Protecting bank deposits

Following the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank last week there has been considerable discussion about whether and how the regulatory regime might be strengthened (or actually more effectively implemented) to prevent such collapses (yet again) in the future. Raising deposit insurance coverage to 100% of all deposits is being suggested (and was provided ad hoc to SVB and Signature Bank this week). Econ 101: SVB and bank runs – Warren’s space (wcoats.blog)

Insuring all deposits and adopting the Chicago Plan represent two very different approaches to removing all risk of loss to depositors and thus any incentive to run from a bank. In the search for regulatory or market checks on excessive bank risk taking or poor management, the expectation that depositors would carefully monitor the behavior and condition of their banks was never realistic. Thus, removing any financial incentive for such due diligence by raising deposit insurance to cover all deposits would have little to no impact on bank behavior. Such scrutiny by bank shareholders and managers is much more realist and thus important. US bank bankruptcy procedures do not spare shareholders, who in the case of SVB have lost everything. However, more might be done to impose losses on managers of insolvent banks.

Following the bankruptcy of SVB considerable attention has rightly focused on the speed with which facts or rumors of a bank’s weakening financial condition can spread over the Internet. What might have taken weeks as depositors began to line up outside their banks to withdraw their deposits while the funds lasted, now takes minutes, dramatically accelerating the speed with which a bank must try to liquidate enough of its assets to fund the withdrawals.

Full deposit insurance and the Chicago Plan of 100% reserve banking (deposits at the central bank, which are always safe and instantly available) eliminate any incentive for bank runs. But the difference between them deserves more attention. The full deposit insurance approach puts the cost of bailing out the depositors of a failed bank on the rest of the banking system (on the “good” banks) who finance the insurance fund. The cost of the Chicago Plan, if indeed it is a cost at all rather than a benefit, is the need for banks to fund their credit operations with equity or long-term debt, rather than with potentially volatile deposits. We should move to the Chicago Plan and fully separate money from credit.

Econ 101: SVB and bank runs

What is a bank run and how can we prevent them? A bank run, as I am sure you all know, is a rush by depositors to withdraw their deposits for fear that the bank will not have the money to give them. But there is a lot to unpack there in order to understand what is going on and how runs might be prevented.

It is important to understand the difference between debt and equity—between lending a specific amount of money with specific terms and investing an amount of money in exchange for a share of the earnings (or losses) of the recipient. When you buy shares in a company, it has no obligation to return your money. If you no longer want to invest in that company, you can sell your shares to someone else or the company might, at its discretion, buy them back. Its failure to “return” your money cannot be the cause of a company’s bankruptcy (take over by creditors to collect what the company is no longer able to return).

The deposits that we make in our banks are a special case of debt finance of whatever the banks do with our money. As we know, they lend much of it to people and companies for one thing or another and invest some in hopefully safe assets like Treasury bills and keep a tiny bit on hand for when you need cash. But the deposit contract says that you have the right to withdraw (or pay to someone else) any or all of it whenever you want to. Thus, banks must keep sufficient liquid assets in order to satisfy such withdrawals by selling them in the market when you demand your money back. The Federal Reserve, our lender of last resort, also has facilities for lending to banks needing cash against the collateral of bank assets.

The difference between illiquidity and insolvency is critical as well. A bank is solvent when the value of its assets match or exceed the value of its liabilities (such as your deposits). But having sufficient good assets doesn’t mean that that bank can always honor your deposit withdrawal demand. That is a question of liquidity. Does the bank have enough of its assets backing your deposit in forms that it can pay out immediately (cash in its vault, deposits at the Federal Reserve that it can transfer to another bank or use to buy cash, or assets it can quickly sell such as t-bills, or credit lines with other banks or the Fed, etc.)? “The difference between bank liquidity and capital” Thus, even a solvent bank (positive capital) might fail to honor your withdrawal demand if it doesn’t have sufficient liquid assets. “The big bailout-what next?”

Usually, a bank becomes insolvent when more of its loan assets default than the bank has capital to cover such losses. But as we will see in the case of Silicon Valley Bank, insolvency can also result from a decline in the current market value of a “good” asset. When depositors suspect that their bank might be insolvent, they will withdraw their money while they still can. This tends to use up the bank’s liquid assets compounding the risk of default. As the word spreads the classical bank run takes off (electronically these days rather than long lines outside the bank as in the old days).

The SVB, which specialized in financial services to start-ups and technology companies, enjoyed a huge increase in its deposits over the last four years, increasing from $49 billion in 2018 to $189.2 billion in 2021 dropping back to $175.4 billion at the end of 2022. It invested most of those deposits in “safe” long term government and similar debt. While the default risk for these assets was negligible, the risk of a loss in current market value if market interest rates increased was high. No one will pay the face value of a 3% ten-year bond while current market rates for the same maturity are 4%. The rapid increase in interest rates as the Federal Reserve reversed money growth to fight inflation tanked the current market value of a large share of SVB’s assets making it impossible for it to come up with the cash depositors might demand if they “ran”. That is how runs work. On March 10 SVB was put into receivership.

The original sin of modern banking is financing long term loans/investments with money (demand and savings deposits). Islamic banking, what uses equity investing, is wiser in this regard. During the Savings and Loan crisis in the U.S. in the 1980s and early 90s (financing mortgages with deposits) more than 1000 S&Ls failed when interest rates increased. But in fact, the U.S. bank regulation regime has some good features. While bank risk taking is subject to many, often costly, regulations, the ultimate check on risk taking comes from the knowledge of bank owners that they will lose their entire stake if their bank becomes insolvent. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which oversees America’s deposit insurance scheme, has developed effective bank bankruptcy and resolution procedures that allow it to take over and resolve insolvent banks with barely a ripple. A favorite tool is the so-called purchase and assumption transaction by which a healthy bank buys the assess of the insolvent one and assumes its liabilities (deposits), usually over a weekend. Thousands of insolvent banks have been resolved by the FDIC in the last fifty years. See “Institutional and Legal Impediments to Efficient Insolvent Bank Resolution and Ways to Overcome Them” by Warren Coats and Arno Liuksilo “Warren Coats-17”

Most bank depositors pay no attention to the financial condition of their bank because their deposits are insured against losses, which until last week had been raised to $250,000. But the government has now implicitly extended such insurance to all deposits via accounting and other tricks, thus removing any remaining check on bank risk taking from all depositors. On Monday, President Biden announced that no depositors in SVB (and Signature Bank of New York) would lose any of their deposits. Following the banking crisis of 2008, the Dodd-Frank law further strengthened financial sector regulations. The most important and helpful provisions of this 2,300 page law provided for significant increases and strengthening of bank capital requirements.

The overuse of debt rather than equity financing is a more general weakness in our economy. The IRS should stop subsidizing it. Interest on borrowing is deductible from taxable income while dividends on equity financing are not. While increasing bank capital makes them less run prone, a simpler and easer to regulate approach is to remove the cause of runs all together by eliminating any risk that your bank can’t honor its obligation to return your money on demand. Another few thousand pages of laws and regulations might catch the last mistakes (though it is hard to see why regulators didn’t address the obvious duration risks taken by SVB), but there is an easier, less costly solution. Bank failures result from the mistakes of banks (their owners and managers) and the failure of depositors to more carefully evaluate the soundness of the bank in which they deposit their money. But depositors have little competence to evaluate bank soundness, and why should they be expected to?

Money (bank deposits) should be fully separated from credit. Deposits should not finance loans. Those financing investments should share in its risks (and rewards) via equity financing. “More than decade ago Professor Kotlikoff and [John Goodman] proposed “limited purpose banking” in The New Republic and in Investment News. The idea is that credit market institutions should be intermediaries between savers and investors and should not themselves use depositors’ money to make risky investments.”

When we deposit money in banks for safekeeping and making payments there should never be any doubt about the bank’s ability to return it on demand and thus no reason to “run” on the bank to protect our deposits. This is the essence of the Chicago Plan which would replace so call fractional reserve banking with 100% reserves (deposits at the central bank). When my bank deposit is backed totally by my bank’s deposits at the Fed, I would know with certainty that they were 100% safe and instantly available. The “Chicago Plan” and New Deal Banking Reform | Levy Economics Institute (levyinstitute.org) Narrow banking schemes have a similar motivation. “A proposal for the feds balance sheet”

The difference between Bitcoin and FTX

Bitcoin is a digital currency (cryptocurrency) that can be paid to another bitcoin user willing to accept it via a blockchain account. It is backed by nothing and promises nothing. Its US dollar value has fallen from $65,496 on November 14, 2021, to $15,630 on November 21, 2022.

“FTX Exchange was a leading centralized cryptocurrency exchange specializing in derivatives and leveraged products. Founded in 2018, FTX offered a range of trading products, including derivatives, options, volatility products, and leveraged tokens. It also provided spot markets in more than 300 cryptocurrency trading pairs such as BTC/USDT, ETH/USDT, XRP/USDT, and its native token FTT/USDT.12 In early November 2022, the exchange and the companies in its orbit began a steep fall from grace…. According to its bankruptcy filing, FTX, which was once valued at $32 billion and has $8 billion of liabilities it can’t pay, may have as many as 1 million creditors…. On November 16, a class-action lawsuit was filed in a Florida federal court, alleging that Sam Bankman-Fried created a fraudulent cryptocurrency scheme designed to take advantage of unsophisticated investors from across the country. ” “FTX exchange”

The difference between Bitcoin and FTX is that Bitcoin is a digital coin/token that some believe might achieve wide adoption as money and thus a stable demand that could stabilize its price. In my opinion, this is HIGHLY unlikely. I explained this potential eight years ago: “Cryptocurrencies the bitcoin phenomena” “The future of bitcoin exchanges” But most people buying Bitcoin are gambling that they can sell it for a higher price than they paid for it (first cousins to slot machine addicts).

On the other hand, FTX and its related products and services promised real things and to play by known rules (contracts). On November 11, FTX and its affiliated firms were put into bankruptcy. Billions of dollars where missing? Founder Sam Bankman-Fried (SBF) claims that he was just careless. It appears more likely that he was a lying fraudster. “An attorney also said the firm had been run as a ‘personal fiefdom’ of Bankman-Fried with $300 million spent on real estate such as homes and vacation properties for senior staff.” “Crypto lender genesis says no plans to file bankruptcy imminently” Presumably to promote himself as a good guy and to win influential friends, SBF also contributed millions to charities and politicians.

Most crypto product and service providers want regulations that will give potential investors and customers more confidence in their products but that will not stifle the potential creativity of a dynamic industry. Hopefully congress will get on with it — carefully. “Crypto bill criticized”

“Sam Bankman-Fried, the founder of the FTX exchange and Alameda Research, a cryptocurrency trading platform, seemed to confuse his bank and his companies. According to John Ray, the new CEO in charge of the restructuring of his empire which went bankrupt on November 11, Bankman-Fried received a personal loan of $1 billion from Alameda. He is not alone: the firm, which is a kind of cryptocurrency hedge fund, has also lent $543 million in personal loan to Nishad Singh, an associate of Bankman-Friend, and $55 million to Ryan Salame, the co-CEO of FTX Digital Markets, one of FTX’s affiliates.

“’Never in my career have I seen such a complete failure of corporate controls and such a complete absence of trustworthy financial information as occurred here,’ Ray wrote. ‘From compromised systems integrity and faulty regulatory oversight abroad, to the concentration of control in the hands of a very small group of inexperienced, unsophisticated and potentially compromised individuals, this situation is unprecedented.’” “Bankman-Fried received 1bn in personal loan from his company”

“Bankman-Fried’s net worth peaked at $26 billion.^[11] In October 2022, he had an estimated net worth of $10.5 billion.^[12] However, on November 8, 2022, amid FTX’s solvency crisis, his net worth was estimated to have dropped 94% in a day to $991.5 million, according to the Bloomberg Billionaires Index, the largest one-day drop in the index’s history.^[13]^[10] By November 11, 2022, the Bloomberg Billionaires Index considered Bankman-Fried to have no material wealth.^[14]” “Sam Bankman-Fried”

I assume that jail is next, perhaps in the cell previously used by Bernie Madoff.

If you subscribe to The Economist you can read fascinating details here: “The failure of ftx and Sam Bankman-Fried will leave deep scars”

Econ 101: The Value of Money

During a discussion of Bitcoin with friends, it became clear to me that it might be helpful if I explained some fundamentals of how the value of money is determined. Like most everything else, money’s value is ultimately determined by its supply and demand.

Demand for money reflects the public’s need to keep an inventory of it in order to use it for making payments. Bitcoin are generally held as a speculative asset rather than for payments as almost no one will accept them in payment. “Cryptocurrencies-the bitcoin phenomena”

The supply of money is determined by those who created it, generally central banks. Generally central banks issue their currency, thus increasing its supply, by lending it (generally to banks) or by buying assets, generally their government’s debt. When anyone holding that currency no longer wants it and has the right to redeem it, the central bank takes it back in exchange for the asset it purchased in the first place, thus reducing the money supply. Under the gold standard, currency was redeemed for gold. The rules governing a central bank’s issuing and redeeming its currency defines the nature of its monetary regime. That is the topic of this econ 101 lesson.

As none of us has ever redeemed our currency, it is understandable that my friends confused spending their money with redeeming it. Spending it transfers it to someone else without changing its supply, while redeeming it reduces its supply. Cryptocurrencies add a new category to our discussion of money. As noted by “a billionaire hedge-fund manager… cryptocurrencies are a ‘limited supply of nothing.’” “Crypto skeptics growing”

As discussed further below, the supply of Bitcoin increases slowly and steadily over time as determined by an unchangeable formula and Bitcoin cannot be redeemed for anything. The U.S. dollar and virtually every other national currency in the world grow at more erratic rates as determined by their issuing central banks. So what makes the value of the dollar relatively stable over long periods of time? The fall in its value by about 8% over the last month is nothing compared to bitcoin’s fall of 23% over the same period and over 50% over the last half year. Over the past 15 years the dollar’s value has declined less than 2% each year. Unlike Bitcoin, dollars are widely accepted for payments that are denominated in dollars, including our taxes, and thus held (demanded) to make such payments. Almost no Bitcoins are held to make payments as almost no one will accept them for payments. But I want to focus on a currency’s supply.

There are fundamentally three broad approaches to determining the supply of a currency. Historically, the supply of most currencies were determined by fixing their price to what they could be redeemed for, such as gold or silver. I have called such a system for regulating money’s supply, a hard anchor. “Real SDR Currency Board” The value of a currency can be fixed (the price set) to something real such as gold or a basket of goods. A country with a strict gold standard, which the U.S. never really had, issues its currency (dollars) whenever anyone wants to pay the fixed gold price for more of them. If the dollar price of gold in the market rises above its official price, there would be an arbitrage profit from buying gold from the central bank at its lower official price. Such gold could be resold in the market at the higher price. But the key point is that this mechanism (what I call currency board rules) of redeeming currency reduces its supply and thus reduces prices in this currency in the market (deflation). Several of the monetary systems I helped establish, work in this way (Bulgaria and Bosnia and Herzegovina). “One Currency for Bosnia”

The most common system of monetary control today is for the central bank to determine its currency’s supply by buying or selling it in the market (the Federal Reserve can buy treasury bills, etc. to increase the supply of dollars). Most central banks today adjust their money supplies in an effort to achieve an inflation target (a much more complicated subject). “Czech National Bank: Inflation Targeting in Transition Economies” Generally they do so by setting an intermediate target for a short-term interest at which market participants (banks) can borrow from the central bank. Such fiat currencies, such as the U.S. dollar, are not redeemable but are widely accepted in payment for goods, services and debts.

This brings us to Bitcoin. The supply of Bitcoin is determined by a formula that predetermines its gradual growth to 21 million by 2140. There are currently about 19 million in existence. The supply is increased by giving them to successful miners for verifying the legitimacy of each transaction (another complicated subject). Thus, the issuer (the formula) received services (protection against double spending the same coin) but no assets such as gold or treasury bills for creating and issuing new Bitcoins. Once created, an issued bitcoin can never be redeemed (i.e. the outstanding supply can never be reduced). When you spend or give away your Bitcoins you are circulating them to other holders, not redeeming them.

When my imaginary aunt Sally discusses Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies more generally, she tends to mix up the marvelous new payment technologies for paying my dollars all over the world with private money such as Bitcoin and Tether. She also doesn’t seem to quite understand that most money has always been privately produced including the U.S. dollars that we spend in various ways (occasionally even by handing over cash). “A shift in monetary regimes”

But these distinctions are critical when considering what role the government should play in our monetary system. The truly amazing technical progress we have experienced and the dramatic increase in the standard of living of the average person it has delivered over the last century was made possible by a government that provided a general framework in which we, the consuming beneficiaries of this progress, could make informed choices. Our government, wisely, generally did not make such decisions for use.

With that in mind consider “a letter addressed to Senate Majority Leader Charles E. Schumer (D-N.Y.), Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) and other congressional leaders, [from 26 influential technology personalities that] outlined what it described as potentially grave dangers of cryptocurrencies.” They are absolutely correct to expose and condemn the technical and economic weaknesses of blockchain technology—the distributed ledger with which Bitcoin claims to avoid the need for trusted third parties to record and document payment transaction (as happens on a centralized ledger when you pay from your bank deposit).

But the fact that foolish people invest in Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies does not justify our government prohibiting and restricting them from doing so. The government requires the banks in which we put our money to publish properly audited financial statements of the assets backing our deposits and to set minimum capital requirements to protect against the possible loss of bank asset value (e.g., loan defaults). Cryptocurrencies claiming redeemability at a stable value (so called stable coins) should similarly be required to disclose the rules by which they operate and the composition and value of the assets backing their digital coins. In short, government regulations should help us decide what we want to buy and/or hold without restricting the ability of fintech pioneers to explore and innovate products to offer.

Overly restrictive regulations create incentives for incumbents to create barriers to competition. Large and intrusive governments tend toward corruption. The Federal Reserve System seems quite aware of these risks as it cautiously explores whether to compete with the private sector in developing a central bank digital currency. “Econ 101-Central Bank digital currency-CBDC”

So when considering the government’s role in money and payments be sure to clearly distinguish money from payment technology and limit government to setting the rules of the game that maximize the ability of private consumers to make wise choices. But perhaps the biggest policy decision of all is how the government should determine/regulate the supply of its currency, most of which is privately created. I support a currency whose value is fixed to something real (a hard anchor) and whose supply is determined by the market via currency board rules. “A libertarian money”

Econ 101: Retail Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC)

The history of money is long and fascinating. Even the currency most frequently used in the United States has a rich history. Money makes possible the specialization and trade upon which our great wealth depends. Through its long history of development and evolution, money has serviced two key functions. It provides the standard unit for pricing traded goods and services so that their values can be meaningfully compared (it’s the unit of account) and it is the common asset in which payments are made (it’s the medium of exchange or payment).

Medium of Payment–Money

When you hire the neighborhood boy to mow your lawn, you probably first agree on a price (the number of dollars) This is the unit of account function of money, which is indispensable for the functioning of markets. You could agree to trade with the neighborhood boy a nice lunch with lemonade in exchange for his mowing your lawn. But paying him $15 in Federal Reserve Notes has the advantage that he can exchange it for your lunch, or he can buy his lunch at Wendy’s or anything else of his choice.

Obviously, markets can’t really function if each item or service is priced in a different money unit (dollars, Euro, rubles, bitcoin, etc.). The Continental Congress of the United States authorized the issuance of a new currency, the US dollar, on July 6, 1785. Following the ratification of the Constitution of the United States, the new Congress established the United States dollar as the official currency of the United States in the Coinage Act of 1792. The Act also established the United States Mint, which produced and circulated coins with a fix amount of gold or silver (later only gold). “History of the United States dollar”

As the result of the changing relative price of silver for gold, the bimetal gold/silver standard was replaced with the single metal standard of gold. The dollar was redefined in 1900 as “twenty-five and eight-tenths grains of gold nine-tenths fine,… and all forms of money issued or coined by the United States shall be maintained at a parity of value with this standard.” Fast forwarding through WWI and WWII and the creation of the Bretton Woods Institutions and the failure of the US to adhere to the requirements of the gold standard, the US “closed its gold window” and proceeded with varying degrees of success to manage the supply of its currency so as to preserve its purchasing power.

Over this long history many private actors (banks) created dollars. There are in fact thousands of private producers of dollars (Chase dollars, B of A dollars, etc.) Glossing over the details, it was a one currency system–the US dollar–because each bank’s currency could be redeemed for gold at fix price or, after the creation of our central bank in 1913, for a deposit at a Federal Reserve Bank. This is obvious when you pay with Federal Reserve Notes, which are direct obligations of our central bank. Originally each note was identified by the Federal Reserve Bank that issued it–there were twelve of them–but even that distinction has been eliminated. Few people even noticed the difference. But most of our dollar money supply (M1: Federal Reserve Notes in circulation plus demand deposits at banks) is privately produced by banks and exists in digital form as accounting records with each of our banks.

Means of Payment

Our money–US dollars (or Euros or bitcoin)–is quite distinct from the various ways in which you can pay it–payment technologies. Cash payments–the transfer of Federal Reserve Notes from me to you–are hand delivered. But most payments are made by digitally transferring an amount of dollars from my bank account to yours. Such digital payments have the obvious advantage of enabling you to pay someone across town, across the country or even across the world (if they accept your currency) plus the safety of keeping your money in the bank pending such payments. It’s not recommended that you send cash in the mail. The key insight is to understand how my dollar balance in my bank gets to your account at your bank and why your bank is willing to accept it. The quick answer is that your bank will not generally accept a claim on my bank but will record my payment because it receives an increase in its deposits at a Federal Reserve Bank of that amount.

In the old days I wrote a check that authorized my bank (after the check was deposited by you at your bank, which sent it to my bank) to debit my balance with the indicated amount and to transfer that amount from its balance at the Fed to your bank’s account at the Fed. SWIFT performs this payment instruction/authorization function for cross border payments (i.e., those involving two central banks). Today I issue this instruction directly to my bank electronically on the internet or my smart phone. The “dollars” are one currency no matter who creates and issues them because whoever receives them can redeem them for balances at the central bank (or in the old days for gold).

Visa, Master Card and American Express credit cards provide payments on my behalf by lending me the money before I actually make the payment from my bank account to the credit provider at the end of the month. The loan to me involved in such payments, increases the cost of this type of payment.

The execution of the interbank portion of my payments have become increasingly efficient over time but can still take several days because the Federal Reserve Banks do not operate in the evening or on weekends. When our central bank launches FedNow next year it will allow the continuous processing of payments between banks 24/7.

The front end of the payment process, i.e., my initiation of a payment to you, for example, has also benefited from software improvements. Unlike bitcoin, Ethereum, or Ripple, which are currencies, Zelle, Venmo, PayPal, etc. are payment technologies rather than money. They are means for paying US dollars (or other currencies) from me to you. Venmo, for example can be thought of as the payment service part of a bank. It can hold money for you and can transfer it to others (who must also have a Venmo account) but Venmo cannot make loans with your money. Thus, people without bank accounts can use Venmo as if it were a bank account.

The Federal Reserve and other central banks are investigating whether they should also provide the service to the public of paying dollars with so called Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC). The Federal Reserve defines a CBDC “as a digital liability of the Federal Reserve that is widely available to the general public.” “Money and payments–Fed report” CBDCs would be a direct claim on the central bank like Federal Reserve notes (cash) but would be held and transferred digitally like your bank deposits. If the Fed goes forward with introducing CBDCs, they would almost certainly be what are called retail CBDCs. Rather than opening accounts at the Fed directly, we would each do so through a bank. We would sign up with and deal with a bank to hold the Fed’s CBDCs. The Fed has no existing capacity to deal directly with each of us in the way that our banks do. The balance of this note will explore how such CBDC would compare with, say, Venmo balances and payments and whether they are worth the trouble.

All digital money is recorded on electronic ledgers, either distributed as with a block chain used by bitcoin, or centrally maintained as with our bank accounts. As block chains are slow and expensive to verify, they would not be used for CBDCs. Just in case you didn’t know, when you walk into your bank and deposit cash, they don’t put it in the value for you. They record the value of the cash you delivered in our account with the bank, and they return the cash to the Fed for a credit to your bank’s Fed account or invest or lend it to someone else (after having converted it into a balance in their Fed account). It is both useful and interesting (to us economists at least) to walk through how my deposit at my bank is transferred to you (your account at your bank).

Taking Venmo as the example of existing digital payment technology, your deposit of dollars to your Venmo account would be digitally transferred from your bank account to your account on Venmo’s ledger. Your bank would transfer the same amount to Venmo’s deposit account with its bank (in the name of PayPal, which owns Venmo) in the usual interbank transfer manner. All (double entry) financial ledgers have a liability side (your deposit with the bank — what the bank owes you) and an asset side (the cash you deposited or the balance in your bank’s fed account for the money you had transferred to it). The ledger shows what the bank owes (liabilities) and the assets it holds with which to pay out what it owes (assets).

All digital money, whether your bank deposit or Venmo or bitcoin, must provide for an on ramp into and off ramp out of the digital system, i.e., for the process of paying cash in to acquire the digital money and of drawing it out as cash. Interestingly, Kenya has had a version of Venmo payments for several decades already. Kenya’s M-Pesa The ownership and use of cell phones (not necessarily smart phones) is very widespread in Kenya, while bank accounts are far more limited. Thus, people paid for phone airtime by the hour by paying cash to street venders selling such service. This became the on ramp for the unbanked to fund their M-Pesa mobile money accounts.

If you have money in your Venmo account (a positive balance), you can issue a payment instruction via your Venmo wallet directly to the friend you are paying. You can also instruct Venmo to take that the money simultaneously from your bank account. You can do all of this on your smart phone while waiting for your drink at a local bar. If your friend doesn’t have a Venmo account, Venmo will instruct her on how to set up one in order to receive your payment. If you give Venmo a day or two to complete the payment, it is free. If you want it delivered immediately (within a few minutes) there is a small fee. When the payment is complete, your balance at Venmo (or your bank) will have been reduced by the amount of the payment and your friend’s balance with Venmo will have been increased by the same amount. She can leave the money there or move it to her bank account (on her cell phone) if she has one. The money will “exist” as an accounting record somewhere. These “dollars” are accepted from wherever they come (from whoever produced them) because they are claims on, or are converted into deposits at, a Federal Reserve Bank.

How would this compare with a payment with central bank digital currency (CBDC)? While the Federal Reserve has not indicated the details of a possible CBDC, it would probably work something like this. I would ask my bank to sell me CBDCs by debiting my checking account by the indicated amount. These would be added to (credited to) my CBDC account at my bank. My bank would transfer that amount from its general account at its Federal Reserve Bank to a segregated CBDC account at the Fed. My cell phone wallet would record (by accessing my CBDC account at my bank) this amount, and my bank would back it 100% with its CBDC account at the Fed.

Why does this matter? It matters because if my bank fails (goes into bankruptcy), the amount in the bank’s CBDC reserves at the Fed would be excluded from the bankruptcy process. They are exclusively and fully available to back my CBDC holdings. When I pay CBDC to my friend, her bank will receive them without regard for the condition of my bank.

Some of you will recognize this as the equivalent of the so-called Chicago Plan. The Chicago Plan required banks to back all checking account deposits 100% with central bank reserves. Our bank deposits today are largely backed by bank loans and investments plus a small deposit with the central bank. Such CBDC deposits would be totally free of default risk. While all CBDCs would exist on the books of the Federal Reserve, ownership by individuals would be reflected on the books of their respective banks and in their CBDC wallets.

Like the Chicago Plan, CBDCs have the potential to reduce the money multiplier (the ratio of broad money to base money–the Federal Reserve’s monetary liabilities). A shift from demand deposits to CBDC deposits at banks would reduce the funds available to banks for lending by increasing the reserves they must hold at the Fed. This could be easily compensated for by increasing base money (Federal Reserve monetary liabilities). Sudden shifts to the safer CBDCs in reaction to financial shocks, like traditional bank runs, would require central bank intervention. The Fed has also indicated that it would want any digital replacement of its currency notes to provide as much user privacy as possible (like cash) consistent with “affording the transparency necessary to deter criminal activity.”

How would this compare with a Venmo payment. From our perspective (the perspective of the payer and payee) a Venmo or CBDC payment would be executed in the same or very similar way. The difference is that the CBDC balances would be totally risk free (being relatively direct claims on the central bank) while the Venmo balances would be exposed to the risk of the failure of the bank in which Venmo keeps its assets that back our Venmo balances. It is not obvious that this is a big enough difference to make it worth undertaking.

Econ 101: Moving money abroad

The Washington Post published an article this morning titled “THREE DOZEN TYCOONS MET PUTIN ON INVASION DAY. MOST HAD MOVED MONEY ABROAD.”“Offshore Putin Russia Oligarchs Pandora” It said things like “many of them had been moving their wealth out of the country for years,” and “The money often ends up offshore.” While where income is claimed is important for tax purposes, which is another interesting and complicated story, the abandon with which this story discusses moving wealth around drives us economists up the wall.

Wealth can be physical (factories, stores, etc.) or human (the knowledge or skills of people). Financial wealth, such as money, is a claim on physical or human wealth. People can move abroad, and many skilled Russian’s are doing so. Moving physical capital abroad is more difficult if even possible. A yacht built in Russia can be sailed off to another country, but not a shopping mall. What this and similar articles generally mean by moving wealth abroad, is, as the headline states, moving money abroad. This is often done to minimize taxation, which is usually based on where income is recorded. “The corporate income tax” That is an interesting subject of its own but not my focus today.

How do people “move money abroad?” Money is rarely moved in suitcases anymore, and a bag full of rubles can’t be spent abroad in most places anyway. So, let’s take a deeper look at what is really happening when Russian tycoons (or anyone else) “move money abroad.”

The easiest example is when Russian exporters are paid in foreign currency (generally US dollars). If the exporter has a dollar account in a bank abroad (in a US bank to keep it simple) the payment for his export can be deposited directly there by a debit to Shell Oil’s bank account and a credit to the Russian exporter’s US bank account via the normal interbank transfer process. He can hold it there or buy US treasures or other US financial assets. His money is moved abroad by moving (selling) his goods abroad and keeping the payment abroad. This helps explain why Russia is insisting that German and other buyers of its oil must pay in rubles.

To pay for oil or any other Russian export with rubles the foreign buyers must first buy rubles in the foreign exchange market. The increased demand for rubles increases its exchange rate (or keeps it from falling as Russian importers sell rubles for dollars to pay for imports). Russia has made the process of paying dollars then buying rubles simple and almost automatic, but critically the Russian exporter receives ruble. Normally Russian exporters would convert dollar payments into ruble with which to pay for their workers and local suppliers, etc. But by keeping the dollar payment abroad, they have effectively “moved money abroad” by shipping goods (and services) abroad.

If a tycoon’s income/wealth is local (in rubles), and he wants to move it abroad, he can’t just write a check (or SWIFT payment order) to deposit X amount of money in his account with the Bank of America. The funds in his local bank, which will be in rubles, will need to be exchanged for dollars in the foreign exchange market. He (his bank) will deposit his ruble in the ruble account of the seller of the dollars and will receive those dollars in his Bank of America account in the U.S. If the supply of dollars to the foreign exchange market are not being supplied as the result of Russian exports, the increased demand for dollars will depreciate the ruble (increase the ruble price of a dollar). With a balance of imports and exports the ruble/dollar exchange rate should be stable. But a net increase in the movement of money abroad would depreciate the ruble. In short, underlying the movement of money abroad, there is a net movement of goods (exports minus imports) abroad.

If there was a sudden increase in money being moved abroad from Russia (often called capital flight) the ruble’s exchange rate would depreciate and the cost of imports would thereby increase.

A Libertarian Money

The long history of money began to take its modern form with the development of national central banks. “The story of central banking goes back at least to the seventeenth century, to the founding of the first institution recognized as a central bank, the Swedish Riksbank. Established in 1668 as a joint stock bank, it was chartered to lend the government funds and to act as a clearing house for commerce. A few decades later (1694), the most famous central bank of the era, the Bank of England, was founded also as a joint stock company to purchase government debt.”[1] Over time central banks were given a monopoly over issuing their country’s currency and usually for regulating the country’s banks, which create most of each country’s money.

Generally, the currencies issued by central banks (or commercial banks) were claims on, and thus redeemable for, gold or silver. The gold standard oversaw a long period of trade expansion and economic flourishing. A currency’s fixed price for gold regulated the money supply both domestically and between other countries also on the gold standard, keeping its supply consistent with the fixed gold price. Countries, like individual families, cannot buy more that they sell over their live time (whatever the lifetime of a country might be). The gold standard, via the price-specie flow mechanism, preserved such balance of trade between gold standard countries.

Two countries on the gold standard, with fixed prices for gold for their currencies, have an unchangeably fixed exchange rate for their two currencies. But if the domestic purchasing power of each currency changes (inflation or deflation) the real value of the nominal exchange rate will appreciate or depreciate. The real exchange rate adjusts via changes in the domestic prices of one country relative to the other. If a country buys more abroad than it sells abroad, the outflow of its money to pay for its trade deficit will reduce its money supply if gold standard rules are observed (gold flows out and the supply of currency backed by that gold contracts). The reduction in its money supply will reduce domestic (and thus foreign) prices in that money. This adjustment in domestic prices relative to foreign prices, which make foreign goods relatively more expensive domestically and domestic goods cheaper abroad, will reduce and eventually eliminated the trade deficit.

When the United States established the Federal Reserve System, its central bank, in 1913, it continued to fix the price of the currency it issued in gold. But it only adhered to gold stand rules loosely and in 1971 no longer had enough gold to honor its commitment to foreign central banks to redeem its currency for gold. Thus, on August 15, 1971, President Richard Nixon “closed the gold window.” The era of the value of currencies anchored by (fixed to) gold or some other hard anchor was over. The Federal Reserve and other central banks needed to develop other criteria for determining the supply of their currencies.

Following the inflationary experience in the U.S. in the 1960s and 70s, there were more and more demands for clear rules for the Fed’s regulation of is money supply, now that it was no longer constrained by a hard anchor (e.g., the price of gold). The objective of monetary policy was broadly accepted around the world to provide a stable value for the currency, though the Federal Reserve was shackled with the dual mandate of price stability and maximum employment. The short-term demand for money was not sufficiently stable for a Friedman rule (fixed growth rate for base, narrow, or broad money – M0, M1, or M2). Inflation forecast targeting (IFT) has evolved to become the state of the art of fiat money supply rules.

In IFT regimes, the central banks’ policy instruments (primarily the interest rate at which it lends to banks) are transparently set on the expectation (based on model forecasts and judgement) that in one to two years in the future they will produce (or maintain) the central bank’s target for inflation. While this approach has performed relatively well, its management of the money supply has been far from perfect and central banks are experiencing increasing government pressure to relax their price stability mandates. And then there are a few countries whose central banks have caved to fiscal dominance and behaved terribly.

Would some cryptocurrency, ala Hayek, provide a better monetary system? Some people claim that libertarians like cryptocurrencies like bitcoin because they do not rely in any way on government. Perhaps those people meant “anarchists” because libertarians accept the critical importance of government in defining and protecting property rights and personal safety. Cryptocurrency providers have been lobbying the U.S. congress (and others) to set out the rules for their legal operations. Are they money or speculative assets? Bitcoin and most other cryptocurrencies do not satisfy the requirements for a good libertarian money because they do not satisfy the requirements for good money. This article explains why this is so and defines properties of a good libertarian money.

Are Cryptocurrencies the Answer?

Economists note the incredible power of markets and market prices in directing our scarce resources (our labor, capital, and technology) to their best uses. But prices are expressed in terms of money, the common unit of account that facilitates comparing relative values.

The presumption, and actual reality, is that within each market prices are expressed in terms of the same money. It would not facilitate our choices if apples were priced at $6 per bushel and oranges at 3 bitcoin per bag. Presently, virtually nothing is priced in bitcoin. In addition, sellers don’t generally accept payment in a currency other than the one in which the good’s price is expressed, thus very few sellers will accept bitcoin in payment. Moreover, you can only accept bitcoin in payment if you have a bitcoin account together with the software required (a bitcoin wallet).

None of these are insurmountable barriers to growth in the use of bitcoins or other cryptocurrencies, but they do require strong incentives for putting up with and/or overcoming them. I explained the basics of bitcoin’s value in the linked blog in 2014: “Cryptocurrencies-the bitcoin phenomena”[2] One incentive would be to replace the established currency in a market (a country’s legal tender) that has very unstable value (think Zimbabwe, Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil at various times in their histories). Another would be the need for anonymity (as is achieved with paper currency) that an illegal drug dealer or a political dissident in a repressive regime might require and find convenient.

Some mistook Fredrick Hayek’s “Competition in Currency” as an endorsement of what we now call cryptocurrencies. In the Preface to that book Arthur Seldon explained “The requirement is not to deprive government of the power to issue money but to deny it the exclusive right to do so and to force the citizenry to use it at the price it specifies. It is thus the government monopoly of money that is objectionable, and history is full of examples of governments that have attempted to enforce their power by extreme measures, including the ultimate sanction of death. The solution is therefore to allow people to use the money they find most convenient, whether the money issued by their own government or by other governments.”[3]

When the Zimbabwean dollar became worthless, reaching annual inflation rates of 10,000 percent in 2007 and exploding in 2008 with an estimated peaked rate in September 2008 of about 500 billion percent per annum, the Zimbabwean government legalized the use of foreign currencies and the country immediately dollarized (priced and paid in U.S. dollars flown in from South Africa). This was the remedy Hayek proposed and it ended inflation almost instantly.[4]

Later in 1976 Hayek followed up his Competition in Currency proposal with the more radical broadening to private currencies in his AEI pamphlet Denationalization of Money, An Analysis of the Theory and Practice of Concurrent Currencies.[5] Most money these days is privately produced by your and my banks (our deposits), but they are fixed in value to and ultimately exchangeable for the U.S. dollars created by our central bank. They are part of the U.S. dollar money supply. Bank deposits are not alternative, private units of account. In this second book Hayek was broadening his call for currency competition to the bitcoins of the world. Hayek was proposing that inflating central bank currencies should face competition from privately produced units of account and monetary assets (medium of exchange and payment).

Otmar Issing, Chief Economist of the ECB and member of its Executive Board from 1998 – 2006, concluded that adopting Hayek’s proposal “We would ‘discover’ that private currency competition – at least nowadays – would not work and would not serve the people affected.”[6] I made the same point to Hayek directly in a debate at the 1976 Mont Pelerin Society meetings in St. Andrews, Scotland. Competing private units of account would undermine an essential function of money in market economies (communicating the relative value of things). In high inflation countries, such as Venezuela, many things are priced in U.S. dollars. However, the Venezuelan government has made payments in dollars illegal. In such cases, Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies are used to some extent to make dollar denominated payments. But as the value of Bitcoin is so unstable, holding on to then is very risky.

In El Salvador, which had successfully dealt with inflation by dollarizing a decade ago, President Nayib Bukele added Bitcoin as legal tender as of September 7, 2021. Though this legally obliges merchants to accept Bitcoin in payment, “few ordinary folk use…. Bitcoin, which has lost 70% of its value since November, is far too volatile to be a good store of value, especially in a country where GDP per person is $4,400.” according to a June 16, 2022, article in The Economist.[7] No one prices in Bitcoin.

Cryptocurrencies that use a Block Chain or Distributed Ledger Technology suffer from other problems as well. Bitcoin’s claim to eliminate the trusted third party (bank accounting systems) required by existing electronic (digital) payments with bank deposits, is particularly attractive to libertarians. But this claim is a gross exaggeration. To prevent the double spending of the same bitcoin, each transaction must be verified by so called miners (third parties you don’t need to trust) which takes five to ten minutes and very large amounts of electricity to process as miners race to solve increasingly difficult mathematical puzzles. Also, all transactions are very public on block chains, though accounts may be held under pseudonyms and are thus described as pseudo-anonymous.

Though actual bitcoin transactions have been made easier via the development of software wallets, many assign their bitcoins to exchanges (trusted third parties).[8] The loss of a bitcoin owner’s password to his account is fatal and final. Those bitcoins are lost forever. But more deadly to the use of bitcoin as money (unit of account and medium of payment) is the volatility of its value. The price of a bitcoin has ranged from just under $30,000 to over $67,500 over the last year. It fell to $18,958 on June 18, 2022. Thus, payments of bitcoin generally involve temporarily purchasing them with dollars or some other stable currency and then exchanging them back to dollars as quickly as possible after receipt. The costs of these exchanges are often overlooked when claiming that bitcoin transfers are cheaper than traditional means of electronic payments. Of equal importance is that for an asset to function as money, it must be generally or at least broadly accepted for payments. Bitcoin fails this requirement miserably. Most buyers and sellers of bitcoin are indulging in a form of gambling rather seeking a “good” medium of payment.

Bloomberg exposes a false “libertarian” attraction to Cryptocurrencies on blockchains:

“An app running on, say, Ethereum, can’t easily be taken offline, since there’s no particular host or entity that can take it down.

“This architecture is inherently oppositional to governments and large corporations, and it’s for this reason that crypto has so much embedded politics. The whole space traces its roots back decades to hippies and hackers in Northern California, who anticipated that in an online world, pure cash-like peer-to-peer transactions would be impossible. When you pay a friend using Zelle or something, the payment goes through a series of intermediaries. You can get kicked off Venmo for buying a Cuban sandwich. Bitcoin can’t kick you off the network for anything.

“Take away the uncensorability of crypto, and all you’re left with is Ponzi schemes, dog coins, and drawings of monkeys. (Wait! That’s basically all that exists right now in the space, so ignore that thought.)”[9]

Unlike bitcoin, which are not redeemable for anything, so called stable coins have a fixed price for some other legal tender currency or even, potential, gold. The quality of the assurance of a stable price, and redemption at that price, vary considerably. Appropriate regulation that required transparency and external audit would be good. But the payment technology that has emerged in recent years such as PayPal, Venmo, or Zelle to transfer U.S. dollars (claims on bank accounts and ultimately on the Federal Reserve) have already introduced efficient, low cost, and fast payments of legal tender currency. The Federal Reserve is also modernizing its interbank settlement system. FedNow, which will operate real time 24/7 began testing in September and is expected to be operational in the summer of 2023. It is hard to see any further advantages introduced by so called stable coins.

The Libertarian Alternative

There are monetary regimes, however, that satisfy libertarian preferences for minimal government involvement and manipulation while satisfying truly valuable needs. The Constitution of the United States provides the authority for such a regime in Article I Section 8 “To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures;” The classical gold standard was such a system. However, its “rules” were diluted when taken over by central banks. Moreover, the practice of actually buying and storing gold distorted its market price and was costly, flaws that are avoided in the system I propose below.

In the U.S. today, as well as every other country in the world, there are thousands of private companies that create and offer their own currency. Most of them are banks. While that would seem to make libertarians happy, thousands of individual bank producers of money would not constitute an efficient monetary system without rules and mechanisms for linking them into what we think of as one currency–in our case the U.S. dollar.

While the dollars deposited in my bank are my bank’s liability, I am protected from the bank’s failure by deposit insurance. Your bank accepts my deposits in my bank because my bank credits your bank’s account with the Federal Reserve (by debiting its account with the Fed). In short, the deposits at thousands of different banks are accepted by every other bank because they are all ultimately claims on the Fed. This is similar to the gold standard in which the money created by thousands of banks were accepted everywhere because they were redeemable for a well-defined amount of gold.

Libertarians want a currency and monetary system that can’t be manipulated by the government (central bank). The dollar is now a fiat currency, redeemable for a deposit with the Federal Reserve, and very importantly, acceptable by the government for the payment of taxes. Thus, its supply is determined by the Fed’s judgement of what is needed for “price stability and maximum sustainable employment.” We libertarians want a currency that we each individually control the supply of. In short, we want a currency with a hard anchor (which was the case for the gold standard) supplied according to currency board rules (which historically were violated by central banks nominally anchored by gold).

Currency board rules require the currency issuer to sell or repurchase its currency at its fixed price in response to public demand. Any number of private producers of dollars redeemable at an officially fixed price for a well-defined anchor (gold, aluminium, a basket of goods, etc.) would result in a money supply determined by the public that was consistent with and appropriate for its fixed price to the anchor and that was fully interchangeable. The central bank would be passive. It would have no monetary policy (beyond the fixed price for the anchor). This seems like libertarian heaven.

In addition to being anchored to a single commodity whose relative price could vary more than would the price of a basket (portfolio) of commodities, the gold standard was flawed by central banks actually buying and storing gold and thus distorting its market price. An ideal regime would use the anchor for setting the currency’s issue and redemption price but the anchor itself would not be purchased and stored by the central bank. Instead, the central bank would issue its currency for assets (such as treasury bills) of equivalent market value to the anchor. The arbitrage mechanism works just as well with this “indirect redeemability”[10]

I led the IMF teams that established the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which follows currency board rules. I have written a book about that experience.[11] I also participated in Bulgaria’s central bank’s adoption of currency board rules. The currencies of both countries are anchored to the Euro and their currency experiences have been outstanding. Their money supplies are basically regulated by market arbitrage. If the market exchange rate of the Bulgarian lev to the Euro rises above its official rate, it would be cheaper for the banks that issue lev to buy Euros from the Bulgarian National Bank thus reducing the supply of lev in the market and lowering its market price for Euro. See my article on Bulgaria’s experience.[12]

A Libertarian International Reserve Currency

What about cross border payments? In brief, cross border transactors have found it economical to price and settle transactions in a vehicle currency, usually the US dollar. The increasingly frequent deployment of sanctions enforced by restricting the use of the dollar has intensified the search for alternatives. See my more detailed discussion in “The Empire and the Dollar”[13] The search for alternatives to the dollar as proposed by Russia’s Sergey Glazyev[14] risks fragmenting the global market place.

The International Monetary Fund has already created such an alternative. An internationally established unit (anchor) is much less likely to be abused for national political purposes, but the IMF’s Special Drawing Right (SDR) suffers from some serious defects. However, these can be fixed.[15] [16]

The SDR can be “fixed” in two stages. The first is to develop the private sector’s uses of the SDR unit of account (invoicing oil and other globally traded commodities in SDRs, borrowing and lending denominated in SDRs, SDR bonds and bills, and digital SDR deposits–eSDRs). See my more detailed discussion in “Proposal for an IMF Staff Executive Board Paper on Promoting Market SDRs.”[17] As with national currencies, where hundreds of individual producers of the national currency are made interchangeable by being claims on the central bank, the market SDRs of many competitive producers would be interchangeable as the result of being redeemable for the official SDR of the IMF.[18]

The second stage would require a reform of the IMF’s official SDR. Rather than allocating them from time to time to all IMF members, they should be issued according to currency board rules. In addition, the valuation of the official SDR should be changed from its current basket of five currencies to a small basket of homogeneous, globally traded commodities. The IMF’s existing rules for periodically adjusting the SDR’s valuation basket are transparent and appropriate and should continue to be used. In one sense, this would re-establish an improved international gold standard like system. It would be improved on the gold standard by replacing a single commodity anchor with a small portfolio of commodities and its supply would be improved by adopting the market driven rules of a currency board. Such a Real SDR issued by the IMF would bring to international payments the same hard anchor and currency board rules favored by libertarians for domestic currencies.[19]

[1] Michael D. Bordo, “A Brief History of Central Banks” Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Dec 2007 https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6670255.pdf

[2] Warren Coats: “Cryptocurrencies—the Bitcoin Phenomena,” Feb 14, 2014, https://wcoats.blog/2014/01/25/cryptocurrencies-the-bitcoin-phenomena/

[3] F. A. Hayek: Competition in Currency, A way to stop inflation, The Institute of Economic Affairs, Feb 1976, London

[4] Warren Coats: “Hyperinflation in Zimbabwe” Jan 25, 2014, https://wcoats.blog/2009/05/29/hyperinflation-in-zimbabwe/

[5] F. A. Hayek: Denationalization of Money The Institute of Economic Affairs Oct 1968 London

[6] Otmar Issing: “Hayek’s Suggestion for Currency Competition: A Central Banker’s View,” Chapter 8 of Stephen F. Frowen (editor): Hayek: Economist and Social Philosopher, A Critical Retrospect, Macmillan Press, 1997, London

[7] The Economist, “El-Salvador’s Government is Gambling on Bitcoin” June 16, 2022. https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2022/06/16/el-salvadors-government-is-gambling-on-bitcoin

[8] Warren Coats: “The Future of Bitcoin Exchanges, March 3, 2014,
https://wcoats.blog/2014/03/03/the-future-of-bitcoin-exchanges/

[9] Bloomberg: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2022-08-18/five-things-you-need-to-know-to-start-your day?cmpid=BBD081822_MKT&utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&utm_term=220818&utm_campaign=markets Aug 18, 2022

[10] R. L. Greenfield and L. B. Yeager, 1983, “A Laissez Faire Approach to Monetary Stability”, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 15: 302-15.

[11] Warren Coats, 2007: “One Currency for Bosnia – Creating the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina” Jameson Books, Chicago Ill. https://wcoats.blog/2008/08/13/one-currency-for-bosnia-creating-the-central-bank-of-bosnia-and-herzegovina/ or “Amazon– One Currency for Bosnia”

[12] Warren Coats: “Bulgaria and the Chicago Plan” Central Banking Vol. XXX Issue 3 (2020)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/warren_coats/51/

[13] Warren Coats, “The Empire and the Dollar”, John Hopkins Institute for Applied Economics, Global Health, and the Study of Business Enterprise, Studies in Applied Economics, SAE./No.207/March, 2022, https://www.dropbox.com/s/7bnvejb5zhqzatj/The-Empire-and-the-Dollar-by-Warren-Coats.pdf?dl=0

[14] Pepe Escabar, “Exclusive: Russia’s Sergey Glazyev introduces the new global financial system” The Cradle April 14, 2022

[15] Warren Coats. “Time for a New Global Currency?” New Global Studies Vol. 3 Iss. 1 (2010)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/warren_coats/1/

[16] Warren Coats, Dongsheng Di and Yuxuan Zhao. “Why the World needs a Reserve Asset with a Hard Anchor” Frontiers of Economics in China (2017)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/warren_coats/34/

[17] Warren Coats: “Proposal for an IMF Staff Executive Board Paper on Promoting Market SDRs” The Bretton Woods Committee Feb 19, 2019 : “Promoting Market SDRs”

[18] Warren Coats: “Real SDR Currency Board” Central Banking Journal Vol. XXII Iss. 2 (2011)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/warren_coats/25/

[19] Warren Coats. “Free Banking in the Digital Age” Banking & Finance Law Review Vol. 33 Iss. 3 (2018) p. 415 – 421 ISSN: 0832-8722 Available at: http://works.bepress.com/warren_coats/45/

The Empire and the Dollar

Committee for the Republic Salon

March 24, 2022

Warren Coats[1]

In our multicurrency world, the U.S. dollar is widely used for pricing internationally traded goods, for international payments, and for denominating the assets governments and companies hold as reserves. Why is that and what are its implications for U.S. behavior? What would a better system look like?

In a world of many different national currencies, the payment for international trade has found economy in using an intermediate, so-called vehicle currency to facilitate the exchange of the buyer’s currency into and delivery of the seller’s currency. Following the collapse in 1971 of the dollar-based gold exchange standard overseen by the International Monetary Fund, the dollar continues to dominate in this role. This role has given the United States important political power and financial benefits.

I will quickly review these benefits, and how they have come to encourage the U.S. to exploit them in exercising its international power, the forces that are building to seek an alternative, and the potential for the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) to provide an alternative.

The Dollar’s International Reserve Status

Cross border commerce and investments require a common currency to price and denominate them and the mechanisms for cross border payments. While modern technologies continue to increase the speed and ease and lower the cost of domestic payments of domestic currencies, cross border payments remain relatively slow and costly.

The payment and receipt of a currency is ultimately reflected/settled on the books of that currency’s issuer. If I pay you for something and your account is in a different bank than mine, the transfer of funds from my bank to your bank and to you will pass through a Federal Reserve Bank. My bank’s account at the Fed will be debited and yours will be credited. A fundamental difference between national and international currencies is that the central bank issuers of national currencies only hold deposits for banks that are domestically licensed, while the issuers of international currencies, such as the Special Drawing Right (SDR) of the International Monetary Fund, hold deposits from banks almost anywhere in the world, enabling the settlement of their payments to enjoy the efficiencies of domestic payments in domestic currencies.

The older gold standard functioned more like an international central bank issuer of currencies but without such an international central bank. Instead, national currencies were tied to gold by virtue of the commitment of central banks on the gold standard to redeem their currency for gold at a fixed price. Thus, any net flow of payments from one country to another was ultimately settled by transferring the ownership of the gold it was fixed to from the deficit to the surplus country. This could occur by debiting the deficit country’s gold account at the New York Federal Reserve Bank and crediting the surplus country’s gold account at the same place or by physically shipping the gold.

In today’s world, cross border payments generally involve the need to exchange one currency for another at exchange rates that fluctuate. To facilitate the comparison of prices of globally traded goods (e.g., oil, gold, copper, and other commodities) they are generally priced in one common currency. The U.S. dollar is the currency most widely used for this purpose (79%). This contributes to the use of the dollar for cross boarder payments as well even when the buyer’s currency differs from the seller’s ultimate currency (the currency paid to its workers, etc.). https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/the-international-role-of-the-u-s-dollar-20211006.htm

Some economy is brought to the markets for foreign exchange needed for cross boarder payments by using a common so called vehicle currency as a common go between. The adoption by airlines of a hub and spoke model for connecting all airports in a country or the world illustrates the economy of a single or small number of vehicle currencies (hubs) to exchange currency X for currency Y. The U.S. dollar is the most widely used vehicle currency for this purpose. This is supported by and reflected in the dominance of the dollar in invoicing internationally traded goods and in the foreign exchange reserves of banks (central and commercial) around the world. The Euro is the second most used currency in these ways.

In 2021 40.5% of international payments were made in US dollars. The use of Euros in international payments and in reserves has moved up to second place behind the dollar at 36.7% of payments. The Pound sterling is a distant third at 5.9%. Having passed the Japanese yen a few years back for fourth place the Chinese RMB achieved 3.2% of international payments in January of this year from almost zero a decade ago. “China’s currency scores a win during the Olympics” The Federal Reserve has constructed an “aggregate index of international currency usage.” The dollar has remained in the neighborhood of 70% for the last two decades. https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/the-international-role-of-the-u-s-dollar-20211006.htm

To pay for things with a currency, one must hold some amount of that currency. It is this demand for dollar reserves resulting from the widespread international invoicing and payments in dollars, that underlies foreign financing of US debt. For starters, about half of dollar currency (actual banknotes) are held abroad. That is the extent to which we pay for imports with cash and the sellers just hold the cash. Foreign central banks hold almost 13 trillion dollars in foreign exchange reserves of which over 7 trillion is in U.S. dollars (much of that is held in the form of US government debt). About 60% of the foreign currency claims of banks are dollar claims.

The dollar grew into its vehicle and reserve currency roles because of the size of the U.S. economy and its extensive trade with the rest of the world, the size and liquidity of financial assets denominated in dollars, public confidence in the stability of the dollar’s purchasing power, and in its trusted contract enforcement (rule of law).

U.S. Benefits from reserve currency status

The so-called exorbitant privilege of a reserve currency–the ability to borrow abroad in your own currency–makes it easier for the U.S. government to finance its military and other expenditures with debt. For countries to accumulate dollar reserves they must have a balance of payments surplus, i.e., they must sell more to the U.S. than they buy from the U.S.. As a result, American’s enjoy cheaper imports and the excess of dollars paid for such imports over those paid back for US exports are held in foreign reserves (generally in the form of US treasury debt).

As an aside, it is simply wrong to attribute much of the so-called offshoring of our manufacturing to the above phenomenon. The somewhat lower exchange rate for the dollar needed to generate the surplus China and other countries need for the trade surplus with which they buy American debt, does make imports somewhat cheaper. However, even if the dollar was totally replaced in foreign reserves and trade balanced, we would continue to be better off producing what we export and importing what China and the others produce and sell to us. Freely pursuing our comparative advantages increases our incomes and the incomes of the Chinese and others selling to us. Free trade is win-win. Contrary to the myth, U.S. manufacturing is at an all-time high. (Manufacturing employment is lower because of increased labor productivity). https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/USA/united-states/manufacturing-output

The U.S. dollar’s dominance in global trade and finance contributes to the existence of the American Empire in two ways. It attracts foreign financing of the U.S. government and its military industrial complex thus reducing the burden of the empire on the American taxpayer and it provides a tool by which the U.S. can impose its will on other countries or individuals in managing its empire. Borrowing to pay our government’s bills is politically easier than raising taxes and avoids (or delays) a debate over guns versus butter.

Three factors now challenge the dollars reserve currency role. 1) Cumbersome payment technology: Existing arrangements for cross border payments via the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) are technically crude and outmoded. 2) Weaponization of the dollar: The U.S. has abused the importance of its currency for cross border payments to force compliance with its policy preferences not always shared by other countries, by threatening to block the use of the dollar. 3) Growing risk of a decline in the dollar’s value: The growing expectation of dollar inflation and the skyrocketing increase in the U.S. fiscal deficit are increasing the risk of holding and dealing in dollars.

The first factor–payment technology–is temporary. It is being modernized. While payment technology (ease, speed, security, and cost of making cross border payments) is important, it is not as important as the features of the currency being paid. As a currency, the dollar excels for the reasons given earlier.

The second factor–weaponization of the dollar–has been growing in importance as the U.S. has increasingly sanctioned trade and dollar payments without broad international support–Iran, etc. The EU has sought work arounds in Euros. China and Russia are building alternative payment arrangement using China’s Renminbi. Even with the dramatic increase in coordinated sanctions against Russia, restricting the use of dollars is less effective than directly blocking trade. https://wcoats.blog/2022/03/04/how-to-stop-russia-in-ukraine/ The broad support for sanctions on Russia more likely increases support from the dollar as the dominant international currency rather than reducing it. On the other hand, those on the other side (e.g., Russia and China) will work harder to find alternatives. The balance of these contradictory forces is difficult to assess.

The third factor has never been taken very seriously until now. At the end of February (2022) the US national debt was over 30.1 trillion dollars or 125% of US output (GDP). Federal government interest payments on its net debt were $426 billion per annum. But with the increase in inflation, interest rates are rising. Uncle Sam’s debt service payments are likely to double or triple over the next five to ten years, rising to 15% to 20% of the Federal budget. The world still expects the US to regain control of its spending, but the risks of default are creeping up. Paul “Samuelson stated in 2005 that at some uncertain future period these pressures would precipitate a run against the U.S. dollar with serious global financial consequences.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_use_of_the_U.S._dollar

It is the second factor, US abuse of its ability to sanction the use of the dollar that is most threatening to push the dollar over the cliff.

The Alternative to the dollar

An internationally defined and issued currency would have a number of advantages over the use of a national currency for cross border payments.

While the value of the dollar has been quite stable for many years, using a basket of major currencies for pricing internationally traded goods and financial instruments would be even more stable. This is what the International Monetary Fund’s unit of account–the Special Drawing Rights (SDR)– offers. The value of one SDR is equal to the current market value of fixed amounts of the US Dollar, Euro, British pound, Japanese yen, and Chinese yuan. Thus, its widespread use for pricing internationally traded goods and financial instruments would provide even greater stability than would any one of these currencies. Every morning when I check movements in the price of oil, I must ask myself whether it was really a change in the price of oil or in the exchange rate of the dollar. See my: “Why the World Needs a Reserve Asset with a Hard Anchor”

The IMF’s SDR can only be held and used by member central banks and a few international bodies. Thus, private SDRs–so called Market SDRs–are needed for payments by the private sector (perhaps issued by the IMF or the BIS). Being issued by an international body, such Market SDRs would have the equivalent of a central bank for settling cross boarder payments allowing the simplifications and economy increasingly available for domestic payments in the domestic currency. `

Moreover, as an internationally issued currency the SDR would be far better protected from the political abuse increasingly experienced with the US dollar and might be expected with the Chinese RMB or other national currencies.

Getting from here to there

But first things first. Before considering the reform of the international monetary system, let’s consider the reform of the dollar–the reform of U.S. monetary policy. The price of the dollar should be fixed to a hard anchor and issued according to currency board rules.

During the heydays of the gold standard (1820-1913) international trade flourished dramatically increasing global incomes and reducing poverty. According to Antoni Estevadeordal, Brian Frantz and Alan M. Taylor “Until 1913 the rise of the gold standard and the fall in transport costs were the main trade-creating forces.” https://www.jstor.org/stable/25053910 However, to cope with WWI, the Great Depression, and WWII, the gold standard failed and was abandoned because of weaknesses in banking systems and because the countries that fixed the value of their currencies to gold did not fully play by the gold standard’s rules.

Under a strict gold standard, the central bank would issue and redeem its currency whenever anyone bought it for gold at the official price of gold. In fact, however, by actively buying and selling (or lending) its currency for other assets whenever it thought appropriate, the Federal Reserve’s monetary liabilities (base money) were partially backed by U.S. treasury bills and other assets. In addition, the fractional reserve banking system allowed banks to create deposit money that was also not backed by gold. The market’s ability to redeem dollars for gold kept the market value of gold close to its official dollar value. However, the gap between the Fed’s monetary liabilities and its gold backing grew until the market (most conspicuously, France) lost confidence in the Fed’s ability to honor its redemption commitment and President Nixon closed the “gold window” in 1971 rather than tighten monetary policy.

Currency Board Rules

A reformed monetary system that returns to a hard anchor (firmly fixed price of the currency for gold or some other asset) should require the Fed to adhere strictly to currency board rules. Such rules oblige a central bank to buy and sell its currency at a set price in response to public demand. Under the Gold Standard, the price of the currency was set as an amount of gold (a gold anchor). For existing currency boards, the price is typically an amount of another currency or basket of currencies. See my book on the establishment of the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“One currency for Bosnia-creating the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina”). The Fed would provide the amount of dollars demanded by the market by passively buying and selling them at the dollar’s officially fixed price for its anchor. All traditional open market operations by the Fed in the forms of active purchases and sales of T-bills or other assets would be forbidden.

The Anchor

Another weakness of the historical gold standard was that the price of the anchor, based on one single commodity, varied relative to other goods, services and wages. While the purchasing power of the gold dollar was relatively stable over long periods of time, gold did not prove a stable anchor over shorter periods relevant for investment.

Expanding the anchor from one commodity to a basket of 5 to 10 commodities with greater collective stability relative to the goods and services people actually buy (as measured by, e.g., the CPI index), would reduce this volatility. The basket would consist of fixed amounts of each of these commodities and their collective market value would define the value of one dollar. There have been similar proposals in the past, but the high transaction and storage costs of dealing with all the goods in the valuation basket doomed them. However, with indirect redeemability discussed next, the valuation basket would not suffer from this problem.

Indirect redeemability

Historically, gold and silver standards obliged the monetary authority to buy and sell its currency for actual gold or silver. If the dollar price of gold in the market was higher than its official price, people would buy gold at the central bank increasing its market supply and reducing the money supply until the market price came down again. These precious metals had to be stored and guarded at considerable cost. More importantly, taking large amounts of gold and silver off the market distorted their price by creating an artificial demand for them. A new gold standard would see the relative price of gold rising over time due to the increasing cost of discovery and extraction. The fixed dollar price of gold means that the dollar prices of everything else would fall (deflation). While the predictability of the value of money is one of its most important qualities, stability of its value, such as approximately zero inflation, is also desirable.

Indirect redeemability eliminates these shortcomings of the traditional gold standard. Indirect redeemability means that currency is issued or redeemed for assets of equal market value rather than the actual anchor commodities. Market actors would still have an arbitrage profit incentive to keep the supply of money appropriate for its official value. As the economy grows and the demand for money increases, this mechanism would increase the money supply as people sell their T-bills to the Fed for additional dollars at its official (gold or whatever) price.

Towards a global anchor

The United States could easily amend its monetary policy to incorporate the above features – adopting a government defined value of the dollar as called for in Article 1 Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution and a market determined supply. The Federal Reserve would be restricted by law to passive currency board rules. Additional financial sector stability would be achieved by also adopting the Chicago Plan of 100% reserve requirements against demand deposits. This would be a natural byproduct of the Fed creating a two-tier Central Bank Digital Currency (CBCD) now under consideration.

The gold standard was an international system for regulating the supply of money and thus prices in each country and between countries and provided a single world currency (via fixed exchange rates). Balance of trade and payments between countries was maintained (when central banks played by the rules) because deficit countries lost money (gold) to surplus countries, reducing prices in the former and increasing them in the latter. This led to a flourishing of trade between countries. This was a highly desirable feature for liberal market economies.

The United States could adopt the hard anchor currency board system described above on its own and others might follow by fixing their currencies to the dollar as in the past. The amendments to the historic gold standard system proposed above would significantly tighten the rules under which it would operate and strengthen the prospects of its survival.

However, there would be significant benefits to developing such a standard internationally. One way or the other, replacing the fluctuating exchange rates between the dollar and other currencies with the equivalent of a single currency would be a significant boon to world trade and world prosperity. Replacing the U.S. dollar as the world’s reserve currency with an international unit would have additional benefits for the smooth functioning of the global trading and payments system.

In a small step to create an internationally issued currency the IMF created its Special Drawing Right (SDR) in 1969 in the expectation of supplementing the gold-based US dollar. But in today’s world of fiat currencies with floating exchange rates the SDR has several limitations as a reserve currency, most of which can be lived with for a while. The SDR allocated by the IMF can only be held and used by the central banks of IMF member countries and a few international organizations such as the World Bank and BIS. The SDR falls short as a challenger to the US dollar because of the absence of widespread private market use of the unit.

To become a serious supplement to, if not replacement for, the US dollar in the international monetary system the SDR would need to be usable for payments by private sector parties. This would require the creation of private or Market SDRs. This could be done in much the same way banks now create dollar deposits.

Digital SDR currency

As with national currencies, the internationally issued SDR needs a central issuer of the base money version of market SDRs (M-SDRs). The IMF should oversee the develop of a procedure for issuing M-SDRs following currency board rules and backed 100% by official SDRs or by an appropriate mix of sovereign debt of the five basket currencies.

The IMF might establish an IMF trust fund that would issue M-SDRs to AAA or AA international banks upon their request and payment of the equivalent value of one or more of the five basket currencies (and would redeem them under similar arrangements). As with other IMF trusts, the IMF might approach the BIS to operationally manage the issuance and redemption of M-SDRs and the maintenance of the official SDR asset backing (or its equivalent in the five currencies in the valuation basket).

Banks offering M-SDR deposits/currency to their customers would hold an M-SDR reserve backing with the IMF SDR trust fund. The base money M-SDRs issued by the IMF trust fund would perform the same payment settlement function as do central banks for the base money they issue, with the critical difference that its depositors/participants would be global rather than national. This would enable virtually instantaneous final settlement of M-SDR payments globally.

An M-SDR would facilitate and be facilitated by invoicing internationally traded goods and financial instruments in SDRs. More, if not most, internationally traded commodities could and should be priced in SDRs. Cross border borrowing can and should be denominated in SDR starting with bond issues and lending by international development institutions (as is now the case with the IMF, and to a very limited extent the World Bank). https://www.brettonwoods.org/article/proposal-for-an-imf-staff-executive-board-paper-on-promoting-market-sdrs

To go all the way with SDRs, the IMF’s Articles of Agreement would need to be amended to replace the allocation of SDRs with issuing them according to currency board rules as discussed earlier. Furthermore, the valuation basket that now consists of key currencies would need to be replaced with a commodity basket as outlined in my Real SDR Currency Board proposal: (http://works.bepress.com/warren_coats/25/).

The shift from dollar to SDR international reserves, payments, and invoicing would give the world a more stable currency for all of these purposes. This would further promote trade because of more efficient cross boarder payments thus further lifting incomes around the world. Being an internationally issued and controlled currency, the potential for its political abuse by the U.S. would be greatly reduced. But eliminating the seigniorage that the U.S. now enjoys supplying its currency to the rest of the world, i.e., the foreign financing of some of its debt, would remain without further measures.

As central banks and foreign firms shifted from dollars to SDRs they might simply transfer the US treasury bills (and other US investments) that they now hold to the issuers of the M-SDRs. In that case the U.S. would continue to enjoy its exorbitant privilege of foreign financing in exchange for holding its currency. In this case M-SDRs rather than USD would also be backed by US debt. Thus, rules are need for what currency or assets must be paid to buy M-SDRs and/or what assets M-SDRs are backed by. This could take the form of buying M-SDRs with USD but the issuer exchanging the dollars for a more balanced portfolio of assets. While the SDR value continues to be defined by a basket of currencies, the assets backing issued SDR might reflect the same proportions of the same currencies.

The reduction in this way of the role of the dollar as a reserve currency would be win win. It would provide for more stable and more efficient international trade and payments. It would help demilitarize money and it would modestly increase the cost of US debt finance, hopefully encouraging more careful spending.

[1] Dr. Coats retired from the IMF after 26 years of service in May 2003 to join the Board of Directors of the Cayman Islands Monetary Authority. He was chief of the SDR division in the Finance Department of the IMF from 1982–88 and a visiting economist to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve in 1979. In March 2019 Central Banking Journal awarded him for his “Outstanding Contribution for Capacity Building.” His recent books are One Currency for Bosnia: Creating the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina; My Travels in the Former Soviet Union; My Travels to Afghanistan; My Travels to Jerusalem; and My Travels to Baghdad. He has a B.A. degree in Economics from U of California, Berkeley, and a Ph.D. in economics from the U of Chicago. He is a fellow of Johns Hopkins Krieger School of Arts and Sciences, Institute for Applied Economics, Global Health, and the Study of Business Enterprise.

Econ 101: How to help Afghans?

The world is rightly looking for ways to help Afghans without helping the Taliban (until or unless the Taliban forms a government the world is willing to recognize). Washington Post: “How to help Afghans without aiding Taliban” In this Post article Anthony Faiola states that “The biggest problem isn’t a lack of food. Rather, it’s the disappearance of what had been the lifeblood of the Afghan economy — Western cash.” This mischaracterizes the problems of Afghans thus confusing our understanding. In this note I attempt to clarify the “cash” aspect of Afghanistan’s problems.

But first there is no escaping the fact that the cut back of foreign aid is reducing the income (and the goods that income buys) available to Afghans. Mention is often made of the approximately 10 billion US dollars of the Afghan government’s funds frozen in deposits abroad. These funds cannot be used until a new Afghan government is recognized with the authority to claim them. But these funds are not part of the lost revenue to the Afghan government. They are the wealth–the previous income saved–of the government (whoever that will turn out to be). The savings that we accumulate from our incomes for retirement or whatever is our wealth not our current income (though it can be drawn on to augment current income).

In recent years (prior to the Taliban take over) the Afghan government’s operating expenditures were 16 to 18% of Afghanistan’s GDP while its domestic revenue was 12 to 14% of GDP. The balance of its financing plus all development expenditures were from donors. The hope is that squeezing the Taliban “government” financially will add to the incentives for them to quickly form an inclusive government meeting international norms of human rights. Unfortunately, it is not possible to shut off the flow of funds to the government without also starving the Afghan people.

While the Ghani government has been replaced (temporarily) by Taliban leaders, the institutions (ministries and agencies) of government remain, but with new management. Of the government’s operating expenditures roughly 80% was for wages and salaries. Thus, the government could more or less finance its wage and salary expenses from its own domestic revenue without donor support. Indeed, all salaries have been and continue to be paid in the central bank (Da Afghanistan Bank — DAB) and presumably in the other government ministries as well, albeit with delays. However, the real value of these incomes is being reduced because of increased inflation (an indirect form of taxation). DAB and other government agencies have largely stopped providing economic and financial data since the Taliban take over. IMF First-Review-Under-the-Under-the-Extended-Credit-Facility

None the less, freezing Afghanistan’s deposits abroad (DAB’s foreign exchange reserves held abroad) has created monetary problems within Afghanistan because of the inability to import the cash (dollar banknotes) on which the economy depends. Afghanistan remains a largely cash economy. Most payments are made in cash. Though inflation has been low in recent years (generally 2-4%), inflation in earlier decades was relatively high and thus Afghans held and transacted in US dollars quite extensively. Around 70% of bank deposits are in dollars. The availability of USD banknotes for local payments is thus very important. These were mostly supplied by the New York Federal Reserve Bank from the dollar deposits that DAB maintains there (and now frozen).

Prior to the Taliban takeover, the normal operation of DAB’s monetary policy consisted of receiving US dollars from the government (largely from donor grants) and depositing the equivalent value of Afghani in the government’s accounts. The government disbursed these Afghani to its employees in wage and salary payments (generally by electronic deposits to employee bank accounts). Without offset, the resulting creation and injection of these Afghani would be inflationary. DAB drains (buys back) this excess base money by auctioning some of the dollars it received from the government (sufficient to stabilize the dollar exchange rate) and capital notes of DAB. The government’s deposits of dollars with DAB took the form of credits to DAB’s dollar account with the New York Fed. From these deposits DAB pays the Federal Reserve to fly USD banknotes to Kabul as needed for DAB’s dollar auctions.

In mid-April 2021, when the U.S. announced its intention to withdraw the rest of its military personnel by September, an increased outflow of dollars by Afghans wanting to protect their wealth put the Afghani exchange rate under pressure. Acting DAB Governor Ajmal Ahmady (his appointment was never approved by Parliament) increased dollar auctions to stabilize the exchange rate. “Afghan central bank drained dollar stockpile before Kabul fell” As the amount of dollars in its vaults ran down, it used USD banknotes that it held on behalf of banks (approximately $700 million USD). The delivery of additional cash from New York expected in July never arrived and DAB’s balances at the New York Fed are now frozen until a new government is recognized so that no more dollar cash can be purchased from the Federal Reserve by DAB.

As an aside, I was surprised during a 2009 visit to Zimbabwe—as part of an IMF team following Zimbabwe’s dramatic hyperinflation during which it dollarized—to learn that there was an active private market in dollar banknotes supplying Zimbabwe from South Africa: “Hyperinflation in Zimbabwe”

In the days just before and after the American evacuation in August 2021 public demands to withdraw dollar cash intensified but DAB had largely used up the dollars in its vaults (both its own and those held for banks). In response, on August 14 DAB imposed limits on the amounts that could be withdrawn each day. This fed public concern that their banks were running out of dollar banknotes and triggered runs on the banks. DAB was even running low on Afghani banknotes, which might have replaced dollars. Without access to its deposits abroad DAB is unable to purchase additional dollar cash nor pay for printing additional Afghani. For a largely cash and heavily dollarized economy this drying up of cash liquidity is very disruptive and the basis of the statement that people can’t buy the food that might be available.

In addition to the cash shortage, Afghans are also lining up to withdraw their deposits out of concern for a possible bank failure. Aid cut offs and civil strife have damaged many firms resulting in arrears on their bank loan payments. This threatens to push bank illiquidity into insolvency. Even if DAB had USD and AFN cash to lend or sell to banks with fully performing loans, DAB is currently unable to buy or lend against these illiquid bank assets. Moreover, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the U.S. Treasury has sanctioned payments to many Afghan entities and activities blocking many payments to and from abroad by Afghan banks and uncertainly about the application of the sanctions regime has made banks overly cautious about executing payments for their customers.

UN and other aid organizations have experience in other countries with delivering wages and other payments to targeted recipiences (teachers, healthcare workers and potentially even government employees) without the funds passing through the government’s hands. This approach is needed and is being developed for use in Afghanistan. OFAC sanctions are being modestly relaxed and UN and other aid agencies have begun funding the importation of dollar cash for humanitarian assistance projects. The use of digital mobile phone payments, such as M-Paisa and HesabPay, should be promoted and exploitation to the extent possible. “Use of mobile phone payments” The United States needs to and has been gradually relaxing its payment restrictions to make this possible.

The Taliban leadership needs to take urgent steps to establish a new inclusive government that can and will be recognized internationally thus unfreezing Afghanistan’s (and DAB’s) deposits abroad and eliminating its cash shortage and restoring development assistance. In the meantime, in addition to the urgent need for humanitarian assistance that bypasses the Taliban, the New York Federal Reserve, or any other doners, should consider a loan to DAB to finance immediate shipments of dollar banknotes to Kabul. Da Afghanistan Bank Law adequately protects the central bank from government interference in its conduct of monetary policy and bank supervision. As a condition for restoring USD currency shipments to DAB, the Federal Reserve (and the UN) should obtain an agreement from the Taliban government to fully respect that law and appoint qualified people to its Supreme Council and Executive Board.

Until Afghanistan has a proper government, and its economic development can resume, Afghans, many of whom are very poor to begin with, will suffer unnecessarily depressed incomes. The lack of cash is adding a further, tragic, and quite unnecessary disruption to the lives of a long-suffering people. This can be and should be fixed urgently. Any such assistance will somewhat reduce the financial pressure on the Taliban, but a total financial squeeze on the government will fall on the people of Afghanistan as well.

________________________________________

I worked in Afghanistan as a member of the IMF program and technical assistant teams from January 2002 until mid 2015. I am grateful to Syed Ishaq Alavi for his insights and comments on this article. Mr. Alavi was Advisor to the governor of DAB from 2010 to early 2013, Director General Monetary Policy Department of DAB from early 2013 to mid 2018, and advisor to the Executive Director of the International Monetary Fund for Afghanistan, Algeria, Ghana, Iran, Libya, Morocco, Pakistan, and Tunisia from June 2018 to August 2020. For the sake of their security, I am not naming those who helped me with this article who remain in Afghanistan.

Econ 101: Erdogan’s Turkey

President Erdogan believes that by cutting interest rates on the Turkish lira the resulting depreciation of its exchange rate will cheapen Turkish goods and thus increase their exports and promote growth (the China model, he thinks). Accordingly, he has replaced four central bank governors who could not bring themselves to accede to his demands. “Revolving door-Turkeys-last-four-central-bank-chiefs”

In an earlier disastrous cycle, the Central Bank of Turkey (CBT) reduced its policy rate from 24% in 2019 in steps to 8.5% in mid 2020 only to raise it again to 19% in March 2021 until the latest cuts started in September of this years. In November, “The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) has decided to reduce the policy rate (one-week repo auction rate) from 15 percent to 14 percent.” “Press Releases/2021/ANO2021-59”

When I was part of the IMF team in 2000-1 working with the Turkish authorities to regain control of inflation (which ranged from 60 and 100 percent between 1980 and 1999) and clean up the banking sector (they closed 13 banks in 2000), the CBT policy interest rate was briefly raised to 100% (ala Paul Volcker in the US). Inflation declined rapidly to single digit levels (until the last four years) with interest rates quickly following.

The dollar price of the Turkish lira has fallen in half since February of this year (i.e., a dollar will buy twice as many lira–one lira cost 0.14 dollars in February and 0.061 dollar on December 17). Erdogan seems to think he is choosing to benefit workers (exporters) over consumers (importer), though they are generally the same people. If the lira depreciates, the rest of the world can buy lira more cheaply and thus (according to Erdogan) will buy more cheaper Turkish exports. This should increase the demand for Turkish good and the jobs that produce them and increase the growth of the Turkish economy.

As any economist can explain to Mr. Erdogan, depreciating the exchange rate with lower interest rates in Turkey than in the rest of the world is achieved by printing more money with which to buy foreign currencies. Broad money (M2) increased almost 48% in November 2020 from a year earlier and 24% from a year earlier this November. But such a rapid increase in the money supply will increase prices in Turkey over and above the increase in the price of imports from the lira’s depreciation. “Turkey-central bank-Erdogan”

Inflation in Turkey has risen from single digits between 2004 to 2016 to “21.3%” in November 2021 (annual rate from a year earlier). According to the Central Banking Journal “Official figures show Turkish inflation reached 21.31% year-on-year in November, but there is considerable controversy over whether these figures are accurate. Several well-informed observers, have told Central Banking that they believe the official figures understate actual inflation.” “Turkey’s currency hits new low after further rate cut” Steve Hanke reports the actual rate at around 100% “Steve Hanke’s estimate of Turkey’s inflation rate”

In short, Mr. Erdogan’s crazy policy of reducing interest rates has not made Turkish goods cheaper for the rest of the world. As the lira became cheaper for foreigners (depreciation), the lira price of those goods became more expensive (inflation). The real effective exchange rate (which takes account of both) is not being significantly reduced because Turkey is experiencing higher and higher inflation along with the lira’s depreciation. Monetary policy works in Turkey the same way as in every other place. The CBT’s inflation target, by the way, is 5%. “Turkey-Erdogan currency crisis”

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