Tag: interest rates

Econ 101: Interest rates

President Trump wants the Federal Reserve to lower interest rates thinking that that would reduce the interest the Federal Government pays in interest on its debt, which this last year was $1.13 trillion (yes trillion). Prior to 2008, the Fed’s policy interest rate—the so called Fed funds rate—was the overnight rate on overnight (i.e. one day) loans between banks. I will skip how the Fed determines (brings about in the market) that rate. Since 2008, when the Fed started to pay interest on bank reserves (deposits at Federal Reserve Banks), the Fed’s policy rate has been the rate paid on bank reserves.

The interest rates paid on longer (than overnight) loans (e.g., one, two, ten-year bonds) are related to the overnight rate because rolling over overnight loans for ten years is an alternative to a ten-year bond. This note explains that relationship.

The interest rate on, say, a one-year bond reflects what the market (lenders and borrowers) expects the one-day rate to be each day over that period. That, in turn, depends on what the market expects the “real” rate to be plus the rate of inflation. Market rates reflect the real rate plus the inflation rate. If inflation increase, other things equal, market interest rates increase.

So, the interest rate on a ten-year bond will reflect what the market expects the overnight rate to be over the next ten years, which reflects the expected real rate and the expected inflation rate over that period. So what happens to interest rates (say the ten-year bond rate) when the Fed lowers its policy rate as President Trump wants? It depends primarily on what that does to the market’s expectation of inflation over the relevant future period.

On Wednesday Dec 10 the Fed reduced its policy rate .25% to 3.50 to 3.75%. On that day the ten-year bond rate fell from 4.19% the day before to 4.15% but by Friday (two days later) had returned to 4.18% In short the ten year Treasury bond rate is essentially unchanged by the quarter percent drop in the Fed’s policy rate. Why? Because the market expects the drop in the overnight rate to be largely offset by a slight increase in inflation over the next ten years.

If the Fed is correct that lowering its policy rate is appropriate for continuing the reduction of inflation to its 2% target, then the ten-year rate will fall as well. Clearly an excessive cut in the policy rate (one that increases the expected rate of inflation) will increase longer term interest rates rather than lower them. Class dismissed.

Econ 101: Interest Rates –Another Go

A month ago I reviewed the role of the Federal Reserve’s policy interest rate: https://wcoats.blog/2025/07/17/the-feds-policy-interest-rate/   The subject is so important and seemingly misunderstand by many that I am reviewing it again here.

Interest rates balance the supply and demand for financial assets. Households and firms that save some of their incomes demand financial assets. Households and firms that borrow to invest in productive capital or for whatever reason supply those assets (mortgages, bonds, etc.). Rates on longer term assets reflect the expected value of the short-term rates over that period. Thus the interest rate on a ten year bond reflects the expected value of one year bills over the ten year period plus a small risk premium because the string of short term loans are an alternative to the single fixed rate ten year loan.

The policy interest rate of the Federal Reserve is set by the Fed to pursue its objective of stable money (defined by the Fed as 2% inflation) and high employment (the Fed’s dual mandate imposed by Congress).

This note reviews the Fed’s policy rate. Since 2008 the Fed’s policy rate has been the rate it pays banks for the money they keep on deposit with a Federal Reserve Bank (of which there are twelve but that is unimportant for understanding the role of the policy rate), which on Aug 6 amounted to $3,332 billion. This rate is known as the Interest on Reserve Balances (IORB).

If the IORB matches comparable market rates for equally liquid funds (the so-called neutral rate), banks will maintain their existing Fed deposits. If it is set above that level, banks will have a financial incentive to place more money with the Fed, i.e. lend less in the market, thus creating fewer deposits and reducing the money supply. If the IORB is set lower than the neutral rate, banks will draw down their Fed deposits to lend more in the market thus increasing deposits and the money supply.

The IORB is currently (Aug 6) 4.5%, where it has remained since Dec 2024. At this rate broad money (M2=bank demand, time and savings deposits) has grown between 4% and 5% (from a year earlier) over the last three months. Given that inflation remains above the Fed’s target of 2% it would not seem wise to lower the policy rate and increase the rate of monetary growth especially as higher tariffs go into effect.

To repeat from earlier blogs (because it is so important), if markets anticipate higher inflation in the future (next few years), market interest rates on longer term debt will increase to preserve their real (inflation adjusted) value. Lowering the Fed’s policy rate prematurely would increase the market’s anticipation of higher inflation rates in the future. In other word, lowering the IORB now is likely to increase interest rates on longer term debt. Leave the Fed alone to do its job as best it can.

The Fed’s policy interest rate

Among the things our protectionist, isolationist President fails to understand correctly is the role of the Federal Reserve’s policy rate. He wants interest rates to be lower and thinks that the Fed can cause that by lowering its policy rate. That rate used to be the overnight money market rate. If the Fed lowered that target it would supply more money (bank deposits at one of the twelve Federal Reserve Banks) to banks and thus the interbank money market for managing bank liquidity by buying government securities from banks. If banks’ liquidity (“reserves”) is increased, their demand to borrow in the interbank money market will be reduced and thus the interest rate prevailing in that market will be reduced. Thus, raising or lowering the Fed’s policy rate (and the consequent change in base –Fed reserve—money) was the instrument by which the Fed controlled the money supply (its own base money and the more relevant boarder bank money—M1, M2, etc.)

If you are into this subject, you will already understand what money is and where it comes from. If you would like a refresher read this: https://wcoats.blog/2024/11/08/econ-101-money/  

The above description of the policy rate was applicable until 2008 when banks held minimal reserves (or excess reserves when there was still a minimum reserve requirement) at the Fed. But in response to the financial crisis in 2008 when the Fed purchased huge quantities of government debt (and mortgage-backed securities), the Fed began to pay banks interest on their now very large deposits at the Fed to keep them from lending them in the market and thus expanding the money supply excessively. So, the relevant Fed policy rate now is the rate it pays on banks’ reserves at the Fed, the so-called Interest on Reserve Balances (IORB).

As with the policy rate in the old regime, the IORB is the instrument by which the Fed now controls the growth in the money supply. When the IORB is reduced below prevailing overnight market rates banks will draw down their Fed deposits to lend at the higher market rate thus increasing money growth.

Interest rates in the market are determined in and by the supply and demand for credit in the market. If the Fed lowers its IORB it will increase the growth rate of dollars. The Fed will do so when it judges that appropriate for achieving its inflation rate target of 2.0 percent. The twelve-month inflation rate in May was 2.4% and rose to 2.7% in June. The Fed decided not to lower the rate further at this time. Doing so could well lead market participants to expect higher inflation in the future, which would raise (not lower) market rates for say 10 year Treasury bills.

Current Fed policy seems appropriate to me. It adheres to an inflation forecast targeting regime that has become popular in recent years in major central banks. But it reacted by raising rates too slowly in response to the surge in inflation in 2021-2 during the Covid pandemic. Inflation reached 9% in mid 2022. A better system is to return control of the money supply to the public that can buy and redeem dollars at a fixed price for a hard anchor (such as a gold standard). I laid this out in the following blog: https://wcoats.blog/2022/06/06/econ-101-the-value-of-money/

Their Turkey and Ours

“Recep Tayyip Erdogan believes high interest rates are the cause of inflation, not the remedy for it”  The Economist May 19, 2018 “How-turkey-fell-from-investment-darling-to-junk-rated-emerging-market”

During the 1990s the inflation rate in Turkey averaged around 80% per annum varying between 60% and 105%.  Over that period interest rates on its 3-month treasury bills averaged about 30% above the inflation rate reaching almost 150% in 1996.  The economy grew rapidly in real terms with real GDP growth averaging 8% per annum between 1995-7.  But growth depended heavily on borrowing abroad in foreign currencies.  Banks were poorly regulated, and heavily exposed to foreign exchange risk and to government debt.  Obviously, Turkey’s nominal exchange rate depreciated at about the same rate as its inflation rate in order to preserve a stable real exchange rate.

In the wake of the Asian and Russian debt crises in 1997 and 1998 foreign investors became more risk averse and capital inflows into Turkey were reduced sharply slowing down economic growth from 7.5% in 1997 to 2.5% in 1998.  A serious earthquake in Turkey’s industrial heartland in August 1999 further deteriorated Turkey’s economic performance.  The combined impact of the two pushed the economy into a deep recession, shrinking GDP by 3.6% in 1999.

With support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1999-2003 the Turkish government reigned in its spending and monetary growth and reduced its inflation rate to 10% by 2004. I was a member of the IMF’s Turkey team at that time and remember the long sleepless nights very well. Turkey’s interest rates followed inflation down and, in fact, its real interest rates (nominal interest rate minus its inflation rate) fell from 30% to negative rates as the economy stabilized. During this transition, a number of state owned enterprises were privatized, 18 insolvent banks were intervened, and debt and the financial sector were restructured and strengthened.  Within a few (rough) years the economy was growing rapidly with low inflation and low interest rates.  In 2017 real GDP grew 7.0% though inflation had crept back up to 11.1%.

Following Turkey’s and the rest of the world’s recession in 2009 the country reverted back to its bad old ways.  “Recep Tayyip Erdogan signed a decree easing access to foreign-exchange loans for Turkish companies.  The new rules lifted restrictions that barred companies without revenue in hard currencies from doing such borrowing—as long as the loans exceeded $5 million.”  How Erdogan’s push for endless growth brought Turkey to the Brink

Erdogan observed the low interest rates, low inflation, and high growth and apparently concluded that low interest rates caused low inflation rather than the other way around. Every economist knows that interest rates incorporate the market’s expectation of inflation over the period of a loan in order to establish a market clearing real rate of interest.  In 1996 when a borrower was willing to pay 130% interest and a lender was not willing to accept less it was because they expected 80% to 90% inflation per annum over the life of the loan.  The very high real rate (130% – 80% = 50%) reflects the risk premium of getting it wrong.

Central banks can, if inflation expectations adjust slowly, push real rates down temporarily by lowering nominal market rates below their equilibrium rate.  Doing so, however, increases the rate at which the money supply grows eventually increasing inflation and forcing nominal interest rates higher than they would otherwise have been.

Under political pressure from Erdogan, the central bank of Turkey has kept interest rates lower (and thus money supply growth greater) than are consistent with its inflation target of 5%.  In the last few years inflation has drifted up reaching 11.1% in 2017.  Markets have grown uneasy about the economic situation in Turkey and when the Central Bank failed to increase its policy interest rate last month from 17.75% investors began selling off Turkish bonds and withdrawing funds from the country.  Its exchange rate plummeted.  From January of this year the Turkish lira depreciated from 11.7 per dollar to 16 lira/USD at the beginning of July and to 21 lira/USD on the 22ndof August. Erdogan’s wrong-headed misunderstanding of the role of interest rates is pushing Turkey over the precipice of bankruptcy.

Meanwhile here in the United States, President Trump apparently attended the same school as Erdogan. After breaking a several decades old protocol against commenting on or interfering with the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy when he stated last month that he didn’t want to see the Fed increase its policy interest rate, he did it again a few days ago. “Trump-escalates-attacks-federal-reserve”  Trump’s advice is wrong. The Federal Reserve needs to continue raising its policy rate back toward normal levels (3% to 4%) before inflation momentum becomes any stronger. Real interest rates are still negative (less than the inflation rate).  The Fed should have started increasing rates several years earlier.

Trump and interest rates

There seems to be no norm or conventional wisdom that President Trump is not willing to overturn. Following Fed Chairman Powell’s congressional testimony Tuesday in which he confirmed the Fed’s intention to continue its gradual increase in its policy interest rate, Trump said: “I don’t like all of this work that we’re putting into the economy and then I see rates going up.”  The statement is wrong on multiple accounts.

The economy is now fully employed and interest rates probably should have been returned to normal some time ago.  The alarming current and projected fiscal deficits of the federal government will force interest rates and trade deficits still higher.  This is Trump’s fault– not Powell’s.  “Who pays uncle Sam’s deficits?”  The major policies threatening to undermine the economic boost from tax and regulatory reforms are Trump’s trade policies (pulling out of the Trans Pacific Partnership, stalling and threatening U.S. withdrawal from NAFTA, Steel and Aluminum tariffs (taxes) on our friends in Canada, Mexico and the EU, and a deepening trade war with China).  Leaving the TPP  Resisting the interest rate increases needed to keep inflation at 2% would increase the most regressive tax around (inflation).

But Presidential interference in implementing monetary policy, as is now being undertaken by President Erdoğan in Turkey, violates a long established principle and practice of central bank independence.  Historically, inflation, which falls heaviest on the poor and undermines economic efficiency and growth, has resulted primarily from governments turning to their central banks for financing in misguided and ultimately futile efforts to keep interest rates (government borrowing costs) low.

President Trump can save the economic benefits of his tax and regulatory reforms by rejoining the TPP, rapidly concluding amendments to NAFTA that improve productive efficiency and fairness, dropping the steel and aluminum tariffs, ending the trade war with China, joining with the EU, Canada, Japan and others to bring China into compliance with the rules of a strengthened WTO, and establishing a fiscal budget surplus primarily through entitlement reform.