples.  For example, a business owner could refuse to provide the same spousal health insurance coverage to a gay employee’s spouse that the company provides to its straight employees’ spouses on the ground that covering the gay employee’s spouse would violate the owner’s religious conviction that marriage is between one man and one woman.  If the Court adopts this “hierarchy of rights” approach, then the State in which the company is located would be constitutionally powerless to apply its non-discrimination law to make the employer provide coverage.

I agree with Warren that same-sex marriage supporters should not be “hysterical” about the Court’s decision to overrule Roe.  But I do think we should be very concerned about the potential of this decision, over time, to erode the LGBT community’s hard-won victories that have secured judicial protection of our fundamental rights, including the right to marry.

Discussion

The Equal Protection Clause

Warren:  As a legal layman, I always thought that my right to marriage equality rested on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.   Didn’t Obergefell hold that the restrictions on same-sex marriage violated both the Due Process and the Equal Protection Clause?

Jack:  Ever since the Court struck down State prohibitions of private consensual same-sex sexual relations in Lawrence v. Texas, it has relied on substantive Due Process, rather than the Equal Protection Clause.  To be sure, there is a brief section in the Obergefell opinion that essentially says that there is a “synergy” between the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses because the denial of marriage equality is a denial of the “fundamental right to marry” protected by the Due Process Clause and a denial of a fundamental right to a specific group also violates the Equal Protection Clause.  As the Court somewhat delphicly explained:

“Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal protection may rest on different precepts and are not always co-extensive, yet in some instances each may be instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other.  In any particular case one Clause may be thought to capture the essence of the right in a more accurate and comprehensive way, even as the two Clauses may converge in the identification and definition of the right.”

However, as I noted earlier, the binding part of a court decision is not what the court says; it is what the court actually does and the reasoning essential to support that action.  The rest of the court’s opinion is non-binding dicta.  The dissenters in Obergefell correctly observed that the Court had utterly failed to conduct an Equal Protection analysis, and, in any case, this finding was not necessary to resolve the case.  Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts stated that the Court’s opinion had “fail[ed] to provide even a single sentence explaining how the Equal Protection Clause supplies independent weight for its position, nor does it attempt to justify its gratuitous violation of the canon against unnecessarily resolving constitutional questions.”  Justice Thomas similarly observed that the Court had “clearly use[d] equal protection only to shore up its substantive due process analysis.” 

The bottom line is that, if you take the substantive Due Process analysis out of Obergefell, the Equal Protection Clause analysis does not provide an adequate independent basis on which to strike down State restrictions on marriage equality.  Consequently, if the Court eliminates substantive Due Process, the passing reference to Equal Protection in Obergefell would not be enough to support the result in that case.

Warren: Even if the Court in Obergefell did not adequately rely on the Equal Protection Clause as the basis for striking down restrictions on same-sex marriage, could the Court rely on that Clause in any subsequent challenge to marriage equality?   Do you think it is worth doing so?

Jack: Unfortunately, if the Court demolishes substantive Due Process, the Equal Protection Clause is unlikely to be able to fill the gap.  Under modern constitutional jurisprudence, when presented with the claim that a statute violates the Equal Protection Clause by impermissibly treating two groups differently, the Court conducts its analysis in different ways depending on which group is being treated differently.

Historically, the Court was very reluctant to find that a distinction between groups made by the legislature violated the Equal Protection Clause.  So, the Court applied what came to be known as “rational basis” scrutiny.  Under this highly deferential standard, regardless of the legislature’s actual intent, the Court upheld a statute if there was any possible basis on which the legislature rationally could have made the distinction.  Not surprisingly, applying this standard, the Court virtually never found a legislative distinction between groups violated the Equal Protection Clause.

The civil rights movement changed things.  Instead of analyzing race-based statutory distinctions under the rational basis standard, the Court ruled that such distinctions were subject to “strict scrutiny.”  This meant that a race-based statutory distinction would be found to violate the Equal Protection Clause unless the legislature actually intended for the distinction to serve a “compelling purpose” and the means it chose were “narrowly tailored” to achieve the stated purpose.  Very few race-based distinctions can be found constitutional under this standard.

Things got still more complicated with the rise of the women’s movement, when the Court had to decide whether to use rational basis or strict scrutiny to assess whether gender-based statutory distinctions violated the Equal Protection Clause.  The Court decided that challenges to such distinctions should receive “intermediate” scrutiny.  Basically, such distinctions need to serve an “important” purpose and the means used must be “substantially related” to achieving the stated purpose. 

The Court has never determined what level of scrutiny to apply in cases involving statutes that make distinctions based on sexual orientation.  In his dissenting opinion in Obergefell, however, Justice Alito briefly considered the Equal Protection argument, effectively applying the rational basis standard.  He concluded that the States had provided a sufficient justification for distinguishing between same-sex and opposite-sex couples because marriage is “inextricably linked to the one thing that only an opposite-sex couple can do:  procreate. . . . States formalize and promote marriage    . . . to encourage potentially procreative conduct to take place within a lasting unit that has long been thought to provide the best atmosphere for raising children.”  Therefore, in his view, because same-sex couples cannot procreate, excluding them from marriage does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.

In order to use the Equal Protection Clause as a basis on which to uphold marriage equality, it would be necessary to convince the Court that distinctions based on sexual orientation should receive some degree of heightened scrutiny.  In light of the history of legal discrimination against gays and lesbians, heightened scrutiny clearly is appropriate.  But given that there are some objective differences between homosexuals and heterosexuals – especially the fact that our sexual unions cannot lead to procreation – some statutory distinctions conceivably could be legitimate, so strict scrutiny may not be warranted.   Moreover, the level of de jure discrimination suffered by gays and lesbians, while significant, is probably closer to the level suffered by women than by African Americans, making it hard to justify strict scrutiny.  Therefore, the most appropriate solution would be for the Court to apply intermediate scrutiny to sexual-orientation-based distinctions.  That said, as a practical matter, given its current make-up, there is no chance that the Supreme Court would add statutory distinctions based on sexual orientation to the short list of categories that receive heightened scrutiny.  A court that is prepared to shrink the reach of the Due Process Clause, is highly unlikely to expand the scope of the Equal Protection Clause.

Interstate recognition of same-sex marriage

Warren:  If marriage equality is overturned and returns to a state-by-state determination, the question arises what would happen if a same-sex couple legally married in Maryland and then moved to a state in which such marriages were not allowed? 

Jack:  We most likely would return to the situation that existed before Obergefell, when a lawful Maryland same-sex marriage would not have been recognized in the vast majority of States where same-sex marriage was not legal. This would lead to some horrific situations.  Here, based on actual experiences before Obergefell, are a couple of examples.

First, the ability of married  same-sex couples to travel would be limited.  Imagine that our lawfully married couple decided to go on vacation in Florida, which did not allow same-sex marriage.  During the vacation, one of the spouses is hospitalized with a life-threatening injury or illness and is unable to make medical decisions for himself.   If the hospitalized spouse had been married to a woman, the wife – as next of kin – would have the legal right to visit her spouse in the hospital and, if necessary, make life or death medical decisions for him.  However, because the hospitalized spouse is married to another man, Florida would not consider his husband to be next of kin.  As a result, he would not have the right to visit his critically ill spouse in the hospital.  Even worse, the right to make life-or-death medical decision for the incapacitated spouse would go to the person that Florida recognized as next-of-kin – who may be a parent, sibling, nephew, or child from a prior heterosexual marriage, even if that person disapproves of the spouses’ relationship.  That person could even requested the hospital to bar the spouse from visiting.

Second, getting a divorce would be a nightmare.  Let’s say that our married friends decide to retire to Florida.  However, after a few years of fun in the sun, the couple agrees to get divorced.  But, because Florida doesn’t recognize their marriage, Florida won’t grant them a divorce; the State cannot dissolve a union that it does not recognize exists.  Unfortunately, the couple can’t make a quick trip back to Maryland to get a divorce decree because they are no longer residents.  So, unless they are prepared to take up residence in a State that recognizes same-sex marriage, they’re stuck with each other.

Warren:  How could this be possible?  Wouldn’t the Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause require Florida to recognize a marriage lawfully performed out of state?

Jack:  The answer, regrettably, is no.   The Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause, Art IV Sec 1, provides that every State must give “full faith and credit . . . to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State.” The Clause also gives Congress power to “prescribe    . . . the effects” of such State acts.  However, notwithstanding this Clause, the courts have long held that a State need not recognize an out-of-state marriage, lawful where entered into, that contravenes the State’s public policy – such as a polygamous marriage or a marriage involving a child or first cousins. 

Prior to Obergefell, a few States that did not yet have marriage equality recognized lawful out-of-state same-sex marriages.  However,  the vast majority did not.  Indeed, a large number of States adopted constitutional amendments expressly barring recognition of such marriages.  Moreover, when it enacted the infamous Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Congress, purporting to use its power under the second sentence in the Full Faith and Credit Clause, expressly provided that States did not need to recognize same-sex marriages lawfully entered into in other States. 

DOMA’s non-recognition provision was not challenged in the Supreme Court’s Windsor case and survived the Court’s decision to strike down the portion of the law that provided that the Federal Government would not recognize same-sex marriages even if they were lawfully entered into in a State that had marriage equality. One of the two questions that the Supreme Court subsequently agreed to consider in Obergefell was whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause required States that did not permit same-sex marriage to recognize lawful out-of-state same-sex marriages.  Because the Obergefell Court ruled that State had to allow same-sex couples to marry, it did not resolve the out-of-state-recognition question.  Thus, if Obergefell is reversed, a State could again decline to recognize same-sex marriages lawfully entered into in another State.

Conclusion

Warren:  It seems to me that if Obergefell is challenged on the basis that no explicit right to same-sex marriage can be found in the Constitution to which the Due Process Clause could be applied, a stronger case for applying the Equal Protection Clause could be made. If that failed, we would have to live with state-by-state determination of marriage equality and Congress could stipulate that the Full Faith and Credit provisions of the Constitution would obligate states that do not permit same-sex marriage to recognize such marriages legally obtained in other states. Public understanding of and sentiment toward LGBT people has evolved and progressed considerably from the earlier times in which restrictive and discriminatory legislation such as DOMA were first adopted. Thus, I think it is likely that marriage equality would be widely embraced in the democratic approach of legislation.

Jack:  Warren believes that times have changed and that, even if Obergefell were overruled, many States would choose to retain marriage equality.  He also believes that, pursuant to its express authority under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Congress would adopt legislation requiring that every State recognize same-sex marriages lawfully performed in another State.  I am far less sanguine. 

Despite all the progress made, 27 States have not yet enacted statutes that expressly bar discrimination in employment, housing, and access to public accommodations on the basis of sexual orientation.  I do not want to count on these States to take affirmative action to preserve the right of same-sex couples to marry.  I am particularly concerned about the many States that, prior to Obergefell, had amended their constitutions to limit marriage to “one man and one woman.”  If Obergefell is overruled, these State constitutional prohibitions on same-sex marriage presumably would immediately come back into in effect.  In that case, same-sex marriage would be barred in those States until such time, if ever, as the State completed the often-arduous process of amending its constitution to remove the restriction. 

As for Congress, the prospect that 60 Senators would support legislation to restrict the historic right of a State to decline to recognize out-of-state marriages that contravene its public policy seems remote.

Warren:  As of the middle of last year 83% of Americans supported marriage equality. Support among Republicans has risen from 40% in 2016 to 55% in June 2021. “Support for same-sex marriage in the United States by political party” Thus, I think it is likely that marriage equality would be widely embraced in the democratic approach of legislation.

Even with regard to abortion, the most recent Pew survey finds that 61% of Americans support the legalization of abortion in all or most cases. “Majority favor legal abortion”  While support is stronger among Democrats, 38% of Republicans support it and almost half of Republicans under thirty do. “Senate Majority Leader Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) late last week teed up a vote on the Women’s Health Protection Act, which would essentially codify Roe into law. The vote is expected to take place midweek. There is little drama surrounding the vote, as it will fail….” “The Hill”  Why it seems destined to fail is a mystery to me, but then life is full of mysteries.