Stable Coins

Digitizing our bank deposits (digital dollars—stable coins) would (will) represent another step forward in the ease and efficiency with which we can make payments and will enhance bank stability. Most of the US supply of money (US dollars) is in the form of our dollar deposits at our banks and most of our payments these days are already made by electronically transferring bank deposits from me to you via my bank to yours. I have discussed all of this in more detail earlier: “Econ 101-Money”

Developing the rails for paying with stable coins is a further improvement on our existing payment options. It is not revolutionary. The payment of cash (currency) requires no infrastructure (e.g. Merchant contract with credit card issuer and card reader, etc.). You just hand it over and anyone can accept it (hopefully the person you intended to receive it). The electronic transfer of a bank deposit balance (e.g., Zelle, Venmo, e-wire) requires the enrollment of the recipient in that particular payment vehicle.  It took decades for credit cards to be widely accepted. Hundreds of companies now issue Visa cards (mine is issued by United Airlines) and all are accepted wherever any of them are accepted. But it took a lot of work to build that system.

What do stable coins issued by banks add that might be useful? From the bank side issuing stable coins from deposit balances simplifies the bank’s management of the assets that back them. When its customers withdraw cash these days, the bank must purchase it from the Federal Reserve in order to pass it on to you. It pays the Fed for the cash from its reserve deposits at the Fed, which reduces its ability to extend credit to businesses and households. If its reserves at the Fed are not sufficient, it will need to borrow from another bank or sell another asset.

The withdrawal of cash from bank deposits tends to follow seasonal patters. Thus the squeeze on its reserves at the Fed would tend to create seasonal fluctuations in bank credit hence in the money supply.  Thus the Fed attempts to offset the impact of currency fluctuations on bank reserves and thus credit with offsetting purchases and sales of government securities (so called open market operations) or with temporary loans to banks in its “lender of last resort” function. If a bank can issue its own currency (as they did in the old days) when a customer withdraws cash from its deposits, its asset backing (and reserve deposits at the Fed) will not be affected. Banks will now be able to do this by issuing their own stable coins. While the customer’s deposit balance will fall when withdrawing cash (or stable coins), its total of stable coins “cash” plus deposit balance will not change thus the bank assets backing them do not need to change. Thus, such fluctuations in the currency/deposit ratio would not product a fluctuation in the money supply.

From the customers side the stable coins are as good as traditional cash only to the extent that the infrastructure to accept them (e.g. phone wallets) has been designed and widely acquired/accepted. Just as it took many years for credit cards (Visa, Mastercard and American Express) to be widely adopted, the same will be true with stable coins. Just as you might now swap addresses via your respective mobile phones, you will be able to make payments.

If everyone can issue their own money it degenerates to barter, i.e. it would not be money at all. The essence of a successful means of payment is the certainty of its ultimate claim on the central bank’s official monetary liability (the dollar). When central banks were limited to issuing currency redeemable for “something” such as gold or silver, the amount they issued was limited by their holding of gold or silver, etc.  Today the Fed’s supply of money is limited by Congress’s mandate for price stability and full employment. And ultimately the government must accept such dollars in payment for our tax obligations stated in the same currency.

Econ 101:  Money

My Ph.D. in economics from the University of Chicago dealt with a monetary policy issue. My five years as an Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of Virginia allowed me to lecture extensively about monetary policy and my 26 years at the International Monetary Fund were largely devoted to providing technical assistance to member (primarily post conflict) county central banks (including Afghanistan, Bosnia, Croatia, Egypt, Iraq Israel, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Serbia, South Sudan, Turkey, West Bank and Gaza, and Zimbabwe). In case you didn’t know, central banks issue the currency (money) of their respective countries. So, I know a lot about “money” and like talking about it.

And it’s not that I haven’t already written a lot about the subject. For a few examples see: “Econ 101-the Value of Money”   “Money”  “A Libertarian Money”

A lot of interesting things are happening these days in the monetary area, but they pertain to payments (transferring money from one person to another via PayPal, Venmo, Zelle, Visa, etc.) rather than money itself. I want to talk to you about “money” (not payments) as I might with my granddaughter. Money is what is transferred in payment.

Money exists because none of us are self-sufficient and must trade what we produce with others who produce the other things we want. I will skip the presumably well-known story of barter trade and its challenge of the double coincidence of wants (you have what I want, and I have what you want so we trade). Giving you a commonly accepted asset, that you can hold until you want to buy something from someone else and can “pay” for it by passing that asset on to the next seller is the essence of money. In addition, it becomes the unit of account (the unit for stating prices). Thus, money is a unit of account, means of payment and store of value.

But now dear granddaughter, lets dig deeper to discuss where this money comes from and its key features in today’s modern electronic (digital) world. First of all, I can’t pay you with any old asset equal in value to your sale price (the barter problem). I must pay you with “money,” an asset universally accepted within the country. To cut to the bottom line, money is the asset issued by our central bank (any of our twelve Federal Reserve Banks) or creditable claims on the Fed’s monetary liability—the U.S. dollar. Until 1933 these dollars could be redeemed for gold at $20.67 per once. Now the U.S. government accepts them in payment of our taxes denominated in dollars, which insures their ultimate value.

Federal Reserve notes (dollar bills) are the most direct manifestation of our money. But almost 90% of our money (the asset with which we can pay for things) is in the form of deposits at American banks, and credit unions. These figures can be a bit misleading because over 60% of our currency is held abroad.

When you pay someone with cash, they receive a direct claim on the Federal Reserve. When you pay with your bank deposit, your bank’s deposit with (claim on) a Federal Reserve bank is transferred to the payee’s bank, which credits the payee’s bank account with the designated amount. The asset paid and received is still ultimately a claim on the Fed.

But our demand deposits with our banks amount to 15.9 trillion dollars, while the reserves that our banks keep with the Federal Reserve Banks amount to only $3.3 trillion reflecting our “fractional reserve” system. What is going on here? How did banks create more of our money (ultimate claims on the central bank) than it backs with its reserves at the Fed?

When teaching money and bank at the U. of Virginia I loved walking the class through the money/banking multiplier that resulted from our fractional reserve backing system. It has become fashionable for some to claim that banks create deposits (money) by making loans. When you received a mortgage loan from your bank, they say it creates the deposits placed in our deposit account. This is sort of true and sort of not true. Your bank actually pays your mortgage loan to the account of the person selling their home and their account is almost surely in another bank. That means that your bank must have sufficient reserve balances at the Fed to transfer to the seller’s bank.

I will leave the details of the bank money multiplier to the Money and Banking class you will hopefully take when you go to college, but the fact that your deposits are only partially backed with reserves at the Fed (the rest of the backing being the bank’s loans and other financial assets, is what lies behind the occasional bank runs we saw in the movies before deposit insurance was introduced to assure depositors that they could get the money back even if their bank failed. If enough bank borrowers default on their loans, the bank could become insolvent. Only the first to withdraw their deposits will be able to get their money back. The potential risk of such runs on a bank only partial backing your deposits with reserves at the central bank motivated the Chicago Plan of 100% reserve banking. “Protecting Bank Deposits”

If bank deposits of US dollars are money, what about cybercurrencies? What are they ultimately claims on? Bitcoin, as you hopefully know, is not a claim on anytime. They can’t be redeemed for anything. It is not unit of account or means of payment for hardly anything—it is not money. It is a speculative “asset” for those who like to speculate (gamble). “Cryptocurrencies-the bitcoin phenomena”  “The future of bitcoin exchanges”  “Bitcoin-Cybercurrencies and Blockchain”  “The difference between bitcoin and FTX”

But there is a class of cryptocurrencies that claim to be redeemable for money, such as US dollars—so called stable coins. The validity of this claim, as with your bank re your deposits there, depend on the details of its contract and the faithfulness of its adherence to that contract. Tether and USD Coin are the most popular US dollar stable coins.

But to use a stable coin for making payments, the person or firm you are paying must have the software or card reader needed to use the cryptocurrency you want to use. You might remember (probably not you, dear granddaughter) when not so many stores could accept visa, or MasterCard (or the Shell Oil, or Texico gas cards). Payment technology has continued to evolve and improve, but if it is not transferring money (US dollars in our case)—i.e. an asset ultimately redeemable for the Federal Reserve’s liability, it will not get you very far.

Other than handing someone cash, paying with your bank account requires a messaging and authorization system. Do you still write checks occasionally—so sorry. A check both indicates the amount to be paid and authorizes its transfer. Almost all payment instructions and authorizations are made electronically these days. Many central banks are considering introducing digital cash in place of or along side their currency notes (Central Bank Digital Currency). When offered through a bank, a CBDC would have the advantage of 100% reserve backing (it would be a direct claim on the Fed). On the other hand, modern electronic means of payment leave little room for further improvement as might be offered by CBDCs. “Econ 101-Retail Central Bank Digital Currency-CBDCs”

To make payments, or send money, abroad, your money must be exchanged for the money of the recipient. I regularly send dollars to Afghanistan, which are received as Afghani. A massive foreign exchange market in which the exchange rate of one currency for another is determined exists for that purpose. Such payments can be made more quickly and cheaply if both parties are willing to use the same currency. Thus, the US dollar is rather widely accepted for cross border payments. “The Dollar Again”  The Special Drawing Right (SDR) of the International Monetary Fund serves this purpose for governments but is not widely used. “What are SDRs?” Stable coins redeemable for gold provide another promising potential unit given golds historical importances. The best existing example is e-gold by Global Standard (to which I am an advisor).

But not all monies behave the same. The behavior of the value of each (its inflation rate) depends on how its issuing central bank manages its supply. Some central bank’s supply whatever their government needs, generally resulting in high inflation rates. Some, such as our Federal Reserve, regulate its money’s supply in an attempt to maintain an inflation target (in the US the target is 2%). Others follow currency board rules that leave to the market the determination of a supply that keeps the currency’s value consistent with that of another currency (The Euro in the case of the Bosnian dinar or the Bulgaria lev). So dear granddaughter there are many interesting things to study about money.

Why don’t you pop over and let’s discuss it more over lunch? Oh, I forgot that you are in the West Coast Washington (state) while I am near the East Coast Washington (DC). Well at least we can meet on FaceTime or Zoom (or even the old fashion telephone). But I would love to meet one way or the other.

P.S. In 2002 as Patrick Honohan and I were finishing up the Bank-Fund Financial Stability Assessment of Egypt (Patrick led the World Bank team and I led the IMF team) I said in an email “Patrick, why don’t you just come across the street and discuss this over tea?” Patrick replied: “Warren, I am in Dublin. I moved here several months ago.” He later became the Governor of the Central Bank of Ireland.

Econ 101:  How to help Afghans?

The world is rightly looking for ways to help Afghans without helping the Taliban (until or unless the Taliban forms a government the world is willing to recognize). Washington Post: “How to help Afghans without aiding Taliban”  In this Post article Anthony Faiola states that “The biggest problem isn’t a lack of food. Rather, it’s the disappearance of what had been the lifeblood of the Afghan economy — Western cash.” This mischaracterizes the problems of Afghans thus confusing our understanding. In this note I attempt to clarify the “cash” aspect of Afghanistan’s problems.

But first there is no escaping the fact that the cut back of foreign aid is reducing the income (and the goods that income buys) available to Afghans. Mention is often made of the approximately 10 billion US dollars of the Afghan government’s funds frozen in deposits abroad. These funds cannot be used until a new Afghan government is recognized with the authority to claim them. But these funds are not part of the lost revenue to the Afghan government. They are the wealth–the previous income saved–of the government (whoever that will turn out to be). The savings that we accumulate from our incomes for retirement or whatever is our wealth not our current income (though it can be drawn on to augment current income).

In recent years (prior to the Taliban take over) the Afghan government’s operating expenditures were 16 to 18% of Afghanistan’s GDP while its domestic revenue was 12 to 14% of GDP. The balance of its financing plus all development expenditures were from donors. The hope is that squeezing the Taliban “government” financially will add to the incentives for them to quickly form an inclusive government meeting international norms of human rights. Unfortunately, it is not possible to shut off the flow of funds to the government without also starving the Afghan people.

While the Ghani government has been replaced (temporarily) by Taliban leaders, the institutions (ministries and agencies) of government remain, but with new management. Of the government’s operating expenditures roughly 80% was for wages and salaries. Thus, the government could more or less finance its wage and salary expenses from its own domestic revenue without donor support. Indeed, all salaries have been and continue to be paid in the central bank (Da Afghanistan Bank — DAB) and presumably in the other government ministries as well, albeit with delays. However, the real value of these incomes is being reduced because of increased inflation (an indirect form of taxation). DAB and other government agencies have largely stopped providing economic and financial data since the Taliban take over.  IMF First-Review-Under-the-Under-the-Extended-Credit-Facility

None the less, freezing Afghanistan’s deposits abroad (DAB’s foreign exchange reserves held abroad) has created monetary problems within Afghanistan because of the inability to import the cash (dollar banknotes) on which the economy depends. Afghanistan remains a largely cash economy. Most payments are made in cash. Though inflation has been low in recent years (generally 2-4%), inflation in earlier decades was relatively high and thus Afghans held and transacted in US dollars quite extensively. Around 70% of bank deposits are in dollars. The availability of USD banknotes for local payments is thus very important. These were mostly supplied by the New York Federal Reserve Bank from the dollar deposits that DAB maintains there (and now frozen).

Prior to the Taliban takeover, the normal operation of DAB’s monetary policy consisted of receiving US dollars from the government (largely from donor grants) and depositing the equivalent value of Afghani in the government’s accounts. The government disbursed these Afghani to its employees in wage and salary payments (generally by electronic deposits to employee bank accounts). Without offset, the resulting creation and injection of these Afghani would be inflationary. DAB drains (buys back) this excess base money by auctioning some of the dollars it received from the government (sufficient to stabilize the dollar exchange rate) and capital notes of DAB. The government’s deposits of dollars with DAB took the form of credits to DAB’s dollar account with the New York Fed. From these deposits DAB pays the Federal Reserve to fly USD banknotes to Kabul as needed for DAB’s dollar auctions.

In mid-April 2021, when the U.S. announced its intention to withdraw the rest of its military personnel by September, an increased outflow of dollars by Afghans wanting to protect their wealth put the Afghani exchange rate under pressure. Acting DAB Governor Ajmal Ahmady (his appointment was never approved by Parliament) increased dollar auctions to stabilize the exchange rate. “Afghan central bank drained dollar stockpile before Kabul fell” As the amount of dollars in its vaults ran down, it used USD banknotes that it held on behalf of banks (approximately $700 million USD). The delivery of additional cash from New York expected in July never arrived and DAB’s balances at the New York Fed are now frozen until a new government is recognized so that no more dollar cash can be purchased from the Federal Reserve by DAB.

As an aside, I was surprised during a 2009 visit to Zimbabwe—as part of an IMF team following Zimbabwe’s dramatic hyperinflation during which it dollarized—to learn that there was an active private market in dollar banknotes supplying Zimbabwe from South Africa:  “Hyperinflation in Zimbabwe”

In the days just before and after the American evacuation in August 2021 public demands to withdraw dollar cash intensified but DAB had largely used up the dollars in its vaults (both its own and those held for banks). In response, on August 14 DAB imposed limits on the amounts that could be withdrawn each day. This fed public concern that their banks were running out of dollar banknotes and triggered runs on the banks. DAB was even running low on Afghani banknotes, which might have replaced dollars. Without access to its deposits abroad DAB is unable to purchase additional dollar cash nor pay for printing additional Afghani. For a largely cash and heavily dollarized economy this drying up of cash liquidity is very disruptive and the basis of the statement that people can’t buy the food that might be available.

In addition to the cash shortage, Afghans are also lining up to withdraw their deposits out of concern for a possible bank failure. Aid cut offs and civil strife have damaged many firms resulting in arrears on their bank loan payments. This threatens to push bank illiquidity into insolvency. Even if DAB had USD and AFN cash to lend or sell to banks with fully performing loans, DAB is currently unable to buy or lend against these illiquid bank assets. Moreover, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the U.S. Treasury has sanctioned payments to many Afghan entities and activities blocking many payments to and from abroad by Afghan banks and uncertainly about the application of the sanctions regime has made banks overly cautious about executing payments for their customers.

UN and other aid organizations have experience in other countries with delivering wages and other payments to targeted recipiences (teachers, healthcare workers and potentially even government employees) without the funds passing through the government’s hands. This approach is needed and is being developed for use in Afghanistan. OFAC sanctions are being modestly relaxed and UN and other aid agencies have begun funding the importation of dollar cash for humanitarian assistance projects. The use of digital mobile phone payments, such as M-Paisa and HesabPay, should be promoted and exploitation to the extent possible.  “Use of mobile phone payments” The United States needs to and has been gradually relaxing its payment restrictions to make this possible.

The Taliban leadership needs to take urgent steps to establish a new inclusive government that can and will be recognized internationally thus unfreezing Afghanistan’s (and DAB’s) deposits abroad and eliminating its cash shortage and restoring development assistance. In the meantime, in addition to the urgent need for humanitarian assistance that bypasses the Taliban, the New York Federal Reserve, or any other doners, should consider a loan to DAB to finance immediate shipments of dollar banknotes to Kabul. Da Afghanistan Bank Law adequately protects the central bank from government interference in its conduct of monetary policy and bank supervision. As a condition for restoring USD currency shipments to DAB, the Federal Reserve (and the UN) should obtain an agreement from the Taliban government to fully respect that law and appoint qualified people to its Supreme Council and Executive Board.

Until Afghanistan has a proper government, and its economic development can resume, Afghans, many of whom are very poor to begin with, will suffer unnecessarily depressed incomes. The lack of cash is adding a further, tragic, and quite unnecessary disruption to the lives of a long-suffering people. This can be and should be fixed urgently. Any such assistance will somewhat reduce the financial pressure on the Taliban, but a total financial squeeze on the government will fall on the people of Afghanistan as well.

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I worked in Afghanistan as a member of the IMF program and technical assistant teams from January 2002 until mid 2015. I am grateful to Syed Ishaq Alavi for his insights and comments on this article. Mr. Alavi was Advisor to the governor of DAB from 2010 to early 2013, Director General Monetary Policy Department of DAB from early 2013 to mid 2018, and advisor to the Executive Director of the International Monetary Fund for Afghanistan, Algeria, Ghana, Iran, Libya, Morocco, Pakistan, and Tunisia from June 2018 to August 2020. For the sake of their security, I am not naming those who helped me with this article who remain in Afghanistan.