Covid-19: What should Uncle Sam do?

On February 29 the first person in the United States died from Covid-19, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2, the so-called novel coronavirus first observed in Wuhan, China.  On March 12, three more people succumbed from this disease bringing the total to 41. Ten days later on March 22, 117 died bringing the total to 419 as the exponential growth of Covid-19 deaths continues. Globally 15,420 had died by midday March 23 and deaths are rising fast.

How and where will this end?  Shutting the economy down and keeping everyone isolated in place until the virus “dies” for lack of new victims would ultimately kill everyone from starvation (if not boredom).  This pandemic will only end (stabilize with the status of the flu, which currently kills about 34,000 per year in the U.S.) when an effective vaccine is developed and administered to almost everyone. This will take one year to eighteen months if it is discovered today, and that is if we are lucky that the safety and effectiveness trials go according to plan. Without a vaccine, the pandemic will “end” when most of us have acquired immunity to it as a result of having and surviving (as almost everyone will) covid-19 –acquiring so called herd immunity.  This assumes that having and surviving the disease will immunize us. This is generally the case with viruses but has not yet been established for SARS-CoV-2.

Our hospitals and medical services could not handle the patient load if every one contracted this disease over too short a period, so it is important to slow down the pace of infection–so called flattening the curve (which could spike quickly as you see from the opening paragraph). The ideal strategy is to allow the infection of those with low risk of serious illness or death to speed up herd immunity with minimum demand on our limited health facilities, while protecting and treating the most vulnerable. The young and healthy are least vulnerable and the old and health-impaired are the most vulnerable.  We should reopen schools and restaurants after Easter and gradually restart our cultural entertainment lives adhering to higher standards of hygiene and public interaction. This would be ideal both with regard to speeding up herd immunity and with regard to minimizing that damage to the economy.

What should government do?

I am from the government and I am here to help (it is risky to attempt humor in these times, but what the hell). “Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin warned GOP senators that the unemployment rate could spike to nearly 20 percent if they fail to act dramatically…. The United States is expected to lose 4.6 million travel-related jobs this year as the coronavirus outbreak levies an $809 billion blow to the economy, according to a projection released yesterday by the U.S. Travel Association…. Research from Imperial College London, endorsed by the U.K. government, suggests that 2.2 million would die in the United States and 510,000 would die in Britain if nothing is done by governments and individuals to stop the pandemic.” “six-chilling-estimates-underscore-danger-of-coronavirus-to-public-health-and-the-economy”

“Infectious disease experts do not yet know exactly how contagious or deadly the novel coronavirus is. But compared to SARS and MERS, SARS-CoV-2 [as the novel coronavirus is now labeled] has spread strikingly fast: While the MERS outbreak took about two and a half years to infect 1,000 people, and SARS took roughly four months, the novel coronavirus reached that figure in just 48 days.”  “Mapping the Novel Coronavirus Outbreak”

The U.S. does not have the medical equipment or hospital beds that will be needed for those anticipated to need ICU facilities.  And as poorly equipped medical staff fall ill from their exposure to the Coronavirus, we will run out of enough doctors and nurses to care for them forcing us to default to the unpleasant realities of medical triage where doctors begin to assess and choose those that have a higher probability of survival and to leave the weakest to fend for themselves. This has already started in Italy.

So, what should the government do? Its response might be considered under three categories:  a) Stop or slow the spread of covid-19; b) Help state and local health service providers care for those needing it; and c) minimize the damage to the economy (i.e. to those whose income is affected by the disease or the measures taken to slow the spread of the disease).

As with all good policies, as the government determines its immediate approaches to the crisis, it should keep one eye on the longer run implications of the policies adopted. It should balance the most effective immediate actions with the minimization of what economists call moral hazard in the future.  The simplest and best-known example of moral hazard results from the now hopefully banished practice of governments bailing out banks when they fail as a way of protecting depositors. This one way bet for the banks–they profit when they win their bets and the government bails them out when they lose them–encouraged banks to take on excessive risks. In the U.S. we have replace bank bail outs with deposit insurance and efficient bank resolution (bankruptcy) procedures. “Key Issues in Failed Bank Resolution”

If economists do nothing else, we pay very close attention to incentives, particularly those created by government rules and regulations (including taxes and subsidies).  Government financial assistance must also be carefully designed to be temporary, recognizing the danger that expansions of government into the economy in emergencies have the bad habit of becoming permanent.

From these general considerations our response should be guided by these principles: Measures should be effective with the least cost. They should be narrowly targeted. They should be temporary. The cost of financial assistance should be shared by all involved–no bailouts.

Flatten the curve 

The government’s first priorities must be to slow the spread of covid-19 while supporting the medical needs of those contracting it.  Limiting the number of infected will limit the resulting deaths (guesstimated to be around 1% of those infected by this virus). Slowing the rate at which people are infected–flattening the curve–will reduce the peak demand for hospital beds and related services until a vaccine is found (once one or several candidates are discovered today, it will take 12 to 18 months of tests to establish its safety and effectiveness and manufacture enough to start administering it).

Despite clear warnings that the novel coronavirus posed serious threats to the U.S. for which we were not prepared, President Trump failed to act until very recently, calling the scare a Democratic plot as recently as February 28. “Trump-says-the-coronavirus-is-the-democrats-new-hoax”  “U.S. intelligence agencies were issuing ominous, classified warnings in January and February about the global danger posed by the coronavirus while President Trump and lawmakers played down the threat and failed to take action that might have slowed the spread of the pathogen, according to U.S. officials familiar with spy agency reporting.” “US-intelligence-reports-from-january-and-february-warned-about-a-likely-pandemic”

Countries that acted quickly to identify and isolate those infected by the virus have generally succeeding in slowing its spread without shutting their economies down.  South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan have tested widely and quarantined those testing positive, many of whom were asymptomatic. Their economies have not been shut down. Restaurants and bars remain open as do schools in Singapore and Taiwan.  New cases in S Korea have fallen to very low levels two weeks ago and active cases have been declining since March 11 as more people recover than acquire the disease. On March 22 only two people died from the disease.  Cases and deaths have remained low in Japan, Singapore and Taiwan. The following describes the lesson’s from Singapore’s success: plan ahead, respond quickly, test a lot, quarantine the sick, communicate honestly with the public, live normally:  “Why-Singapore’s-coronavirus-response-worked–and-what-we-can-all-learn”

As a result of the U.S. failing to act earlier, the potential for this approach has been reduced in the U.S.  Nonetheless, the government should urgently remove its barriers to testing, increase the supply of tests, and pay most of the cost of testing. In order to discourage frivolous testing those being tested should pay a small amount of the cost (e.g. ten dollars per test).  Even today (March 21) very few Americans are tested despite frantic catch up efforts by the U.S. government.  “A-government-monopoly-led-to-botched-covid-19-test-kits-but-private-labs-are-now-saving-the-day” Positive test results (“cases”) in the U.S. are rising rapidly (983 new cases on March 16 jumped to 9,339 on March 22, for a total of 33,546). However, as so little testing has been possible, there is no way we can know whether this dramatic increase reflects increases in infection or only the increase in the identification of existing infections. “Peggy Noonan gets tested–finally”

As a result, the government has urged people to stay home, and most entertainment centers (theaters, cinemas, restaurants, gyms, and bars) have closed, and a few state governors are mandating it.  Many international flights have been cancelled.  Aside from grocery stores and pharmacies, most shops and malls have closed. A controversy is raging over whether closing schools does more harm than good. Among the arguments against it is that because serious illness and death among the young is rare but they can spread the disease (to their families at home and others), attempting to block their infection interferes with herd immunization (protection from infection as the result of a large proportion of the population becoming immune as the result of recovery from infection).

The economic impact of those drastic measures will be explored below, but the government must now urgently prepare for the surge of covid-19 patients promising to overwhelm our brave medical health care workers, medical supplies and hospital beds even with these draconian measures. Priorities must be given to properly equipping medical service providers and training their replacements as they fall ill. Hospital beds and respirators and other equipment needed for the more seriously ill must be urgently produced, in part by turning out and away, less seriously ill patients and those with non-emergency, elective treatments. We can delay the investigation into why these steps where not taken two months ago when the need was identified.

Care for the sick

The government should support the market’s natural incentives to develop better treatments and ultimately a vaccine (i.e. profit). This raises challenging policy issues. Protecting the patent rights of firms developing treatments protects the profit incentive for them to do so. However, the sharing of research findings, thus threatening such patents, can greatly accelerate the discovery of helpful medicines or procedures. Hopefully rights can be established and protected that both encourage drug development and cooperative information sharing.

The failure of the U.S. government to provide for or allow significant testing for covid-19 is a scandal. The government should get out of the way. “Coronavirus-and-big-government” Its claim last week and the week before that testing was opening up is sadly not true.  By March 19th the U.S. with a population of 327 million had only tested 103,945 people (0.03%).  S. Korea with a population of 51.5 mil. had tested 316,664 by March 20th (0.6%) and Germany with a population of 82.9 mil. had tested 167,000 by March 15th (0.2%)  “Covid-19-why-arent-we-prepared”

President Trump’s trade war has damaged world’s ability to fight covid-19 in general but more specifically his tariffs on medical supplies are contributing to their shortage in the U.S.  “The US-China trade war has forced US buyers to reduce purchases of medical supplies from China and seek alternative sources. US imports of Chinese medical products covered by the Trump administration’s 25 percent tariffs dropped by 16 percent in 2019 compared with two years earlier.”  “Tariffs-disrupted-medical-supplies-critical-us-coronavirus-fight”

Save the economy

Having missed the opportunity to flatten the curve via testing and targeted quarantines, the U.S. has taken much more drastic steps to restrict public interactions, shutting down the entertainment, educational, and transportation sectors of the economy. These should result in temporary interruptions of the supply of these services that will bounce back when the restrictions are lifted. Some output will be lost forever (lost classroom time, and restaurant meals) but others can be recouped or at least restored to original levels (rates). Clothing and other retail items not purchased during the shut down can be purchased later.

What the economy will look like afterward (hopefully only a few months) will depend on several factors. The first is the extent to which our public behavior is altered permanently. Home movies might permanently replace some part of our usual attendance to the cinema. Teleconferencing might permanently reduce meeting travel or accelerate the existing trend in that direction, etc.

The policies being debated in congress at this moment for protecting individuals and firms from the financial cost of the temporary shutdown can profoundly affect the future composition and condition of the economy. Every big firm out there is working on how they can tap some of the taxpayer’s money that government will be giving out. Those pushing government interventions into new areas on a permanent basis will exploit the occasion to slip in their favorite policies. Unfortunately, once the government moves into an area– it rarely withdraws. Almost 19 years later, the horrible Patriot Act, adopted when a scared public was willing to trade off liberty for security, is still largely with us.

Our public interest would be served by incentives that lead those who might be sick with covid-19 to stay home rather than risk infecting others, and by policies that enable viable firms that lost customers and individuals who stayed home to bridge their financial gap until returning to normal. Affected firms and individuals will continue to have expenses (food, rent, mortgages, etc.) but no incomes. They should be provided with the funds to meet these expenses in order to return to life/work when the lights go back on. The sharing of the cost of those funds must be considered politically fair and must incentivize the desired behavior. Everyone must have some skin in the game (a share of the cost). Adopting measure that fill those criteria will not be easy.

The government (taxpayers) should cover much of the cost of the covid-19 related medical services and hospital costs, including very widespread testing. Medical service providers should be tested daily (e.g., several doctors have died from covid-19 in Italy). Anyone staying at home and testing positive should receive sick leave paid for by the government.

Assistance to companies and the self-employed should be as targeted as possible on those forced to reduce or stop operations as a result of covid-19. Where possible, assistance should take the form of loans to companies that continue to pay wages to their employees even if not working. Restrictions should be placed on how such loans are used (no stock buy backs, or salary increases during the life of the loans). Bank and lending regulators should allow and in fact encourage temporary loan forbearance by the lenders on temporary arrears from otherwise viable firms. “Bailout-stimulus-rescue-check” One small businessman convincingly argued that wage subsidies that keep working on the payroll are better than generous unemployment insurance, which makes it easier for firms to lay off their workers. “Dear-congress-i’m-a-small-business-owner-heres-what-my-business-needs-to-survive”

What about the big companies, such as Boeing, the airlines, the Hotel Chains, and Cruise ship operators? Yes, they should be included in the loan forbearance and incentive loan programs, but they should receive no special consideration beyond that. If government (partially) guaranteed loans through banks to pay wages and other fixed expenses for a few months are not enough to finance a firm’s expenses without income for a few months it is probably not viable in the long run anyway and should be resolved through bankruptcy as were GM and Chrysler in earlier financial crises. This would wipe out the stakes of owners while preserving the ability of the firm to return to profitable operation with new owners. “Bailing-out-well-if-bail-out-we-must”

Monetary policy

The American economy (and elsewhere) is suffering in the first instance a supply shock (sick people unable to work and produce). This fall in income from supply disruptions also reduces demand. Cutting the Fed’s already low interest rate target to almost zero is a mistake. No one will undertake new or expanded investments because of it, and its impact on reducing the return on pensions and other savings will, if anything, reduce spending. The last decade of very low interest rate policy targets has already contributed to excessive corporate debt and inflated stock prices (recently deflated back to normal).

Injecting liquidity via new lending facilities and international swap lines, as the Fed is now undertaking, is the correct response. If lenders allow their borrowers to delay repayments for a few months, they need to replace that missing income somehow (rather than calling in nonperforming loans and bankrupting the borrower). The Federal reserve should substitute for that income by lending to banks freely against the good collateral of government debt or government guaranteed debt.

“The vital need of everyone in the economy, from the corner drugstore to the local transit authority to the mightiest multinational, is liquidity: credit to meet payroll and other key obligations so as to remain solvent until the end of what we all must hope is a finite crisis.”  “Here’s-an-economic-aid-plan-better-than-mitch-McConnell’s”

Macroeconomic policy

As noted above, the government’s help should be narrowly targeted to the direct victims of covid-19.  A general fiscal or monetary stimulus is not needed or desirable.  Nonetheless, it will add to the federal debt that is already bloated by years of annual deficits at the peak of a business cycle when a surprise is customary and appropriate.

“The United States is not confronted with a financial crisis and a follow-on crisis of demand, as in 2008 or 1929. Rather, previously robust consumption and production are being deliberately halted to save lives. Thus, traditional tools of monetary and fiscal stimulus, such as zero interest rates and direct cash aid to households, are unlikely to prove decisive. You can’t shop, or invest in new construction, while on lockdown.”  “Here’s-an-economic-aid-plan-better-than-mitch-McConnell’s”

This is a dangerous period both for our personal health and for the health of the economy. Affected firms should be helped in order for them to continue paying their employees and to remain solvent until they can return to production. But the United States has failed to prepare properly and is handling the fight against covid-19 poorly. We need to reopen our schools and restaurants and return to normal at a reasonable pace while allowing herd immunity to develop at a faster pace while supporting the most rapid development of a vaccine possible. Don’t fight this wildfire with our eyes shut while enhancing the dangers of future fires from ill-advised measures undertaken in this emergency environment.

Stay strong everyone. We will all get through this.

Cyprus: Bailing in and capital controls

Three European countries with oversized banking sectors have suffered major bank failures. Two of them are in the Euro Zone (Ireland and Cyprus) and one has its own currency (Iceland). Iceland and Cyprus imposed temporary capital controls, while Ireland did not. Iceland imposed losses on the foreign depositors in its large, failed banks while Ireland, under EU pressure bailed out everyone (even bond holders) except the shareholders.

The jargon used to describe much of this—“bail outs,” “bail ins,” “haircuts,” “good bank bad bank splits,” etc.—can be confusing. In this note I attempt to clarify the key concepts and their importance via the examples of Iceland, Ireland and Cyprus.

Market discipline vs. supervision and regulation

Incentives always matter. Banks, like any other business, are in business to make money. But the amount of risk they take (more risk more return—ON AVERAGE) depends on who regulates their behavior. Fundamentally, the market can regulate bank risk taking—by the willingness of investors to lend to banks and of depositors to place their money there—or the government can.

The last century has seen a steady shift away from market regulation toward government regulation. Deposit insurance is an important factor contributing to that shift by removing any concern by smaller depositors of the condition of their bank. Thus deposit insurance requires a substitution of the due diligence that used to be performed by small depositors with increased government regulation of bank risk taking. In the United States, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) provides much of that supervision and regulation.

However, increasingly countries became unwilling to allow banks to fail. While shareholders might be wiped out when a bank became insolvent (i.e., when the value of its assets fell below that of its deposits and other liabilities), country after country have “bailed out” all other bank creditors, including uninsured depositors. Bailing out depositors and other creditors means giving taxpayers’ money to the bank to make up for its losses and thus cover its liabilities (other than shareholders).  For large, “systemically important” banks (meaning banks whose failure could cause fatal losses in other banks or firms), most countries are not willing to let them fail at all, thus bailing out shareholders as well in order to allow the banks to continue to operate. Hence the problem of banks that are “too big to fail.” Bailing out uninsured depositors made deposit insurance redundant and pointless. Market discipline was pushed aside all together. The safety and soundness of banks came to rest almost completely on the adequacy of regulations and the skills of supervisors. Bank owners, the only ones who care any more, now have a financial incentive to take big risks for potential big gains. If they lose, as they do from time to time, the government, i.e., tax payer, will pick up the bill.

It is desirable to shift more of the discipline of bank risk taking back to the market by convincingly putting bondholders and large, uninsured depositors at risk of loss if their bank becomes insolvent. They have a financial incentive to get it right that supervisors do not.

Resolution of insolvent banks

Best practice when a bank becomes insolvent is to resolve it quickly and fully and to put a large part of the cost of its losses on uninsured creditors (shareholders, bond holders and uninsured depositors in that order).  Normal company bankruptcy can take the form of shutting down, locking the doors, and selling off anything of value (normally taking a few years) and distributing the proceeds to the creditors in the order of the legal priority of their claims. It is a transparent and objective, but slow process. In many instances the highest value for a failing company is obtained by selling it whole or in part to another company that is able to run it more efficiently. The recent bankruptcy of Sara Lee and sale of its best products to other companies is an example.

The bankruptcy and resolution of an insolvent bank is more challenging because of the ease with which depositors can run when they sense trouble. Thus the weekend sale of such banks in whole or in part to another bank is the norm for small or medium-sized banks in the U.S.  The good bank bad bank split, as occurred recently in Cyprus, is a recent example. Laiki became the bad bank that was closed and is being liquidated and the Bank of Cyprus became the good bank. After wiping out its shareholders and bondholders and administering a large haircut to the uninsured depositors, it acquired the insured deposits of Laiki and an equivalent value of good Laiki assets. Such bank resolutions, which freeze depositors’ funds only for very short periods (a few days), require special bankruptcy laws for tailored for banks. As the surviving good bank must continue to operate with little to no interruption, more judgment and uncertainty is involved in valuing the assets that it acquires from the bad bank.

It is instructive to look more closely at the resolution process used in Cyprus. First, the two major banks in Cyprus, Laiki and Bank of Cyprus, incurred large losses on their holdings of Greek sovereign debt when all banks were required to “voluntarily” write off about 75% of its value. The magnitude of this loss was clear and well-known from October 2011. The only issue was who would pay for it, the Cypriot government, the EU, or the creditors (depositors) of these banks. Depositor’s obviously thought that they would be bailed out (i.e. that the Cypriot government or the EU would pay for the losses of Laiki and Bank of Cyprus) as had been all depositors in Europe before them, though the deposit liabilities of the Bank of Cyprus fell from 37.1 billion Euros at the end of 2010 to 32.1 billion at the end of 2011 to 28 billion at the end of September 2012 (the latest available).

After a terrible false start in which the Cyprus government attempted to pay for the losses by levying a wealth tax on all depositors (of good and bad banks), Cyprus choose to impose the entire loss on the respective banks’ owners and creditors, and to undertake the good bank bad bank split briefly described above (see my earlier blog on the subject: https://wcoats.wordpress.com/2013/03/27/the-cyprus-game-changer/). This was a dramatic change in approach that shifted the risk of bank behavior back to uninsured depositors. Many were shocked.

This approach is relatively easy for known losses and should have been undertaken a year and a half earlier when the Greek debt write off occurred. But many of the losses a bank has or is incurring are less clear. Of the currently delinquent mortgage loans, for example, how many will actually default and what will be the market value of the mortgage collateral. The recapitalization of insolvent Irish banks suffered from underestimation of the ultimate losses resulting in three separate injections of state money to recapitalize them, which weakened market confidence in the process. In part to deal with this uncertainty but to restore market confidence in the solvency of the surviving good bank (Bank of Cyprus), known losses were totally written off while the additional but uncertain further losses were covered by replacing an equivalent amount of deposits with equity claims on the BOC (shares). If losses turn out to be smaller than was provided for, these claims will have value and will thus reduce the size of the initial haircuts to deposits.

So “bailing out” a bank refers to covering its losses with someone else’s money (tax payers somewhere) and “bailing in” a bank’s creditors refers to covering its losses (after its capital is used up) with bondholders and uninsured depositors’ money via “haircuts” (writing off part of their value). The former “socializes” losses while leaving any gains from successful bets to the private owners and creates a serious moral hazard leading to excessive risk taking by banks. The latter makes depositors financially responsible for excessive bank losses and restores the market’s discipline of bank risk taking. This is very desirable as market discipline is more effective than regulatory discipline, but the dramatic change in the implicit rules in Cyprus was very large and abrupt.

Capital controls

As part of their respective bank resolutions, both Iceland and Cyprus imposed temporary capital controls, which, however, served very different purposes. Iceland has its own currency while Cyprus is part of the Euro zone.

At the time of Iceland’s banking crisis in 2008 its three largest banks had assets 11 times the total annual output of the economy. About half of their assets (largely loans) and their funding were outside of Iceland. Landsbanki, for example, funding its lending with roughly the same amount of borrowing and deposits (a highly risky strategy). When the borrowed funding of these three banks dried up, their size made it impossible for the Icelandic Central Bank (ICB) to provide their needed liquidity (much of which was in the Euro, a foreign currency), resulting in the failure of all three banks in the second week of October 2008.

Iceland honored all insured deposits domestically and abroad but moved all domestic deposits into newly established “good” banks from the three now bad banks, while leaving their overseas, uninsured deposits in these three banks in receivership. To the extent that these banks failed because of illiquidity (the cut off of their borrowed funding), the receivership should be able to recover all losses to depositors from the liquidation of the banks’ remaining assets.

The UK and Netherland’s objected to the unequal treatment of the uninsured deposits of Icelanders and of foreigners. While Iceland’s decision to bail out all of its domestic depositors may be questioned because of the moral hazard it perpetuated, they had no legal obligation to do the same for Euro deposits by foreigners. The UK and the Netherlands stepped in and followed the same policy adopted by Iceland by guaranteeing the deposits of their citizens. They then tried to collect the cost of these guarantees from Iceland, a very questionable claim.

As the three new “good” banks were fully capitalized, they should have been able to withstand any level of deposit withdrawal as long as the ICB was able to provide any liquidity needed against the good but illiquid assets of these banks. The return of depositor confidence to the banks invariably takes time and some depositors wanted to withdraw their funds. However, because Iceland has its own currency, nervous Icelandic depositors wanting to move their bank deposits abroad, would need first to convert them into Euros or U.S. dollars, which would have depreciated the international value (exchange rate) of the Icelandic króna, and depleted ICB’s international reserves. A depreciation of the króna would raise the cost of imports and reduce the standard of living in Iceland. To protect the exchange rate from excessive devaluation, the ICB imposed temporary limits on the amount of money its residents could move out of the country. These capital controls are still in effect.

Lucky Cyprus is in the Euro zone.  After recapitalizing its banks, in part by writing down their deposit liabilities, they should have sufficient assets to cover all of their deposit liabilities and thus to cover any deposit withdrawals. The only issue would be whether the BOC’s assets were sufficiently liquid to cover the withdrawals. Within the Euro zone payments outside the country are made via the Target Payment System. A transfer of deposits from the BOC in Cyprus to a bank in any other Euro zone country is made by debiting the BOC’s clearing balance with the Central Bank of Cyprus (CBC) and crediting the recipient bank’s clearing account with its central bank via Target. If the BOC does not have sufficient funds in its clearing account with the CBC and is unable to sell sufficient assets to increase that balance, it can borrow the funds from the CBC using its good but illiquid assets as collateral. The CBC is able to do the same by borrowing from the European Central Bank (ECB), which is prepared to lend unlimited amounts against good collateral now that Cyprus has undertaken the measures required for the troika’s financial support (i.e., from the EU/ECB/IMF). There is no exchange rate issue or concern. It is purely a matter of the solvency and liquidity of Cypriot banks.

However, establishing sufficient liquidity to fund large deposit withdrawals may take a few weeks or months and thus Cyprus has imposed temporary capital controls that limit the amount of money that may be withdrawn each day as cash or by transfer. If the arrangements enjoy sufficient public confidence in the soundness and viability of the surviving Bank of Cyprus, the deposit withdrawals should be modest. The period of limits on withdrawals should be measured in weeks rather than months or years.

Conclusion

The resolution of Cyprus’s insolvent banks ultimately, after a false start, was achieved by bailing in its creditors. The resolution was relatively quick and seems complete. While Cyprus’s economy is likely to suffer its abrupt adjustment for some time, its banks should now be sound. The dramatic shift of the responsibility of regulating the risk taking of banks to their uninsured depositors, should, if it is maintained throughout Europe despite nervous claims that it is one-off and not a model, restrain excessive risk taking by banks and lead over time to a stronger banking system. In the interim, there may be some disruptive deposit shifts as previously reckless banks are forced by the market to clean up their acts.