Category: Economics

Cyprus and the Euro

Does the Euro need to be supported by closer European fiscal integration? Many countries do just fine without their own currency and no fiscal coordination with their currency’s issuer. Panama has used the U.S. dollar for well over a century with good success. Ecuador and El Salvador have used the dollar as their own currency for a much shorter time and are doing better for it. Etc.

The major failing of the Euro, along with its considerable benefits for the Euro zone countries and those doing business or traveling among them, has been the failure of lenders to properly price the risk of lending to the Greece’s and Italy’s of the world. The spread between Greek government bonds over German government bonds collapsed to near parity after Greece replaced its inflation prone currency with the low inflation Euro. Greeks, both private and public, responded by borrowing with abandon. Greece has many other structural problems that keep its productivity lower than its neighbors, but credit markets indulged its borrowing binge on the assumption that there was little to no risk that the Greek government would be allowed to default on its debt.  This gave Greece the illusion of a higher standard of living for a while. Richer brothers to the north would surely step in and bail it out if it couldn’t repay its debts. And so it was for a while.

Against German resistance, Greece finally defaulted on much of its debt (the so-called voluntary haircut – write down — of its debt held by banks to about 30% of its full value). This was an important restoration of market risk and hence market discipline of Greek and other EU periphery countries’ borrowing. It will potentially help save the Euro. Most banks were able to absorb their resulting loss, but some big Cyprus banks apparently were not.

The EU/ECB/IMF (the troika) have offered conditional financial assistance to Cyprus but not to cover the cost of recapitalizing Cyprus’s underwater banks. Cyprus is required to raise those funds themselves. At least this is my assumption. Press reports on what the external support covers are almost totally lacking and the conditions for the deal are not yet final anyway. There is a relatively straightforward approach to resolving these banks, though the details would depend on the particulars of its banking and bankruptcy laws. I do not know the details of these laws nor of the conditions of these banks (Laiki and Bank of Cyprus), but I assume that they are viable if recapitalized and worth more as going concerns than from liquidating them.

The insolvent banks should be put into receivership and instantly split into a good, fully capitalized, bank and a bad bank (i.e. what ever is left) to be liquidated. The good banks would be fully capitalized by leaving some of their liabilities with the bad bank, starting with its shareholders, then bondholders (of which there are not many), then uninsured depositors. These creditors would, in effect, be written off. This would enable the new good banks to continue operating without serious interruption. The only real debate should be about how far to cut into depositors (so-called bailing creditors in) to rebalance assets and liabilities. The Economist argues that the write-offs should stop with shareholders and bondholders and all depositors should be made good via bailout funds from the European Stability Mechanism.

Depending on the particulars of the banking law, an insolvent but otherwise viable bank is put into receivership. This removes the shareholders from any control over the bank. Immediately the good assets of the bank, including its branch network and equipment, and staff would be sold to a new bank, which would assume all insured deposits and a proportionate amount of the uninsured deposit sufficient to match the value of the assets purchased. Ideally the new bank would be sold immediately to new private owners. But if more time is needed to organize its sell, it would be sold temporarily to the government for one Euro. What remains of the old bank would be liquidated and the proceeds would be apportioned in accordance with the priorities provided in the law to the credits (deposits that were not transferred to the new bank). As all of the good assets were transferred to the good bank, there would be virtually no further assets in the bad bank to recover and the remaining creditors would receive little to nothing.  The overall loss to depositors will depend on the losses incurred by the bank on its assets that made it insolvent in the first place. The orderly resolution described above almost always result it much smaller losses to creditors than a disorderly default in which the bank closes its doors totally.

Market discipline would clearly be more strengthened if uninsured depositors were also at risk of losing money. But increasing that risk unexpectedly and to too large an extent could cause deposit runs throughout Euro (and the world). Ultimately, but maybe not at the moment, this would be a good thing for the banking sector. Banks would have to behave more prudently or run the risk of losing deposits. Such market discipline is more effective in limited excessive risk taking by banks than is tighter supervision; though required capital and senior convertible bonds should be significantly increased in the future. In my view, the full recapitalization of all insolvent banks should be financed by bailing in as many uninsured depositors as needed to cover their capital deficiency. The IMF’s position, opposed by the EU, was that a good bank should assume only the insured depositors and receive sufficient good assets to cover them. This would leave all uninsured deposits in the bad bank, which were expected to suffer losses of 20 to 40 percent of their value.

The Cypriote officials originally proposed something quite different. They proposed a one-time levy on all depositors with a lower tax rate on smaller insured deposits. Thus both insured and uninsured depositors in good banks as well as bad ones would be paying to cover the losses of insolvent ones. Not exactly a boost to market discipline of banks. Depositors everywhere and especially in the Euro zone were shocked and the Cyprus Parliament rejected the proposal.

It will be interesting to know what motivated this crazy idea. For one thing it protects the shareholders from the loss of their shares and control of their banks, which is not a good idea from the point of view of the health of the banking system, though it may have been a deliberate goal of the plan (the shareholders are likely to be influential people in Cyprus). Antonis Samaras, the President of Cyprus, suggested that he wished to diminish the loss to large depositors (which include many wealthy Russians, some of whom have dealings with his law firm). Steve Hanke states that about half of Cyprus banks’ deposits are owed to Russians (including those of Russian subsidiaries established in Cyprus).

Whether lightening the burden of large depositors (sharing the burden more equitably according to the President) involved murky deals with Russians or the mistaken belief that it might save the large offshore deposit business Cyprus had developed (the deposit liabilities of its banks were eight time Cyprus’s GDP) only time will tell (maybe). Cyprus’s banking business is more like that of Iceland or Ireland before they crashed and burned several years ago, than the typical off shore financial centers like Cayman. The deposits in Cyprus are with Cyprus banks. If they become insolvent, depositors (or tax payers somewhere) lose. Foreign depositors in Cayman banks are actually depositing in branches of international banks with headquarters and assets elsewhere. Loses incurred by Cayman branches would be a small fraction of the total assets of the global bank and more easily absorbed.

Cyprus’s misguided attempt to spare large depositors at the expense of depositors in general, even if rejected in the end, greatly unnerved depositors everywhere and is likely to weaken rather than strengthen market discipline of bank risk taking.  By making the depositor haircut a levy/tax, Cyprus intended to bypass the bankruptcy/resolution provisions of the banking law and deposit insurance provisions. They created a mess.

The Sequester

Everyone agrees that the sequester, an $85 billion cut from the planned increase for this fiscal year, applied across the board within the broad categories of Defense ($42.5 billion) and non defense discretionary ($42.5 billion) is the worst way to allocate cuts. This is apparently why President Obama proposed it as a sort of poison pill. (See Bob Woodward: bob-woodward-obamas-sequester-deal-changer/).   Indeed it is. Little else is clear about the sequester. It is worth clarifying the facts and context of the size of the cuts and their distribution after a quick review of how we got here.

Background

Republicans want to bring federal government spending down to traditional levels, which can be fully financed with existing taxes, while Democrats want to raise taxes to finance a larger government (currently at 24.3 percent of GDP reflecting, in part, great recession related factors, and averaging 19.8 percent from 1960 to 2007).  Many efforts have been made to forge a compromise package that would be accepted by both the Republic majority House and the Democrat majority Senate. So far, none has succeeded.

Three years ago President Obama established a bipartisan budget reform commission—Bowles-Simpson commission, which in December 2010 recommended spending cuts and tax increases that would slow down the ballooning of debt over the next ten years by 4 trillion dollars, 3 trillion in spending cuts and 1 trillion in tax increases (largely from closing tax loopholes). As the base line projected increase over that period was $10 trillion, the Bowles-Simpson proposals would hold the increase in the debt to $6 trillion. Sorting out what Bowles-Simpson actually proposed became so complicated (e.g., they actually used an eight year period rather than ten and for incomes over $250,000 assumed a return to pre-Bush tax cuts rates) that even President Obama ignored the report. http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=3844

Soon thereafter (January 2011) three Republican and three Democrat Senators, the so-called gang of six, began discussions to find an acceptable compromise, eventually announcing failure in May of that year. Later that same year the Bipartisan Policy Center’s Debt Reduction Task Force co-chaired by Pete V. Domenici, former Republican U.S. Senator from New Mexico, and Alice M. Rivlin, founding director of CBO, former OMB director, and former Vice Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, made similar recommendations.

On several occasions President Obama and Speaker of the House, Republican John Boehner, were close to a “grand bargain” that included some tax revenue increase and entitlement cuts. Efforts failed when Boehner concluded that he could not obtain enough Republican votes in the House. The President may have had the same problem with his party in the Senate if he had tried to present it to them. Other efforts, such as one led by Vice President Biden, met similar fates.

To avoid the sharp curtailment of government spending that would result from hitting the debt ceiling, preventing any further government borrowing in late 2011, the Budget Control Act of 2011 increased the authorized debt ceiling by $2.3 trillion and cut $841 billion from the projected deficit increase over the next ten years by capping the annual increases in discretionary spending over that period. The caps do not constrain increases in war related expenditures (Afghanistan), natural disasters, or entitlements. It also established as special joint committee of Congress charged with agreeing on an additional $1.2 trillion in deficit reduction over the next ten years with everything on the table (entitlements and defense cuts, tax increases, etc). If this so-called Super Committee was unable to reach an agreement or Congress did not approve it, the same amount would be cut according to the now infamous sequester. (Super Committee Sequestration) The sequester provision was deliberately meant by all sides to be so unpalatable that the Super Committee could not possibly fail to reach a compromise.

However, on November 20, 2011, the co-chairs of the Super Committee stated that “after months of hard work and intense deliberations, we have come to the conclusion today that it will not be possible to make any bipartisan agreement available to the public before the committee’s deadline.”

Two things were scheduled to happen if nothing changed. First, $1.2 trillion of automatic across-the-board spending cuts would kick-in on Oct 1, 2012. Second, the Bush tax cuts would expire for everyone at the end of that year. In addition, the temporary cuts in the payroll tax and the extension of unemployment benefits might not be continued. These three items constituted the infamous fiscal cliff, which was averted at the last-minute by making the Bush tax cuts permanent for everyone except those with incomes above $400,000, indexing the Alternative Minimum Tax and a few other things. The start of the sequester was delayed until January 1, 2013 and then again until March 1. This is a very simplified summary (trust me) of how we got to the sequester.

The Sequester

The sequester does not reduce total spending. Total Federal government’s spending in 2012 was $3,538 billion and planned spending (no actual budget has been approved for three years) for 2013 (which ends September 30) was (before the sequester) $3,796 billion. Reducing this amount by the $85 billion as required by the sequester still leaves an increase of $173 billion, which even after adjusting for inflation is a real increase. http://www.usfederalbudget.us/federal_budget_estimate_vs_actual

The often misleading practice in Washington of referring to reductions in increases as “cuts” is illustrated by the following statement by Sen. Bernard Sanders (I-Vt.), a member of the Budget Committee: “Some of us believe very strongly that it would be absolutely wrong to cut Social Security benefits.” He was referring to the proposal offered by President Obama to John Boehner to shift the index used to increase Social Security benefits over time to one that would increase them more slowly (the chain CPI index, which would preserve the real value of benefits).  Senate-democrats-budget-challenges-obama-on-medicare-social-security-cuts

While the sequester does not cut total spending, the way in which it is allocated does cut spending in some areas. Half of the cut comes from Defense, which was already being cut (cuts that actually reduce spending below the previous year) before the sequester. The other half of the cut falls on discretionary spending (sparing the entitlements – social security, Medicaid, etc, and the Department of Veteran’s Affairs). As such non-military discretionary spending is only about 15% of total spending, taking half of the total cut from items that are only 15% of the total is about an 8% cut. These figures apply to this year only. Like this year’s “cuts,” the sequestered spending over the next ten years are to be taken from the ever-increasing base line amounts and thus just slows down the previously planned increases.

The Budget Control Act of 2011 also specified that within the categories identified above, the cuts must be applied across-the-board (i.e. proportionally) to each Budget Account (BA), of which there are 1200, and each of which consolidates a number of programs, projects and activities (PPA).  Within each Budget Account, the executive branch of government is responsible for prioritizing the cuts, i.e. for cutting those things least valuable (most wasteful). The government rarely spends money on things that have no value at all (some of my friends will challenge me on this statement), but that is not the correct standard of judgment. The correct standard (in part) is whether the money spent on a valuable project would have produced even more value if spent on something else (whether by the government or the taxpayer).

To review, the President proposed the cross the board cuts to defense and non-defense discretionary spending and Congress accepted the idea in the Budget Control Act of 2011 believing, with the President, that it would never need to be applied. However, we are now there and the cuts must be made. But within the cuts required for each Budget Account, it is the Administration that is responsible for what to cut. Like the CEO of any company faced with limited resources, Department heads are responsible for cutting those activities of least value and preserving those of greatest value.

Smoke

Any cut hurts someone even if it benefits the economy over all. Consider, for example, the loss of four air traffic controllers at the Garden City, Kansas airport. “THE $85 BILLION in across-the-board budget cuts known as sequestration have begun to affect places like Garden City, the Kansas county seat (pop. 26,880) whose airport will lose $318,756 in Federal Aviation Administration funds that pay for four air traffic controllers. As The Post’s Stephanie McCrummen reported, Garden City Regional Airport’s control tower is one of 238 affected by sequestration, which will reduce total FAA spending in fiscal 2013 from about $16.7 billion to $16.1 billion. Small towns are lamenting the potential impact on air safety and local economies.” A Washington Post editorial on March 8 notes that of the two commercial flights that take off and land there each day one already does so when the control tower is closed (Small-town-airports-propped-up-with-200-million). The Post concludes that the $200 million a year the federal government spends to subsidize commercial flights to small lightly used airports is a waste that deserves to end.

A considerable fuss was raised about the Administration’s cutting the White house tours. Was this the least costly cut from the White House or Secret Service budget? I have no idea.  The Washington Post editorialized that: “THE DECISION to drop White House tours always had a whiff of what’s known as Washington Monument syndrome. The ham-handed tactic is employed when government is faced with budget cuts and officials go after the services that are most visible and appreciated by the public.” (Reopen-the-white-house-to-tourists) The government could not threaten to close the Washington Monument because it has already been closed for several years for repairs from earthquake damage.

On the other side of the ledger, the Administration’s release of non dangerous illegal immigrants held in federal prisons is more likely a case of doing what the Administration and many others consider the right thing to do anyway and using sequestration as an excuse (the release was weeks before the sequestration). Wasting-money-lives-through-the-detention-of-immigrants

The proposal to cut back on Congressional junkets abroad was made by a columnist, not the administration for obvious reasons. Everyone can find their own favorite wasteful spending. Budget decisions are never easy and resources are always limited so careful prioritization is a normal and essential part of the management of any organization.

Lies

Then there were the claims of cuts that never occurred. Education Secretary Arne Duncan’s false claim of pink slips for teachers earned him 4 Pinocchios (big lie) from The Washington Post’s Fact Checker. And Duncan is one of the good guys:  4-pinocchios-for-arne-duncans-false-claim-of-pink-slips-for-teachers

On March 1 at his press conference President Obama stated: “Starting tomorrow everybody here, all the folks who are cleaning the floors at the Capitol. Now that Congress has left, somebody’s going to be vacuuming and cleaning those floors and throwing out the garbage. They’re going to have less pay. The janitors, the security guards, they just got a pay cut, and they’ve got to figure out how to manage that. That’s real.” But it wasn’t. It also received 4 Pinocchios from the Fact Checker.  sequester-spin-obamas-incorrect-claim-of-capitol-janitors-receiving-a-pay-cut

The Congressional janitors seemed to be a particular concern of the administration. Gene Sperling, director of the White House economic council, on ABC News’ “This Week,” March 3, 2013 observed: “You know, those Capitol janitors will not get as much overtime. I’m sure they think less pay, that they’re taking home, does hurt.”

On March 4, White House spokesman Jay Carney observed at his news briefing: “On the issue of the janitors, if you work for an hourly wage and you earn overtime, and you depend on that overtime to make ends meet, it is simply a fact that a reduction in overtime is a reduction in your pay.”  But none of this was true and drew 4 more Pinocchios from the Post Fact Checker. Capitol-janitors-making-ends-meet-with-overtime-nope

Though the President already has the responsibility of deciding where to cut within Budget Accounts, Republicans have offered to broaden the range of his discretion to determine what to cut and what to keep. Senator Toomey (R-Penn) reported this to us at the Heritage Foundation the day after his dinner with the President at the Jefferson Hotel. He and Sen. James Inhofe (R-Okla) have introduced a bill in the Senate to this effect. The President said no thanks. If you believe that the president has the best interests of the nation at heart, this is a shocking revelation. The President seems to prefer to blame the Republicans for forcing harmful cuts on the nation because after having accepted tax increases on the wealthy they refuse to raise taxes more without some cuts in entitlement programs. This was confirmed in a revealing article by Ezra Klein How-to-fix-sequestration-without-raising-taxes

The way forward

The Budget Act of 1974 requires the president to submit a budget request to Congress on the first Monday in February. He has yet to do so (written March 14th). His recent step into the leadership role normally played by Presidents on major budget matters is welcomed and will be essential if compromise is to be achieved.

White-house-delay-budget-proposal-infuriates-republicans. For the first time in three years the Senate is on the way to adopting a budget as well. Given the budget already passed by the House (the Ryan budget), for the first time in several years the two chambers will have written proposals to negotiate, and hopefully reconcile, with each other.

Most Republicans don’t want to raise taxes or cut defense. Most Democrats don’t want to touch entitlements. Most everyone accepts that the current path is not sustainable. “Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-Va.) argued — to the “consternation” of people “on my side,” he said — that Democrats will have to do more to prevent Social Security and Medicare from bankrupting the nation as the population ages. I share the belief of even my most progressive colleagues that Medicare and Social Security are among the greatest programs ever implemented. But I also believe that the basic math around them doesn’t work anymore,” Warner said. The longer we put off this inevitable math problem,” he said, “the longer we fail to come up with a way to make sure that the promise of Medicare and Social Security is not just there for current seniors but for those 30 years out.” (in the previously cited Post article). Demographics alone will dramatically increase Social Security, Medicaid and Medicare spending even if benefits for each person are not increased as the ratio of old and retire people to working people increases dramatically over the next thirty. Increasing immigration, reducing benefits and increasing tax revenue are the only things that can help. Both sides will need to compromise.

My preference is to cut the Defense department a bit more and “cut” entitlements a lot (which would have little to no effect for a number of years but is critical for the future), and modestly increase the State Department and infrastructure repair spending. Medicare and Medicaid will be more difficult because they require structural changes that actually reduce the cost of medical care, not just arbitrary cuts that must be made up by paying customers picking up other peoples’ bills. Social Security is much easer to fix: Saving Social Security

There are many reasons for reducing the size of our government. Keep-it-lean, How-to-measure-the-size-of-government.

Whether it increases tax revenue or not our tax system needs major overhaul: “US Federal Tax Policy”. At a minimum personal income tax loopholes (deductions) should all be closed and if the corporate income tax can’t be eliminated yet, its rate should be lowered to the levels found in Europe.

But Obama won the last election. I will not get what I want. Republicans will also have to compromise. The battle should be fought over spending. The question should be what government programs and at what level are we willing to pay for with our tax revenue. Some tax increases and spending cuts have already been adopted. More are needed.  It is time for Congress and the Executive to get back to their jobs of evaluating priorities and trade offs and develop and adopt a real budget. Hopefully this time they will succeed. Much depends on it.

Our Government, or Lack There Of

Some of you thought my recent complaints against uncompromising Republicans toward the fiscal cliff were somewhat one sided. It takes two to tango in the compromise game, of course. I would like to suggest a structural change in the U.S. budgetary rules that I think will help reduce our deficits and our debt while at the same time making government more effective. It shifts the focus of the debt reduction discussion from taxation to expenditures, which is the side of the equation on which the Democrats have been irresponsible and uncompromising. The Democrat controlled Senate has not even passed our government’s budget for the last three years.

The subject of taxation divides into its structure (what is taxed and how the burden is shared among the population—these are issues of fairness and the economic consequences), and its level (how much revenue is raised). Getting the structure right is very important for economic growth and for public acceptance of and cooperation with paying the taxes chosen. My views on taxation were reviewed four years ago: https://wcoats.wordpress.com/2008/09/06/how-to-measure-the-size-of-government/ and more extensively almost 40 years ago: http://works.bepress.com/warren_coats/29/.

My proposal, which is really a bit of left over unfinished business from the Reagan administration, is that the level of tax revenue should be set to pay for all of government’s expenditures over the business cycle. Deficits would be allowed during recessions (the so called automatic stabilizers), which would have to be paid for with surpluses during booms. I would like to see a constitutional amendment that imposes this requirement in place of legislated debt ceilings. If the public really wants more government spending, taxes will need to be raised to pay for it.

The focus on taxation, and the refusal of many Republicans to raise them, has been very counterproductive. The Republicans have done a terrible job of making the case for smaller government and I blame a lot of that on their emphasis on taxes rather than spending. If we insist that Obama’s spending programs must be financed by tax revenue rather than borrowing (except for automatic stabilizers during recessions – e.g., increases in unemployment insurance and the natural fall in tax revenue when incomes fall), people would start focusing on the fact that they will have to pay for these expenditures. It would make fighting for more restrained spending easier.

The government (federal, state and local) should be involved in some areas of our lives, but we should make the case for such involvements carefully because the nature of government, if not firmly and continuously resisted, is to keep growing. The defense industry in the United States is large and powerful. It has an obvious profit interest in seeing the government’s defense expenditures increase and it has the economic means to help influence such an outcome. The taxpayers’ representatives in government need the counter pressure those taxpayers can provide to evaluate defense spending and all other government programs carefully and to apply rigorous cost benefit analysis to every proposal.

Even then, it is well known in public choice literature that it is difficult for the diverse and defused public interest of taxpayers to dominate over the individual special interests of bankers, pharmaceuticals, farmers, teachers unions, etc. If these special interests are able to gain special favors from the government (e.g., farm subsidies) they benefit greatly but the cost is spread widely over all taxpayers. These forces push government to grow into activities that can harm the economic efficiency and growth that benefits us all. But they also invariably push and ultimately cross the boundaries of honest advocacy into blatant corruption. I expounded on this dangers in (at least) two earlier blogs:

https://wcoats.wordpress.com/2009/12/23/keep-it-lean/ and http://dailycaller.com/2011/01/17/ikes-farewell-address-fifty-years-on/

Liberal (in the classical meaning defined by John Stewart Mill) and democratic societies are the exception in history. They are not easily defended.

“The price of liberty is eternal vigilance.”

Happy New Year.

Our Unsupportable Empire

Most of you are grudgingly aware that the U.S. government has promised us more than we want to or can easily pay for.  China is no longer willing to fill the gap knowing that we will not be capable of repaying it.  This is on top of the existing national debt from past borrowing to cover the government’s current and past spending in excess of its revenue of $16 trillion, about the same as the United States’ total annual output.  These numbers pale in comparison with the government’s unfunded commitments (those not covered by the revenue expected from existing tax laws and user charges) to future retirees and recipients of medical care (social security, medicare and Medicaid). The present value of the revenue short fall to pay for these future commitments (the government’s unfunded liabilities) is currently around $50 trillion for an astonishing total debt of around $66 trillion, which is larger than the total annual output of the world per year.

Naturally, these promises must be pared back because they can’t be paid for. To some extent a healthy, growing economy will also increase our capacity (lighten the burden) to pay for them but by itself growth will not be enough. This is one, but only one, of the reasons that we also need to reconsider our military promises around the world, while reducing and reorienting our military budget and modestly increasing our diplomatic (State Department) expenditures.

Our promise to provide security to most of the world suffers from the same moral hazard as does an overly generous welfare state.  Incentives matter. When access to welfare is easy and the level of support is generous, more people will choose it over taking a job that doesn’t interest them much.  When President Bill Clinton signed “The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996” (PRWORA) on August 22, 1996 (with strong Republican support), he fulfilled his campaign pledge to “end welfare as we have come to know it.” The law ended welfare as an entitlement by introducing tighter conditions for receiving it. Welfare costs dropped following adoption of the law. “A broad consensus now holds that welfare reform was certainly not a disaster–and that it may, in fact, have worked much as its designers had hoped.”[1] While some people remain skeptical, Sweden’s welfare reforms of the last two decades have demonstrated very similar results.[2]

The United States spends more on its military than the next 14 largest military spenders combined (China, Russia, UK, France, Japan, Saudi Arabia, India, Germany, Brazil, Italy, South Korea, Australia, Canada, and Turkey). We are policing/protecting most of the world. This has two negative effects. The first, similar to chronic welfare recipients, is that other nations spend less on their own defense, taking a free ride on the United States’ ability to keep the world safe for everyone else. The second is that by diverting so much of our productive resources into the military, we reduce the resources available for developing and strengthening our economy. It is our powerful economy that underlies our influence in the world as much, if not more, than our military power. Moreover, our military might is made possible by our economic power. So we need to get the balance right. I urge you to read David Ignatius’ recent discussion of this issue in The Washington Post, (“The foreign policy debate we should be having”, Oct 21, 2012, page A15)

But there are more reasons that our military adventurism and spending should be reduced and more resources given to diplomacy. Our national security and the freedoms America was founded to establish and protect will be strengthened as a result.

American hegemony rests largely on our economic and military power, but also on widespread respect for the American way of life (our respect for human freedom and dignity and our prosperity). Our efforts to promote democracy via military interventions have generally not gone well.  The talents and spirit of enterprise that have served us so well at home have not generally contributed to success in building new democratic nations where we have militarily intervened. Books like Joseph Heller’s, Catch 22 (about WWII) and movies like Robert Altman’s Mash (about Viet Nam) entertainingly introduced us to the bureaucratic problems of fighting and/or governing in foreign lands. We have the best trained and most well equipped military history has ever known, but it has failed for the last ten years to win in Afghanistan, which is now the longest war in American history. Our powerful military is not good at nation building, nor should we expect it to be. The military is not the right tool for promoting the values we believe in around the world. That is a job for diplomacy (with our powerful military well in the background).

We have been more successful at promoting our values and our economic interests through our promotion of and participation in international organizations like the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization and a wide range of international agreements and cooperation that facilitate free trade, and capital movements, and that extend the protection of property and human rights internationally. These organizations and agreements have developed the international legal frameworks for telecommunications, patents, financial and product standards, etc. that underlie the explosion of globalization that has dramatically raised the standard of living for much of the world’s population.

Rajiv Chandrasekaran, has written an excellent exposition of our military efforts in Afghanistan, which I urge you to read “Afghan security forces rapid expansion comes at a cost as readiness lags” (The Washington Post, Oct 21, 2012, page 1). Every few years America’s military strategy has changed: from counter terrorism, to counter insurgency, to building and training (and equipping) an Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. As each approach fails, the Joint Chief’s extract the lessons learned and try a new one until it fails. In recent years, our military commanders have correctly emphasized the fact that “success” cannot be achieved by the military alone (it amazes me that anyone could have thought so – no wonder they are so eager to start wars).

But those are far from the only reasons for reducing our military footprint and budget. I believe in keeping government relatively small and encumbered with the organizational and political checks and balances meant to replace the role of competition in the private sector in bending self-interest to the public good. People are influenced by their self-interest whether they are in government or the private sector. However, in the private sector success comes from serving the needs of others in the market. This exerts a strong incentive on individual behavior. (Dishonesty can exist in either sector and can only be addressed by embracing appropriate moral standards and consistent punishment of breaches of those standards) In place of market discipline (acceptance or rejection), government must rely more on checks and balances to ensure that government officials behave as intended and they can only go so far to keep government honest and impartial in serving the public. The power of the government to coerce, and the expenditure of large sums of money by the government create enormous temptations for personal gain by those in positions of power in the government. The bigger government gets the more difficult it is to prevent some in government from yielding to the temptations to direct its power and money to their own good rather than the general good.

The firms in our large and important military support industry (Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrup Grumman, General Dynamics, Raytheon, Halliburton, United Technologies, Computer Sciences, BAE Systems, General Electric, Bechtel, and Honeywell International, to name a few), do not have a disinterested view about the most appropriate and cost-effective military technology the defense budget should provide for. The millions of dollars they spend attempting to influence the choices of the services and congress are, in a sense, “honest” efforts to promote their self-interested view of what best serves our national security. The growing behemoth of the industrial military complex of which Eisenhower warned us over fifty years ago now both defends and threatens our liberties. See my earlier comments on Ike’s famous farewell address: http://dailycaller.com/2011/01/17/ikes-farewell-address-fifty-years-on/

The risks of the misallocation of our resources and waste are directly related to the size of our military (and government more generally). The boundary between honest differences of opinion over the best military equipment and systems and simple cronyism is fuzzy.  Consider, for example, the recent award of a large contract to build 100,000 homes in war-torn Iraq to HillStone International, a newcomer in the business of home building. When its president David Richter was asked how the newcomer swung such a big deal, he replied that it really helps to have “the brother of the vice president as a partner” (James Biden).[3] It would not be fair to disqualify bidders because they are friends or relatives of high government officials (As Afghan President Karzai’s brother Mahmoud said to us with regard to the shares of Kabul Bank given to him by its founders. The Bank is now in receivership as the result of the bank lending 95% of its deposits to its shareholders), but how can you tell what is merit and what is cronyism?

My point is that the defense budget needs to be on the table when our elected officials finally confront the cuts that must be made to the government’s expenditures to save the country. Defense spending needs to be cut not just because we can’t afford it, but also because our oversized military is weakening our economic base on which both our military and our political power in the world rest. And perhaps most important of all, over reliance on military power to the exclusion of diplomacy has actually weakened our security and standing in the world.

[1] The New Republic, editorial September 4, 2006, page 7.

[2] The Economist, “Sweden: The New Model” October 13, 2012.

Has the ECB provided the missing piece to resolve the EU debt crisis?

On September 6, Mario Draghi, president of the European Central Bank (ECB), announced that the ECB would engage in unlimited secondary market purchases of government bonds of member countries adhering to the policy conditions agreed to with the IMF and EU (and thus qualified to borrow from the European Financial Stabilization Fund – EFSF – or the European Stabilization Mechanism – ESM) to the extent needed to promote the efficient transmission of monetary policy throughout the Euro area. The over all liquidity impact of such purchases will be sterilized (offset by the sale of some other ECB assets), as needed, in order to preserve the ECB’s inflation objective of an inflation rate below but near 2% over the next two years. What does this add to the existing European tool kit and is it enough to resolve the EU debt crisis?

All responsible government officials recognize and accept that in the long run nations, like individuals, must live within their means (pay fully for what they consume). Their standard of living will depend on what they are able to produce (productivity).  Eliminating government deficits requires reducing government spending and/or increasing its tax revenue. Increasing the sustainable standard of living of its people (the level of consumption they can fully pay for with what they produce) requires liberalizing restrictions on labor and product markets and investment that will increase the productivity and thus output of workers and businesses. The debate is primarily over the optimal pace of introducing the measures needed to balance budgets and increase productivity and competitiveness.  This matters in that it takes time for the economy to adjust to reforms before it enjoys the benefits of more rapid growth. In the interim continuing but declining deficits must be financed either in the market (if market lenders have confidence in the effectiveness of the measures being taken), or by the IMF/EU/ECB until market confidence can be established.

I have elaborated these points in earlier blogs: “European debt crisis: causes and cures”; “Saving Italy and the euro”;   “Buying time for Italy”; and “Saving Greece-Austerity and/or Growth”.

Throughout the crisis Germany has demanded that Greece and other over indebted and uncompetitive countries undertake the needed corrective measures before being granted the financing needed for the transition back to normal market borrowing.  Events have proven Germany to be right as earlier “bailout” commitments have led to a suspension or slow down in policy reforms thus prolonging recovery.  For the same reason Germany has vigorously opposed (correctly in my view) the adoption of Eurobonds, which would allow Greece and others to borrow at the same interest rate as Germany and all other EU members. The moral hazard of bad fiscal behavior when market discipline of over borrowing is removed is a real and serious issue.

On the other hand, Germany is also pushing for Fiscal Union in order to gain better EU wide control over excessive national deficits. This may or may not be a good idea for Europe (I have my doubts) but it is certainly not, contrary to much opinion, essential for the viability of the Euro. The idea behind the German push for Fiscal Union stems from the markets’ failure to properly price the risk of lending to Greece, Portugal and some other overly indebted countries and Germany’s belief that the only way it can protect its tax payers from supporting inflated living standards to the South is by gaining control over their governments’ expenditures. Until the last few years, the governments of Greece and Portugal could borrow in the market at interest rates very close to the rates paid by the German government, which by the way has borrowed quite a lot itself (the ratio of German government debt to its GDP is currently above 81%). These governments spent and over promised future benefits recklessly on the (temporary) basis of relatively cheap debt financing in the market.

It is certainly a fair question to ask why the market failed in this regard and over lent to a number of governments that now have difficulty repaying. The expectation that Germany and other Northern EU countries would not allow the profligate southern ones to default made such lending seem risk free and the market priced it accordingly.  Fiscal Union and/or EU-wide fiscal rules are one way to limit such excessive borrowing and unfunded future promises. Improved market discipline of borrowing via more accurate risk premiums on market lending is another, and in my opinion, superior approach. Greece’s orderly default (75% haircut) on its publicly held debt and the current crisis have restored a large measure of market discipline to sovereign borrowing. Greece and Portugal do not need to borrow from the market for several more years as long as they implement and adhere to the reforms demanded by the IMF/EU/ECB. However, Spain and Italy closely watch the now far more sensitive interest rates demanded by the market when lending to them. Given the substantial outstanding debt of these countries, those interest rates can make the difference between the success or failure of reform efforts. Ireland, which has successfully, though painfully, implemented all of the conditions of the IMF et al “bailout,” is well on the way to full recovery and is now able to borrow again in the market at reasonable interest rates.

The missing piece in the EU/ECB tool kit to manage the ongoing debt crisis is the availability of sufficient temporary adjustment financing for larger countries such as Spain and Italy should markets loss confidence in one or both of them before their reforms have had time to bear fruit. The resources of the EFSF/ESM, still waiting for the German constitutional court’s approval, are not sufficient to finance stabilization programs with both countries. This leaves markets uneasy and volatile.  Market interest rates on ten-year Spanish government bonds have varied this year between under 5% to 7.6%. German government bond rates have varied between 1.24% and 1.85%.  Mario Draghi’s commitment of ECB funds to buy short-term sovereign debt (with maturities of up to three years) in secondary markets does not augment the resources available to the EFSF/ESM to finance adjustment programs with the IMF, but by buying such bonds in the secondary market should liquidity in a program country dry up, the ECB should be able to significantly reduce the prospects of what it considers unrealistically high risk premiums for such bonds. The ECB would only buy bonds of countries meeting the conditionality of an IMF supported adjustment program. Outright secondary market purchases are a standard and traditional liquidity management tool for central banks. What is unique in the European context is that open market purchases must be for the bonds of individual countries and the choice of countries matters. It is for others to determine whether, as Mr. Draghi claims, the new initiative is consistent with the ECB’s mandate.

This past week I attended a meeting of the Mont Pelerin Society in Prague. Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman and a few other free market champions founded the MPS in 1946. Czech President Vaclav Klaus, also an MSP member, hosted this year’s meeting. President Klaus has opposed the Czech Republic’s adoption of the Euro. It has kept its own currency, which the Czech National Bank has managed very well under an “inflation targeting” policy regime. However, Spanish economist Jesus Huerta de Soto spoke at the meeting in defense of the single currency. He favors a return to the gold standard but convincingly argued that the monetary discipline on Spain provided by giving up its own currency to the Euro was a good second best.  The key to success or failure of the Euro for the overly indebted countries that use it is whether they reform deeply enough to live within their own means within a few years and to sufficiently improve their competitiveness with the rest of Europe and the rest of the world. Failure to do so will harm the defaulting country far more than it will harm the Euro.  I wish them well.

Spain’s Financial Crisis: First Principles

Europe’s debt crisis has many contributing elements: bloated government bureaucracies, unaffordable social welfare programs, and productivity stifling labor and commercial laws.  However, none is as central as the condition and behavior of those European banks that overlent to and undercharged many European governments, and whose potential insolvency should one or more European governments default (as Greece has already to some extent) has dominated the EU’s slow, halting approach to dealing with it. Focusing on the case of Spain, the following note illustrates the importance for the future of Europe’s financial markets of resolving the banking sector’s problems properly.

Overview

In some respects the financial and debt situation of Spain is similar to that of the U.S.[1] Its central government debt is less than the U.S.’ and Germany’s (68%, 103%, and 83% respectively). This year its public sector deficit is expected to be 5.9% (8.5% last year), less than the U.S. at 7.6%, but more than Germany’s at 1.3%. Its total debt (public and private) to foreigners (external debt) is less as well (84%, 103%, and 142% respectively). Spain’s housing bubble and subsequent collapse were average. The decline in Spain’s real housing prices from their peak in 2007 of about 20% was about the same as the UK’s and the Euro zone’s and less than in Ireland and the U.S.

To over simplify, what sets Spain apart is a) its lack of competitiveness (its current account deficit with the rest of the world relative to GDP was 9.6% in 2008 and is currently almost 3% while the Euro area as a whole is balanced – i.e., 0); b) the heavy reliance of its banks on borrowed funds (its loan to deposit ratio is about 150% compared with 80% for U.S. banks; and c) its banks’ large exposure to the real estate and construction sectors (56.5% compared to 30% for U.S. banks). In addition, Spanish and European banks in general operate on much less capital than do American banks. Going into the recent financial crisis—2007—the ratio of total European bank assets to capital—i.e., the leverage ratio—averaged around 30, while for American banks it averaged around 13 (i.e. capital gearing ratios of 3.3% and 7.7% respectively).

Spain was confident that it could make sufficient budgetary and policy adjustments to convince markets that it was still safe to lend to while gradually winding down excess spending and liberalizing rigid labor and product markets (its no bailout strategy). But after four years of inadequate measures Spanish voters ousted the Socialist Party and gave the center right party of Mariano Rajoy a solid majority in Parliament with a mandate to move more aggressively. Prime Minister Rajoy’s reform program has been a mixed bag (see “Spain’s Economic Reforms: A Mixed Bag”). The central government’s spending and deficit are falling rapidly, though excessive regional government spending remains a problem. Labor market reform has been quite quick and strong and is already producing improvements in competitiveness. However, Spain has fallen back into recession and unemployment is the highest in Europe at over 24%.  (see Rajoy government reform program)

Spain’s Banks

Spain’s primary vulnerability comes from its banks. In fact, a central feature of the European debt crisis is the relatively large exposure of European banks, including German banks, to the sovereign debts of Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Spain, etc. If depositors think that their deposits are at risk, they will move them. If they think all banks in Spain suffer this risk, they will move them out of Spain to other banks that accept Euros. If depositors withdraw their deposits too rapidly (i.e., bank runs) then even solvent, well capitalized banks can have trouble liquidating assets fast enough to fund the withdrawals. The total deposits of Greek banks have fallen from € 245 billion at the end of 2009 to € 175 billion at the end of April 2012. However, Spanish banks’ deposits have not begun to decline until very recently.

Countries limit the risk of deposit runs by explicitly insuring bank deposits up to a limit and/or by standing ready to intervene (bailout) failing banks. In Spain, all deposits are insured up to € 100,000 per depositor. If governments guarantee all deposits as a result of a comment to bail out insolvent banks, deposit insurance is redundant and not needed. Even a full deposit guarantee provides some market discipline of bank behavior if the regulator intervenes promptly when a bank becomes insolvent, because shareholders lose all of their investment in the bank. Market discipline is strengthened further if bank bondholders also incur losses when the assets of an intervened bank are not sufficient to cover their repayment.

The Importance of Bank Capital

Without deposit insurance or government deposit guarantees, their bank’s capital is the primary protection for depositors against the risk of loss.  If depositors think that their bank’s capital is too low to cover potential losses, they will move their deposits to safer banks. Unfortunately, the value of a bank’s capital cannot be known with certainty. Economic capital (net worth) is the difference between the value of assets and the value of liabilities. A large share of banks’ assets is loans. The value of a loan is less than its face (book) value if it is not repaid fully or on time. It is impossible to know for sure which loans are “good” and which are doubtful and how doubtful they might be in the future.

Minimizing the risk of deposit runs via capital adequacy consists of three elements:

  1. The level of capital banks are required to hold in normal times (dynamic or cyclically adjusted capital requirements deserve more serious attention) must be sufficient to absorb possible losses. Higher capital requirements provide more deposit protection.
  2. The rules for valuing assets and thus capital must reflect their real value as best as possible. Most bank loans have no secondary market from which to measure their value. Thus bank regulators have established rules of thumb for estimating the probable loss in value for loans that are not performing or are at risk of falling into arrears and potentially defaulting. Banks are required to provision (write down capital) to cover such probable losses. This is the equivalent of “marking to market” the probable value of loans that have no market. Loan valuation and loan loss provisions need to realistically reflect and cover the most likely repayment outcomes.
  3. Depositors must have confidence in the adequacy of the first two measures and the faithfulness with which banks apply them. This is the issue of transparency. The recent deployment of stress tests, when properly explained (especially when undertaken by third parties, such as the IMF), is meant to reduce the uncertainty surrounding the adequacy of measured capital.

The risks to Spanish bank depositors come primarily from three sources:

  1. The potential losses from loans to Spain’s now busted housing and construction markets and from holdings of sovereign debt of Greece are uncertain and have almost certainly been underestimated and under provisioned in the past. Significant exposure to Spanish sovereign debt is now becoming an issue as well. Capital injections are needed just to keep actual capital at currently reported levels. Higher levels of capital are needed to compensate depositors for the uncertainty of the actual level of capital.
  2. The ability of Spain to honor its deposit insurance commitments or its implicit commitments to cover deposits in the event of an intervention are increasingly in doubt because the ability of the Spanish government to borrow additional amounts to cover such commitments is in doubt.
  3. The ability of banks to fund their loans from non-deposit sources or to fund deposit withdrawals even if they are well capitalized are in doubt in current market conditions. This is a liquidity problem, not a solvency problem, and should be handled by the provision of central bank liquidity.

Spanish banks fund a large part of their loans with relatively short-term borrowed money rather than deposits. Access to such funds has become difficult and expensive. From the beginning of central banking, a core function of central banks has been to provide banks with the liquidity they need in such circumstances. The long-established principle is that the central bank should provide illiquid but solvent banks with all the liquidity they need (generally by lending to them against good collateral), but should not lend to insolvent banks (banks lacking sufficient good assets to cover their deposit and other liabilities). The ECB’s three-year Long Term Refinancing Operation is addressing banks’ liquidity problem (#3).

But even without deposit runs (or walks), Spanish and other European banks (especially) need to reduce the extent to which they lend long-term on the basis of short-term borrowed funds. They can only do so by reducing lending until their deposits finance a larger share of it and/or by increasing capital. The bank deleveraging now underway around the world is an important source of reduced bank lending and the slow pace of recovery (see Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, “This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly”).

Spanish banks were better capitalized than most at the onset of the international financial crisis but more recently have been overwhelmed by the magnitude of the collapse of Spain’s housing and construction markets. The government (previous and current) has taken measures to address banking sector weaknesses but always a bit behind the curve.  Seven failing cajas (regional savings banks heavily exposed to real estate) were merged in 2010 to form Bankia making it Spain’s fourth largest bank. In May the bank was largely nationalized (costing the Spanish government around 20 billion Euros to date) and trading of its shares was suspended on May 25, 2012. Deposit insurance was established then raised. Government guarantees of senior bank bond holdings were introduced (October 2008).

As time passed, depositors have only become more concerned about the safety of their deposits. In an effort to finally get ahead of the curve, the authorities have increased the provisions required against weak and doubtful loans and other assets, and initiated third-party stress tests of its banks. The IMF’s recent Financial Sector Stability Assessment found Spain’s large internationally active banks to be well capitalized and able to absorb the new capital strengthening requirements. However, its former savings banks and some of its medium and small private sector banks are more vulnerable and will need capital injections from the government to cover insured or guaranteed deposits. Because of its own financing difficulties, the government of Spain has turned to the EU to backstop its ability to recapitalize (replace capital lost by or potentially lost by defaulting loans) those of its banks with inadequate capital. For this purpose the EU has committed €100 billion.

The Way Forward

Deposit runs on Spanish banks (including the drying up of wholesale funding) can be prevented only by convincing depositors that their money is safe, i.e. that their banks have sufficient capital to cover any losses. This requires honest accounting and full implementation of the indicated provisioning, and adequate capital; or creditable government guarantees.

For the future health of Spanish banks, it is important that Spain’s banking interventions preserve the intended discipline of excessive risk taking that results from imposing losses on shareholders and senior bond holders while honoring its commitments to protect depositors. Thus liquidity support should only be given to solvent banks. Nonperforming loans should be properly provisioned. Banks that are critically undercapitalized and are unable to raise their own capital to required levels within a reasonable period should be intervened. Intervened banks should be resolved according to the least cost principle (least cost to the tax payer). Shareholders and senior bondholders should be wiped out before government money is injected to cover other liabilities. Viable banks should be continued and sold to new owners within a reasonable period of time. Non-viable banks should be wound down (liquidated) paying off all insured or guaranteed depositors with the help of public funds as needed.

In requesting EU financial assistance, Spain is committed to abiding by EU rules on state aid to banks. However, emergency responses to a financial crisis much too often produce the foundation of moral hazard and excessive risk taking that creates the next crises delaying true and long-lasting resolution. More market discipline of risk taking needs to be reintroduced via a sound bank resolution policy. Spain will contribute to the future soundness and vitality of its banking sector and that of all of Europe if it adheres to the above principles as it “cleans up” its financial sector.

[1] The International Monetary Fund’s “Financial Sector Stability Assessment”  provides an excellent summary as of May 2012.

The Hutchinson Lecture at the Universtiy of Delaware

Tuesday (April 17) I spent an enjoyable day in Newark, Delaware as the guest of the Economics Department of the University of Delaware. My afternoon, more technical, lecture to the graduate students and faculty covered my proposal for the reform of the international monetary system: http://works.bepress.com/warren_coats/25/

My evening lecture, this year’s Hutchinson Lecture, is reviewed here by the U. of Delaware newspaper (in which there is also a link providing background on the Hutchinson Lecture): http://www.udel.edu/udaily/2012/apr/HutchinsonLecture042012.html.

Saving Greece: Austerity and/or growth

Econ 101: When discussing Greece’s economic problems public officials and the press regularly toss out the need for “austerity” and/or “growth” as if they were clearly defined and understood concepts. I suspect that they mean quite different things to different people. While it is convenient to summarize complicated policies with single words, it can also stand in the way of understanding what is really meant. So what are the policies needed for Greece’s recovery and what should we call them?

Stocks and flows: For starters we need to distinguish the stock of Greek debt (the existing outstanding amount of previous, unrepaid borrowing) from its annual deficit. Greece’s debt reflects the past history of its annual deficits. Its current and prospective deficits foreshadow the future stock of debt. A full default on Greek debt—wiping it all off—would reduce Greece’s annual interest payments on its debt but beyond that would do nothing to reduce its annual deficit and the build up of its future stock of debt, which eventually would again become unsustainable. So forgiving (defaulting on) all existing Greek debt, by itself, will not resolve Greece’s problems.

Sticking with broad simplifications, Greece has two major economic problems. First, its government spends more than it can pay for without borrowing (the deficit — the flow of new debt). Moreover, like the U.S. and many other governments, it has made commitments to spend in the future (e.g. unfunded pension commitments) that are not yet reflected in its stock of debt or its annual deficits. This must change because it is not sustainable. Lenders will lose confidence in the government’s ability to service its debt and will stop lending. This calls for “austerity”, i.e. eliminating the annual deficit, by some combination of reducing expenditures and increasing tax revenue. I will return later to the distinction between structural and cyclical deficits.

Greece’s second major problem is its low productivity and uncompetitive prices. By themselves these would simply imply a lower standard of living for Greeks. But the average Greek has been spending more than his income by borrowing, giving the temporary illusion of a higher standard of living. To the extent that Greek spending is for foreign produced goods and services and these imports are not fully paid for with Greek exports, they must be paid for by borrowing. This artificial standard of living is obviously not sustainable.

Greece shares the same currency, the Euro, with 22 other European countries (including non members such as Monaco, Kosovo, and the Vatican).  If Greeks borrow domestically to pay for imports, Euros will flow out of Greece, tightening liquidity. This should put downward pressure on wages and prices in Greece, which would help restore its competitiveness with the rest of the Euro zone. If Greeks borrow abroad, interest rates on such borrowing should eventually increase to cover the increased default risk. This will discourage Greek borrowing. Greece has reached this point.

Some argue that if Greece had its own currency it could reduce its real wages by devaluing its currency and thus restore external competitiveness. Cutting real wages in this way would be easier, they argue, than cutting nominal wages directly as Greece has just done for government employees. Experience in other countries suggest that devaluing its own currency, if it had one, would set off domestic price increases to offset the loss of real wages unless labor markets were made more competitive. A spiral of devaluations and inflation would likely ensue. Only when real wages can be reduced to competitive levels one way or another can Greece hope to grow out of its current problem.[1] Thus the Greek government is undertaking structural adjustments to liberalize labor and product markets in order to make them more efficient and to make wages and prices more responsive to market conditions.

Some argue that the emphases in Greece should be put on growth.  Given the debate in the U.S. between Keynesian and neo classical economist over whether growth requires “stimulus” to increase demand (the Keynesian view) or “structural adjustments” to make labor and product markets more efficient and to encourage investment (the neoclassical view), it is not completely obvious what the proponents of growth in Greece have in mind. Attempting to promote growth with government stimulus to demand is not in the cards, as that would require more government spending and/or lower taxes and thus even larger deficits that no one is willing to finance. The only way for Greece to enjoy a higher standard of living is to undertake structural reforms that will allow the economy to be more productive and its wages and prices to be more competitive with the rest of the world.

So Greece needs to eliminate its deficits (actually run surpluses to reduce its outstanding debt) and liberalize its labor and product markets to establish balance in its external trade. All serious students of the Greek situation agree with this. The policy debate is complicated, however, by the interaction between growth and deficits and the speed with which an economy adjusts to changes.

If the Greek economy grows more rapidly it helps its debt problem in several ways. First, a growing economy generates more tax revenue from the same tax system. This reduces the deficit. It also tends to reduce government expenditures linked to safety net expenditure (e.g. unemployment insurance). This also reduces the deficit. In addition, the capacity of an economy to sustain and service debt is linked to its size. Thus economists look at the ratio of debt to GDP. A more rapidly growing economy tends to reduce the debt/GDP ratio by increasing the denominator.

While Greece must eliminate its deficits, the initial impact of expenditure cuts and higher taxes is to temporarily reduce income and tax revenue. Greece is experiencing this now. Its expenditure cuts have not reduced its deficit as much as expected because the temporary slow down in economic activity as displaced government employees (for example) look for new jobs, has been larger than expected thus reducing tax revenue by more than expected. A reduction in income has the same but opposite effect on the deficit as does an increase in income. This phenomenon is called automatic stabilization. Both Keynesian and neoclassical economists favor allowing such cyclical swings in government deficits and surpluses. But in the long run the government’s structural deficit (its full employment deficit) should be zero or at least smaller than the economy’s long run average growth rate. In Greece’s case it should be in surplus for a number of years to reduce its existing stock of debt.

The positive impact on competitiveness and income of liberalizing labor, services and product markets will also take time to develop. Balancing Greece’s fiscal budget now, before structural reforms have had time to work, would require much larger fiscal corrections (spending cuts and tax increases) than would be needed for long run balance.

This background should help understand and evaluate Greece’s options. Without external financial help (as is now provided by the EU, IMF and ECB), Greece could not adjust its fiscal deficits enough in the short-term to avoid the need to continue borrowing temporarily. Under these circumstances market lenders are likely to charge such a high risk premium to buy Greek sovereign debt to cover the prospects of default that deficits would become worse rather than better. Greece would default (with or without leaving the Euro). If it had defaulted in December 2011, it would have saved 16.3 billion Euros in interest payments on outstanding debt out of total government expenditures of €76.8 billion, but would have had to cut expenditures instantly an additional €6.3 billion to keep it within its tax revenues of €54.2 billion, over a 10% cut in non-interest expenditures instantaneously. This is austerity on steroids. The Greek economy had already stopped growing in 2008 and shrank by 3.3%, 3.5% and 5.0% in 2009, 10, and 11 respectively. The shock of default would surely depress the real economy further than the 2.0% decline currently forecast for 2012, reducing tax revenue further and requiring even larger cuts in spending. This does not take account of the impact of a Greek default on its banks, which hold a significant amount of Greek sovereign debt, and which the government would no longer be in a position to support. Default is no panacea, and this has not taken into account the possible negative effects in Spain and Italy, to name but two other European countries.

The approach taken by the IMF and EU is to agree with Greece on targets for both deficit reduction (austerity) and structural reforms (growth) that aim to restore full balance by 2021 and to finance the declining deficits in the interim at modest interest rates so that Greece does not need to borrow from the market. The program requires the “voluntary” write down of private sector holdings of Greek sovereign debt by about 70%. Greece would reduce its deficit from almost 10% in 2011 to less than 5% in 2012 (a primary surplus – i.e. not including interest on its debt—of 0.2%, raising to a primary surplus of 2.4% in 2013 and 5.0% in 2014). This “austerity” is being supplemented by significant structural reforms. The program is a balance between the pace of austerity and growth. Slower implementation of austerity requires a longer period of IMF/EU financing but with potentially more rapid growth.

Government employment is being reduced by 22% between 2010 and 2015 (150,000 employees). Future pension commitments have been reduced. Inflation has fallen below the Euro area average. However, external competitiveness has improved as the result of wage reductions in Greece rather than improved productivity, i.e. living standards have fallen. In general, labor market and business sector reforms have lagged. Changes in labor laws to allow more flexible wage bargaining and to ease the cost of lay offs are showing positive results. A number of services and professions have been liberalized to subject them to greater competition (cruise ships, highway freight, tourist coaches, regulated professions). The cost of starting new businesses has been reduced (“The new law reduces the number of steps (from 11 to 1), days (from 38 to 1), and cost (by more than 50 percent) required to start a business.”). Nonetheless the slow pace of such reforms is the major weakness of the program. Public acceptance of its changed circumstances and how best to deal with them has not be easy or smooth either.

It is noteworthy that the Greeks work more hours on average than any other European county (2,017 hours per year compared to 1,408 hours a year for Germans). German’s enjoy a higher standard of living because they produce more each hour they work. Greece needs to liberalize its markets to become more productive. Lowering wages will make Greek output more competitive beyond its borders but will not raise the standard of living for Greek workers.

The euro group has stated in its communiqué, “We reiterate our commitment to provide adequate support to Greece during the life of the program and beyond until it has regained market access provided that Greece fully complies with the requirements and objectives of the adjustment program.” The proviso is standard but also reflects Greece’s poor record of honesty and implementation.

IMF financial support is parceled out in quarterly installments contingent on Greece meeting the conditions agreed to for each quarter. This combines the carrot of financial assistance with the stick of close monitoring of Greece’s compliance with the reforms needed for long run success. There are no good options for Greece, but the current agreement between Greece and the IMF/EU seems to hold out the best hope for potential success. It balances austerity and growth. It will not work without public acceptance. Government promises to its public are being and must be broken. The Government needs to convincingly explain that these promises cannot be kept and that a brighter future requires the reforms that have been promised to the IMF/EU/ECB and the increased productivity and growth they should make possible.

Iceland and Ireland are well on their way to recovery from their debt disasters. If Spain and Italy can get and stay ahead of the adjustment and reform curve, and they have new governments committed to doing so, Europe should pull through and be stronger for the experience. But the next few years will be difficult.

[1] Mario Blejer and Guillermo Ortiz, “Latin Lessons”, The Economist February 18, 2012, page 94.

The Future of Money

I solicited 12 articles on very diverse aspects of the future of money for the current issue of the Cayman Financial Review (I am a member of the Editorial Board).  http://www.compasscayman.com/cfr/

I wrote two of the articles myself and I hope that you enjoy them:

http://www.compasscayman.com/cfr/2012/01/11/The-future-of-money—What-is-it-/

http://www.compasscayman.com/cfr/2012/01/11/The-Technology-of-Money/