Category: Banks

My Key stories of the world in 2014

Twenty fourteen was a busy year for the planet and in general a rather unhappy time. But believing as I do that when the pendulum swings too far in one direction (big brother) it swings back (personal freedom), I am such an optimist that I see some hopeful signs for 2015. These are the developments that I think are important (and/or felt like writing about).

Torture: A big plus this year was the eye-opening report of the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report on CIA Torture. It found that the CIA used torture (violating the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations Declaration Against Torture, and the I, II, and IV Geneva Conventions of 1949 all of which were signed by the United States and are thus binding laws of the land) and that it was not effective in gathering actionable information that couldn’t have been obtained with traditional interrogation techniques. Admittedly Senator Diane Feinstein was angry about CIA illegal hacking of computers of the Committee staff who have the legal responsibility of CIA oversight and may have been settling some scores. But if you do not find these abuses of power frightening, you live in the wrong country. While the report might not have been fully balanced, its findings on the ineffectiveness of torture are consistent with the earlier findings. https://wcoats.wordpress.com/2010/02/26/torture-is-immoral-and-doesn’t-work/

Our common sense assumption that a prisoner being tortured will tell his captures whatever they want to hear in order to stop the pain was dramatically confirmed by the recent news that Nian Bin was released by the Chinese government after eight years in prison for murders he did not commit. He was originally tortured into admitting the alleged crimes. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/in-china-a-rare-criminal-case-in-which-evidence-made-a-difference/2014/12/29/23f86b80-796b-11e4-9721-80b3d95a28a9_story.html

Hopefully these disclosures will reign in these embarrassing and appalling abuses by the United States government.

Greece: Since joining the EU and adopting the Euro (still very popular in Greece as protection against the bad old inflation days), Greece has enjoyed and unfortunately recklessly indulged in a higher living standard (consumption) than it earned (produced) by borrowing from the rest of Europe at the low interest rates paid by Germany. This mispricing of the risk of lending to Greece by financial markets resulted in part from the failure of the European Central Bank (ECB) to rate Greece sovereign debt realistically (treating all sovereign debt of its members alike). It also reflected the moral hazard of the wide spread belief that the EU, ECB, and international financial institutions such as the IMF would bail out holders of such debt. But no one and no country can live beyond its means forever. What can’t go on forever, won’t. https://wcoats.wordpress.com/2010/05/30/greeces-debt-crisis-simplified/, https://wcoats.wordpress.com/2012/02/26/saving-greece-austerity-andor-growth/

The balance between what Greece (short hand for individuals, firms, and government domiciled in Greece) imports and (pays for with) exports can be restored by lowering the cost of Greek goods and services. This will increase its exports and decrease its imports. This can be achieved by lowering wages and other costs of production or increasing productivity. Lowering wages without an increase in productivity simply acknowledges the reality that Greeks are poorer than most other Europeans. Increasing productivity improves Greek competitiveness and thus exports while also increasing its real standard of living.

The loans provided to the Greek government by the troika (EU, ECB, and IMF) tied to (i.e. conditional on) reductions in the government’s borrowing needs (reducing government employees, increasing tax revenue, etc) and structural reforms to make the economy more productive, provided an alternative to its default and forced sudden cut in government spending that markets would have forced on it otherwise. There is debate about which approach would be best for Greece in the long term. Hopefully Greek voters will face and debate this choice honestly in the presidential elections in January: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/greek-impasse-forces-early-elections-and-fears-of-euro-crisis-return/2014/12/29/3be75924-8f4e-11e4-ba53-a477d66580ed_story.html The implications for the EU and the Euro are huge. https://wcoats.wordpress.com/2011/11/02/the-greek-referendum/

Cuba: President Obama has decided to diplomatically recognize Cuba after a half century long failed policy of sanctions. Not only have our economic sanctions failed to displace the Castro brothers and their pernicious regime (most other countries do not observe our sanctions and trade and invest with Cuba anyway), we have no business (or national self interest) in adopting and promoting a regime change as national policy, however much we might wish for it. Moreover it is very much in our national interest to have good information on and channels of communication with every country with a government no matter how chosen. The linked article by Marc Thiessen illustrates the arrogant and dangerous thinking of our neocons. If Thiessen supports something, I start out against it until convinced otherwise: http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/marc-thiessen-cuban-dissidents-blast-obamas-betrayal/2014/12/29/cc68ffcc-8f5b-11e4-ba53-a477d66580ed_story.html

Crony capitalism: President Eisenhower famously worried about the dangers of the military industrial complex as he sought to conduct a cold war with the USSR: https://wcoats.wordpress.com/2011/01/17/eisenhowers-farewell-address-50-years-later/. It is difficult for the government to objectively serve the public interest while dealing with or regulating industry. https://wcoats.wordpress.com/2014/12/18/free-markets-uber-alles/ The relationship that develops in such a situation often serves the interests of the regulated industry more than the general public. The result is what we call crony capitalism and it is the enemy of true capitalism as much as its variants– socialism and fascism. One of the particularly alarming examples of truly disgusting and damaging crony capitalist deals is described in the following article. It involves JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon and Eric Holder’s Justice Department agreeing on what seems like a large fine, but is more accurately described as a bribe, to suppress evidence of criminal behavior on the part of Chase. http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-9-billion-witness-20141106.

Twenty fifteen will be a better year than was 2014 if public outrage at the use of torture, the abuse of the privacy of American’s, the bailing out of and favoritism toward Wall Street and the costly and counter productive deployment of American military around the world, result in rolling back these dangerous excesses. My fear is that nothing will be done and that there will be more the same. I hope that I am wrong.

The Rule of Law

The rule of law is an essential foundation of modern market economies. It increases the prospect and expectation that our individual efforts will be rewarded on the basis of merit (i.e., the success with which we satisfy the public’s wants at prices the public is willing to pay) rather than on the basis of favoritism (i.e., who we know). It introduces an element of certainty (rules of the game) in an otherwise uncertain world upon which to build our entrepreneurial efforts. It is fundamental to our notion of fairness and a protector of our personal freedoms. It is a notion and practice that attracts wide admiration from ambitious and freedom-loving people around the world and to our great benefit brings many of them to our shores.

We have never enjoyed the rule of law fully or perfectly, but our belief in it and our relatively close adherence to it remains critical to our success and the world’s eroding respect. Departures from the rule of law in our dealings with each other at home or abroad, undermine the efficiency of our market economy and diminish our freedom, but more importantly undermine the respect of others and our moral authority, which is almost as important to our place in the world as our military strength. Thus any erosions of the rule of law should be exposed and resisted vigorously.

Two principles of the rule of law are that they must apply to everyone equally (ourselves as well as others) and that the rules can’t be changed retroactively.

Through the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) and other tax and Anti Money Laundering measures the United States has been increasingly forcing its own laws on other countries and turning banks into policemen to the detriment of the banking system. According to The Economist magazine (6/28/14): “In a piece of extraterritoriality stunning even by Washington’s standards, the new law requires banks, funds and other financial institutions around the world to report assets held by American clients or face a ruinous 30% withholding tax. America is, in essence, using threats to outsource its financial policing. This is working: so far, more than 77,000 financial institutions have agreed to pass information to the IRS. The costs of complying with FATCA are likely to dwarf the extra revenue it raises” Many of the approximately 7 million Americans living abroad are finding it difficult to open bank accounts. “Many have been rejected by foreign providers of banking services, insurance and mortgages because, given the amount of paperwork needed to satisfy Uncle Sam, American clients are simply too much hassle. Foreign firms are less keen to hire Americans because of the extra tax complications. Not surprisingly, the number of Americans renouncing their citizenship has quadrupled since FATCA was hatched…. FATCA’s intrusiveness raises serious privacy issues…. The financial superpower looks ever more a regulatory bully, setting rules it ignores itself.” “America’s new law tax compliance heavy handed inequitable and hypocritical FATCAs-flaws?”

When contracts can’t be honored because a company is not earning enough money, bankruptcy laws provide for a well-defined process for transferring ownership from shareholders to creditors, which includes the priority of creditor claims against the inadequate assets of the failed company. Bank bondholders and other creditors price their credit in light of their place in the cue. It violates the principles of the rule of law to changes these priorities after the fact, but this is exactly what the Obama administration did when it put General Motors into bankruptcy by favoring the United Auto Workers pension fund: “A bedrock principle of bankruptcy law is that creditors with similar claims priority receive equal treatment. In the auto bankruptcies, however, the administration gave the unsecured claims of VEBA [union pension] much higher priority than those of other unsecured creditors, such as suppliers and unsecured bondholders.” “Obama’s UAW Bailout”

The government’s inconsistent and unpredictable treatment of distressed financial institutions in 2007-8, some were bailed out and some were allowed to fail, and the resulting uncertainty about future treatment, has surely contributed to the reluctance of banks to lend and of firms to invest thus slowing the pace of our economic recovery. “The Financial Crisis: Act II”

Sadly the examples of political hypocrisy with regard to the rules of the game are growing. Fortunately there are some signs of push back. The Supreme Court just unanimously overturned as illegal the President’s so called recess appointments of members to the National Labor Relations Board. “Supreme court strikes blow-Obama exceeded authority with recess appointments” The Speaker of the House of Representatives is suing “the Obama administration for its use of executive actions to change laws.” “Boehner confirms lawsuit against Obama executive actions”

The hypocrisy has been non-partisan. Though fully justified, the hypocrisy of the outcry over the IRS’s missing emails related to targeting conservative organizations was exposed fully in Sunday’s Washington Post. Government departments and agencies are required by law to maintain copies of official correspondence (all office emails included). This law has been regularly violated. Examples are “the Bush White House’s destruction of millions of e-mail messages [including those of John Yoo, the Department of Justice lawyer who justified torture] as well as the destruction of pre-investigative files by the Securities and Exchange Commission, including files pertaining to Bernie Madoff and Goldman Sachs.” How has this happened? “Congress has neither appropriated sufficient funds for agencies to implement electronic record-keeping nor added oversight and penalties to the Federal Records Act that would ensure compliance.” “The IRS isn’t the only agency with an e-mail-problem”

Hypocrisy is rendered impotent, hopefully, from exposure. Thus hopefully George Wills’ latest column on the Redskins will be widely read. “The government decided that redskins bothers you” It begins: “Amanda Blackhorse, a Navajo who successfully moved a federal agency to withdraw trademark protections from the Washington Redskins because it considers the team’s name derogatory, lives on a reservation where Navajos root for the Red Mesa High School Redskins.” And the hypocrisy gets worse from there.

For more examples see my “Big brother is getting bigger”

Cyprus: Bailing in and capital controls

Three European countries with oversized banking sectors have suffered major bank failures. Two of them are in the Euro Zone (Ireland and Cyprus) and one has its own currency (Iceland). Iceland and Cyprus imposed temporary capital controls, while Ireland did not. Iceland imposed losses on the foreign depositors in its large, failed banks while Ireland, under EU pressure bailed out everyone (even bond holders) except the shareholders.

The jargon used to describe much of this—“bail outs,” “bail ins,” “haircuts,” “good bank bad bank splits,” etc.—can be confusing. In this note I attempt to clarify the key concepts and their importance via the examples of Iceland, Ireland and Cyprus.

Market discipline vs. supervision and regulation

Incentives always matter. Banks, like any other business, are in business to make money. But the amount of risk they take (more risk more return—ON AVERAGE) depends on who regulates their behavior. Fundamentally, the market can regulate bank risk taking—by the willingness of investors to lend to banks and of depositors to place their money there—or the government can.

The last century has seen a steady shift away from market regulation toward government regulation. Deposit insurance is an important factor contributing to that shift by removing any concern by smaller depositors of the condition of their bank. Thus deposit insurance requires a substitution of the due diligence that used to be performed by small depositors with increased government regulation of bank risk taking. In the United States, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) provides much of that supervision and regulation.

However, increasingly countries became unwilling to allow banks to fail. While shareholders might be wiped out when a bank became insolvent (i.e., when the value of its assets fell below that of its deposits and other liabilities), country after country have “bailed out” all other bank creditors, including uninsured depositors. Bailing out depositors and other creditors means giving taxpayers’ money to the bank to make up for its losses and thus cover its liabilities (other than shareholders).  For large, “systemically important” banks (meaning banks whose failure could cause fatal losses in other banks or firms), most countries are not willing to let them fail at all, thus bailing out shareholders as well in order to allow the banks to continue to operate. Hence the problem of banks that are “too big to fail.” Bailing out uninsured depositors made deposit insurance redundant and pointless. Market discipline was pushed aside all together. The safety and soundness of banks came to rest almost completely on the adequacy of regulations and the skills of supervisors. Bank owners, the only ones who care any more, now have a financial incentive to take big risks for potential big gains. If they lose, as they do from time to time, the government, i.e., tax payer, will pick up the bill.

It is desirable to shift more of the discipline of bank risk taking back to the market by convincingly putting bondholders and large, uninsured depositors at risk of loss if their bank becomes insolvent. They have a financial incentive to get it right that supervisors do not.

Resolution of insolvent banks

Best practice when a bank becomes insolvent is to resolve it quickly and fully and to put a large part of the cost of its losses on uninsured creditors (shareholders, bond holders and uninsured depositors in that order).  Normal company bankruptcy can take the form of shutting down, locking the doors, and selling off anything of value (normally taking a few years) and distributing the proceeds to the creditors in the order of the legal priority of their claims. It is a transparent and objective, but slow process. In many instances the highest value for a failing company is obtained by selling it whole or in part to another company that is able to run it more efficiently. The recent bankruptcy of Sara Lee and sale of its best products to other companies is an example.

The bankruptcy and resolution of an insolvent bank is more challenging because of the ease with which depositors can run when they sense trouble. Thus the weekend sale of such banks in whole or in part to another bank is the norm for small or medium-sized banks in the U.S.  The good bank bad bank split, as occurred recently in Cyprus, is a recent example. Laiki became the bad bank that was closed and is being liquidated and the Bank of Cyprus became the good bank. After wiping out its shareholders and bondholders and administering a large haircut to the uninsured depositors, it acquired the insured deposits of Laiki and an equivalent value of good Laiki assets. Such bank resolutions, which freeze depositors’ funds only for very short periods (a few days), require special bankruptcy laws for tailored for banks. As the surviving good bank must continue to operate with little to no interruption, more judgment and uncertainty is involved in valuing the assets that it acquires from the bad bank.

It is instructive to look more closely at the resolution process used in Cyprus. First, the two major banks in Cyprus, Laiki and Bank of Cyprus, incurred large losses on their holdings of Greek sovereign debt when all banks were required to “voluntarily” write off about 75% of its value. The magnitude of this loss was clear and well-known from October 2011. The only issue was who would pay for it, the Cypriot government, the EU, or the creditors (depositors) of these banks. Depositor’s obviously thought that they would be bailed out (i.e. that the Cypriot government or the EU would pay for the losses of Laiki and Bank of Cyprus) as had been all depositors in Europe before them, though the deposit liabilities of the Bank of Cyprus fell from 37.1 billion Euros at the end of 2010 to 32.1 billion at the end of 2011 to 28 billion at the end of September 2012 (the latest available).

After a terrible false start in which the Cyprus government attempted to pay for the losses by levying a wealth tax on all depositors (of good and bad banks), Cyprus choose to impose the entire loss on the respective banks’ owners and creditors, and to undertake the good bank bad bank split briefly described above (see my earlier blog on the subject: https://wcoats.wordpress.com/2013/03/27/the-cyprus-game-changer/). This was a dramatic change in approach that shifted the risk of bank behavior back to uninsured depositors. Many were shocked.

This approach is relatively easy for known losses and should have been undertaken a year and a half earlier when the Greek debt write off occurred. But many of the losses a bank has or is incurring are less clear. Of the currently delinquent mortgage loans, for example, how many will actually default and what will be the market value of the mortgage collateral. The recapitalization of insolvent Irish banks suffered from underestimation of the ultimate losses resulting in three separate injections of state money to recapitalize them, which weakened market confidence in the process. In part to deal with this uncertainty but to restore market confidence in the solvency of the surviving good bank (Bank of Cyprus), known losses were totally written off while the additional but uncertain further losses were covered by replacing an equivalent amount of deposits with equity claims on the BOC (shares). If losses turn out to be smaller than was provided for, these claims will have value and will thus reduce the size of the initial haircuts to deposits.

So “bailing out” a bank refers to covering its losses with someone else’s money (tax payers somewhere) and “bailing in” a bank’s creditors refers to covering its losses (after its capital is used up) with bondholders and uninsured depositors’ money via “haircuts” (writing off part of their value). The former “socializes” losses while leaving any gains from successful bets to the private owners and creates a serious moral hazard leading to excessive risk taking by banks. The latter makes depositors financially responsible for excessive bank losses and restores the market’s discipline of bank risk taking. This is very desirable as market discipline is more effective than regulatory discipline, but the dramatic change in the implicit rules in Cyprus was very large and abrupt.

Capital controls

As part of their respective bank resolutions, both Iceland and Cyprus imposed temporary capital controls, which, however, served very different purposes. Iceland has its own currency while Cyprus is part of the Euro zone.

At the time of Iceland’s banking crisis in 2008 its three largest banks had assets 11 times the total annual output of the economy. About half of their assets (largely loans) and their funding were outside of Iceland. Landsbanki, for example, funding its lending with roughly the same amount of borrowing and deposits (a highly risky strategy). When the borrowed funding of these three banks dried up, their size made it impossible for the Icelandic Central Bank (ICB) to provide their needed liquidity (much of which was in the Euro, a foreign currency), resulting in the failure of all three banks in the second week of October 2008.

Iceland honored all insured deposits domestically and abroad but moved all domestic deposits into newly established “good” banks from the three now bad banks, while leaving their overseas, uninsured deposits in these three banks in receivership. To the extent that these banks failed because of illiquidity (the cut off of their borrowed funding), the receivership should be able to recover all losses to depositors from the liquidation of the banks’ remaining assets.

The UK and Netherland’s objected to the unequal treatment of the uninsured deposits of Icelanders and of foreigners. While Iceland’s decision to bail out all of its domestic depositors may be questioned because of the moral hazard it perpetuated, they had no legal obligation to do the same for Euro deposits by foreigners. The UK and the Netherlands stepped in and followed the same policy adopted by Iceland by guaranteeing the deposits of their citizens. They then tried to collect the cost of these guarantees from Iceland, a very questionable claim.

As the three new “good” banks were fully capitalized, they should have been able to withstand any level of deposit withdrawal as long as the ICB was able to provide any liquidity needed against the good but illiquid assets of these banks. The return of depositor confidence to the banks invariably takes time and some depositors wanted to withdraw their funds. However, because Iceland has its own currency, nervous Icelandic depositors wanting to move their bank deposits abroad, would need first to convert them into Euros or U.S. dollars, which would have depreciated the international value (exchange rate) of the Icelandic króna, and depleted ICB’s international reserves. A depreciation of the króna would raise the cost of imports and reduce the standard of living in Iceland. To protect the exchange rate from excessive devaluation, the ICB imposed temporary limits on the amount of money its residents could move out of the country. These capital controls are still in effect.

Lucky Cyprus is in the Euro zone.  After recapitalizing its banks, in part by writing down their deposit liabilities, they should have sufficient assets to cover all of their deposit liabilities and thus to cover any deposit withdrawals. The only issue would be whether the BOC’s assets were sufficiently liquid to cover the withdrawals. Within the Euro zone payments outside the country are made via the Target Payment System. A transfer of deposits from the BOC in Cyprus to a bank in any other Euro zone country is made by debiting the BOC’s clearing balance with the Central Bank of Cyprus (CBC) and crediting the recipient bank’s clearing account with its central bank via Target. If the BOC does not have sufficient funds in its clearing account with the CBC and is unable to sell sufficient assets to increase that balance, it can borrow the funds from the CBC using its good but illiquid assets as collateral. The CBC is able to do the same by borrowing from the European Central Bank (ECB), which is prepared to lend unlimited amounts against good collateral now that Cyprus has undertaken the measures required for the troika’s financial support (i.e., from the EU/ECB/IMF). There is no exchange rate issue or concern. It is purely a matter of the solvency and liquidity of Cypriot banks.

However, establishing sufficient liquidity to fund large deposit withdrawals may take a few weeks or months and thus Cyprus has imposed temporary capital controls that limit the amount of money that may be withdrawn each day as cash or by transfer. If the arrangements enjoy sufficient public confidence in the soundness and viability of the surviving Bank of Cyprus, the deposit withdrawals should be modest. The period of limits on withdrawals should be measured in weeks rather than months or years.

Conclusion

The resolution of Cyprus’s insolvent banks ultimately, after a false start, was achieved by bailing in its creditors. The resolution was relatively quick and seems complete. While Cyprus’s economy is likely to suffer its abrupt adjustment for some time, its banks should now be sound. The dramatic shift of the responsibility of regulating the risk taking of banks to their uninsured depositors, should, if it is maintained throughout Europe despite nervous claims that it is one-off and not a model, restrain excessive risk taking by banks and lead over time to a stronger banking system. In the interim, there may be some disruptive deposit shifts as previously reckless banks are forced by the market to clean up their acts.