SCOTUS – Louisiana v. Callais

“The Supreme Court’s invalidation of Louisiana’s congressional map has triggered a swirling debate about just how fundamentally the justices altered the Voting Rights Act landscape.” This and following quotes are from The Hill article: the hill – regulating voting-rights-act-supreme-court – SCOTUS-Decision  

The court’s ruling in Louisiana v. Callais was adopted by 6 – 3 of the judges.

I am quite amazed how dramatically differently some people have characterized the decision’s result.

“Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 [as Amended in 1982] has enabled groups to force states to draw additional majority-minority districts for decades,” despite the 15th Amendment to US constitution in 1870, which prohibited the federal and state governments from denying a citizen the right to vote based on that citizen’s “race, color, or previous condition of servitude”, effectively protecting the voting rights of Blacks.

Section 2 “bars voting maps that give a racial minority ‘less opportunity than other members of the electorate’ to elect their preferred candidate.”

In Thornburg v. Gingles (1986), the Supreme Court ruled that multi-member legislative districts in North Carolina violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act by diluting Black voting power. The landmark ruling established a critical three-part legal test to determine if an electoral map illegally discriminates against minority voters.

To prove a violation of Section 2, plaintiffs must satisfy the following three preconditions:

  1. Numerosity and Compactness: The minority group must be sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a voting majority in a single-member district.
  2. Political Cohesion: The minority group must show that it is politically cohesive, meaning they largely vote for the same candidates.
  3. Majority Bloc Voting: The plaintiffs must prove that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to usually defeat the minority group’s preferred candidates

After Thornburg v. Gingles, plaintiffs could prove vote dilution by showing that a minority group was large and compact enough to form a majority in a reasonably drawn district, was politically cohesive, and faced bloc voting by the majority that usually defeated its preferred candidates.

That framework gave civil-rights groups a litigation template: draw an “illustrative” majority-minority district, show polarized voting, and argue that the state had cracked or packed minority voters so they could not elect their preferred candidate. If they won their case, the remedy often required the state to create an additional majority-minority district, even though Section 2 formally says it does not create a right to proportional representation.

In its recent Louisiana v. Callais ruling the Court held that Louisiana’s second majority-Black congressional district was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander and that Section 2 did not require Louisiana to draw it. The Court majority said that Voting Rights Act compliance can be a compelling interest only when Section 2 is properly construed, and it tightened the Gingles test by requiring race-neutral illustrative maps, closer adherence to state districting goals such as compactness, incumbency protection, and partisan objectives, and evidence separating racial bloc voting from ordinary partisan voting.

The practical effect is that plaintiffs can no longer easily say, “Here is a compact majority-minority district; therefore, the state must draw it.” After Callais, they must show that the alternative map satisfies the state’s nonracial redistricting criteria, that the voting polarization is racial rather than merely partisan, and that the totality of circumstances points to present-day legally relevant discrimination rather than mainly historical disadvantage.

A “majority-minority district” is one in which a racial minority (blacks, Asian, Hispanics, etc.) constitute a majority of the voters. The presumption seems to be that, for example, only (or mostly) blacks will vote for a black candidate. That is clearly a racist view. Barack Obama, for example, was elected President of the United States by a majority of white voters.

I am really shocked at how overtly racist the opposition to the court’s decision is. “’Unfortunately, we are talking about rolling back to an era of Jim Crow, and I don’t believe I’m overstating that,’ Sophia Lin Lakin, director of the American Civil Liberties Union’s voting rights project, But Jim Crow laws were used to segregate blacks and whites. Majority-minority districts move in the same direction. The court’s weakening of the arguments for such districts is the opposite of a Jim Crow law. Voters are motivated by many things, but I have more confidence than does Ms. Lakin in voters choosing the candidate they think best and most effectively supports the policies they support, whether the voter is black, white, or yellow whatever the color of the candidate.

“House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries (D-N.Y.) said the law was ‘largely gone,’ telling reporters the decision was ‘designed to undermine the ability of communities of color all across this country to elect their candidate of choice.’” Good grief.

Here is an excellent discussion of this issue: “The supreme court’s vote ruling empowers minorities”

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Author: Warren Coats

I specialize in advising central banks on monetary policy and the development of the capacity to formulate and implement monetary policy.  I joined the International Monetary Fund in 1975 from which I retired in 2003 as Assistant Director of the Monetary and Financial Systems Department. While at the IMF I led or participated in missions to the central banks of over twenty countries (including Afghanistan, Bosnia, Croatia, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kosovo, Kyrgystan, Moldova, Serbia, Turkey, West Bank and Gaza Strip, and Zimbabwe) and was seconded as a visiting economist to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1979-80), and to the World Bank's World Development Report team in 1989.  After retirement from the IMF I was a member of the Board of the Cayman Islands Monetary Authority from 2003-10 and of the editorial board of the Cayman Financial Review from 2010-2017.  Prior to joining the IMF I was Assistant Prof of Economics at UVa from 1970-75.  I am currently a fellow of Johns Hopkins Krieger School of Arts and Sciences, Institute for Applied Economics, Global Health, and the Study of Business Enterprise.  In March 2019 Central Banking Journal awarded me for my “Outstanding Contribution for Capacity Building.”  My recent books are One Currency for Bosnia: Creating the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina; My Travels in the Former Soviet Union; My Travels to Afghanistan; My Travels to Jerusalem; and My Travels to Baghdad. I have a BA in Economics from the UC Berkeley and a PhD in Economics from the University of Chicago. My dissertation committee was chaired by Milton Friedman and included Robert J. Gordon. I live in National Landing Va 22202

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