Tag: Federal Reserve

Econ 101: Interest rates

President Trump wants the Federal Reserve to lower interest rates thinking that that would reduce the interest the Federal Government pays in interest on its debt, which this last year was $1.13 trillion (yes trillion). Prior to 2008, the Fed’s policy interest rate—the so called Fed funds rate—was the overnight rate on overnight (i.e. one day) loans between banks. I will skip how the Fed determines (brings about in the market) that rate. Since 2008, when the Fed started to pay interest on bank reserves (deposits at Federal Reserve Banks), the Fed’s policy rate has been the rate paid on bank reserves.

The interest rates paid on longer (than overnight) loans (e.g., one, two, ten-year bonds) are related to the overnight rate because rolling over overnight loans for ten years is an alternative to a ten-year bond. This note explains that relationship.

The interest rate on, say, a one-year bond reflects what the market (lenders and borrowers) expects the one-day rate to be each day over that period. That, in turn, depends on what the market expects the “real” rate to be plus the rate of inflation. Market rates reflect the real rate plus the inflation rate. If inflation increase, other things equal, market interest rates increase.

So, the interest rate on a ten-year bond will reflect what the market expects the overnight rate to be over the next ten years, which reflects the expected real rate and the expected inflation rate over that period. So what happens to interest rates (say the ten-year bond rate) when the Fed lowers its policy rate as President Trump wants? It depends primarily on what that does to the market’s expectation of inflation over the relevant future period.

On Wednesday Dec 10 the Fed reduced its policy rate .25% to 3.50 to 3.75%. On that day the ten-year bond rate fell from 4.19% the day before to 4.15% but by Friday (two days later) had returned to 4.18% In short the ten year Treasury bond rate is essentially unchanged by the quarter percent drop in the Fed’s policy rate. Why? Because the market expects the drop in the overnight rate to be largely offset by a slight increase in inflation over the next ten years.

If the Fed is correct that lowering its policy rate is appropriate for continuing the reduction of inflation to its 2% target, then the ten-year rate will fall as well. Clearly an excessive cut in the policy rate (one that increases the expected rate of inflation) will increase longer term interest rates rather than lower them. Class dismissed.

Stable Coins

Digitizing our bank deposits (digital dollars—stable coins) would (will) represent another step forward in the ease and efficiency with which we can make payments and will enhance bank stability. Most of the US supply of money (US dollars) is in the form of our dollar deposits at our banks and most of our payments these days are already made by electronically transferring bank deposits from me to you via my bank to yours. I have discussed all of this in more detail earlier: “Econ 101-Money”

Developing the rails for paying with stable coins is a further improvement on our existing payment options. It is not revolutionary. The payment of cash (currency) requires no infrastructure (e.g. Merchant contract with credit card issuer and card reader, etc.). You just hand it over and anyone can accept it (hopefully the person you intended to receive it). The electronic transfer of a bank deposit balance (e.g., Zelle, Venmo, e-wire) requires the enrollment of the recipient in that particular payment vehicle.  It took decades for credit cards to be widely accepted. Hundreds of companies now issue Visa cards (mine is issued by United Airlines) and all are accepted wherever any of them are accepted. But it took a lot of work to build that system.

What do stable coins issued by banks add that might be useful? From the bank side issuing stable coins from deposit balances simplifies the bank’s management of the assets that back them. When its customers withdraw cash these days, the bank must purchase it from the Federal Reserve in order to pass it on to you. It pays the Fed for the cash from its reserve deposits at the Fed, which reduces its ability to extend credit to businesses and households. If its reserves at the Fed are not sufficient, it will need to borrow from another bank or sell another asset.

The withdrawal of cash from bank deposits tends to follow seasonal patters. Thus the squeeze on its reserves at the Fed would tend to create seasonal fluctuations in bank credit hence in the money supply.  Thus the Fed attempts to offset the impact of currency fluctuations on bank reserves and thus credit with offsetting purchases and sales of government securities (so called open market operations) or with temporary loans to banks in its “lender of last resort” function. If a bank can issue its own currency (as they did in the old days) when a customer withdraws cash from its deposits, its asset backing (and reserve deposits at the Fed) will not be affected. Banks will now be able to do this by issuing their own stable coins. While the customer’s deposit balance will fall when withdrawing cash (or stable coins), its total of stable coins “cash” plus deposit balance will not change thus the bank assets backing them do not need to change. Thus, such fluctuations in the currency/deposit ratio would not product a fluctuation in the money supply.

From the customers side the stable coins are as good as traditional cash only to the extent that the infrastructure to accept them (e.g. phone wallets) has been designed and widely acquired/accepted. Just as it took many years for credit cards (Visa, Mastercard and American Express) to be widely adopted, the same will be true with stable coins. Just as you might now swap addresses via your respective mobile phones, you will be able to make payments.

If everyone can issue their own money it degenerates to barter, i.e. it would not be money at all. The essence of a successful means of payment is the certainty of its ultimate claim on the central bank’s official monetary liability (the dollar). When central banks were limited to issuing currency redeemable for “something” such as gold or silver, the amount they issued was limited by their holding of gold or silver, etc.  Today the Fed’s supply of money is limited by Congress’s mandate for price stability and full employment. And ultimately the government must accept such dollars in payment for our tax obligations stated in the same currency.

Econ 101: Interest Rates –Another Go

A month ago I reviewed the role of the Federal Reserve’s policy interest rate: https://wcoats.blog/2025/07/17/the-feds-policy-interest-rate/   The subject is so important and seemingly misunderstand by many that I am reviewing it again here.

Interest rates balance the supply and demand for financial assets. Households and firms that save some of their incomes demand financial assets. Households and firms that borrow to invest in productive capital or for whatever reason supply those assets (mortgages, bonds, etc.). Rates on longer term assets reflect the expected value of the short-term rates over that period. Thus the interest rate on a ten year bond reflects the expected value of one year bills over the ten year period plus a small risk premium because the string of short term loans are an alternative to the single fixed rate ten year loan.

The policy interest rate of the Federal Reserve is set by the Fed to pursue its objective of stable money (defined by the Fed as 2% inflation) and high employment (the Fed’s dual mandate imposed by Congress).

This note reviews the Fed’s policy rate. Since 2008 the Fed’s policy rate has been the rate it pays banks for the money they keep on deposit with a Federal Reserve Bank (of which there are twelve but that is unimportant for understanding the role of the policy rate), which on Aug 6 amounted to $3,332 billion. This rate is known as the Interest on Reserve Balances (IORB).

If the IORB matches comparable market rates for equally liquid funds (the so-called neutral rate), banks will maintain their existing Fed deposits. If it is set above that level, banks will have a financial incentive to place more money with the Fed, i.e. lend less in the market, thus creating fewer deposits and reducing the money supply. If the IORB is set lower than the neutral rate, banks will draw down their Fed deposits to lend more in the market thus increasing deposits and the money supply.

The IORB is currently (Aug 6) 4.5%, where it has remained since Dec 2024. At this rate broad money (M2=bank demand, time and savings deposits) has grown between 4% and 5% (from a year earlier) over the last three months. Given that inflation remains above the Fed’s target of 2% it would not seem wise to lower the policy rate and increase the rate of monetary growth especially as higher tariffs go into effect.

To repeat from earlier blogs (because it is so important), if markets anticipate higher inflation in the future (next few years), market interest rates on longer term debt will increase to preserve their real (inflation adjusted) value. Lowering the Fed’s policy rate prematurely would increase the market’s anticipation of higher inflation rates in the future. In other word, lowering the IORB now is likely to increase interest rates on longer term debt. Leave the Fed alone to do its job as best it can.

The Fed’s policy interest rate

Among the things our protectionist, isolationist President fails to understand correctly is the role of the Federal Reserve’s policy rate. He wants interest rates to be lower and thinks that the Fed can cause that by lowering its policy rate. That rate used to be the overnight money market rate. If the Fed lowered that target it would supply more money (bank deposits at one of the twelve Federal Reserve Banks) to banks and thus the interbank money market for managing bank liquidity by buying government securities from banks. If banks’ liquidity (“reserves”) is increased, their demand to borrow in the interbank money market will be reduced and thus the interest rate prevailing in that market will be reduced. Thus, raising or lowering the Fed’s policy rate (and the consequent change in base –Fed reserve—money) was the instrument by which the Fed controlled the money supply (its own base money and the more relevant boarder bank money—M1, M2, etc.)

If you are into this subject, you will already understand what money is and where it comes from. If you would like a refresher read this: https://wcoats.blog/2024/11/08/econ-101-money/  

The above description of the policy rate was applicable until 2008 when banks held minimal reserves (or excess reserves when there was still a minimum reserve requirement) at the Fed. But in response to the financial crisis in 2008 when the Fed purchased huge quantities of government debt (and mortgage-backed securities), the Fed began to pay banks interest on their now very large deposits at the Fed to keep them from lending them in the market and thus expanding the money supply excessively. So, the relevant Fed policy rate now is the rate it pays on banks’ reserves at the Fed, the so-called Interest on Reserve Balances (IORB).

As with the policy rate in the old regime, the IORB is the instrument by which the Fed now controls the growth in the money supply. When the IORB is reduced below prevailing overnight market rates banks will draw down their Fed deposits to lend at the higher market rate thus increasing money growth.

Interest rates in the market are determined in and by the supply and demand for credit in the market. If the Fed lowers its IORB it will increase the growth rate of dollars. The Fed will do so when it judges that appropriate for achieving its inflation rate target of 2.0 percent. The twelve-month inflation rate in May was 2.4% and rose to 2.7% in June. The Fed decided not to lower the rate further at this time. Doing so could well lead market participants to expect higher inflation in the future, which would raise (not lower) market rates for say 10 year Treasury bills.

Current Fed policy seems appropriate to me. It adheres to an inflation forecast targeting regime that has become popular in recent years in major central banks. But it reacted by raising rates too slowly in response to the surge in inflation in 2021-2 during the Covid pandemic. Inflation reached 9% in mid 2022. A better system is to return control of the money supply to the public that can buy and redeem dollars at a fixed price for a hard anchor (such as a gold standard). I laid this out in the following blog: https://wcoats.blog/2022/06/06/econ-101-the-value-of-money/

Should the State mandate or advise?

It depends of course. But in America, which was established to empower each individual to make their own decisions, the state should only regulate those individual activities that might harm others such as violating property rights. This attitude presumes that each of us cares more about our wellbeing than does anyone else and know better how to achieve it taking account of our differences in tastes, interests, and risk preferences. It has resulted in a society of more prosperous and happier members.

This can be contrasted with the view that the average person is not intelligent enough or self-motivated enough to maximize their potential and needs to be guided by smarter, wiser people.

A society in which each individual enjoys the maximum freedom of choice hardly means that the government has little or no role in our wellbeing. In addition to providing public safety, shared institutional and physical infrastructure development, and the adjudication and enforcement of contracts (the rule of law), government can contribute to the provision of the knowledge to help inform the individual choices we each make. I want to review two very different areas of government involvement that have reflected the above conflicting attitudes of the government’s best role—monetary policy and public health policy.

Section 8 of the US Constitution gives the federal government the power “To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof,…” Our twelve Federal Reserve Banks and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System carry out that mandate via a system of market determined prices of goods and services and an inflation target of 2%. While I would prefer a monetary policy in which currency was issued or redeemed at a fix price for a hard anchor (traditionally gold) in response to market demand (currency board rules), the Fed has behaved very well within its inflation targeting regime over the past two years (after keeping its policy interest rate too low until two years ago).

A successful inflation targeting policy requires keeping inflation expectations anchored to the target (2% in the US) so that economic wage and price decisions are made in light of that expectation. But todays’ policy actions are only fully felt over the next year or two (what Milton Friedman called “long and variable lags” in the effects of policy). Federal Reserve policy is implemented largely by setting the rate at which it supplies the money it creates to the market. If it sets that rate below the so called neutral rate, it must supply money to keep the rate low. If it sets the Fed Funds (and related) rate above the neutral rate, it must absorb money from the market to keep the rate high. Setting its policy interest rate is the lever by which it controls the rate at which the money supply grows. Each Federal Reserve President and Governor must evaluate all available information about economic activity most likely over the next one to two years and determine in like of that what monetary growth is most likely to result in 2 percent inflation over that period. If market participants believe that the Fed’s choice is most likely to result in achieving the stated target in the future, their wage and price decisions will anticipate that inflation and thus bring it about.

It should be obvious that if Fed officials are honest it attempting to achieve their target and explain as fully as they themselves understand the prospects to the public and the public has confidence in the Fed’s commitment, this is the best that can be done. In fact, the Fed deserves high marks for such transparency in our uncertain and evolving world. Each person and firm make their own forward looking decisions in light of their best guesses of future conditions. The Fed’s guidance is the best and most the Fed can do to bring or keep inflation on target.  

When governments don’t trust “the people” to make their own decisions (they are not smart enough or are two lazy or whatever), they must mandate the “proper” behavior. Consider our approach to the public’s health during the Covid pandemic. Whether government should offer advice and provide information on what is known about a disease such as Covid-19 is complicated by the fact that we should not be free to expose others to communicable diseases. In the case of Covid the government’s understanding of its nature and best protection grew and evolved over time. But the US public heath agencies lost credibility from the beginning by telling well intentioned lies.

“In early March 2020, Dr. Fauci said ‘there’s no reason to be walking around with a mask.’ In the same interview he said people could wear masks if they liked, but they wouldn’t get perfect protection, and it would further pinch what at the time was a short supply of masks for doctors and nurses.” PolitiFact | Marco Rubio says Anthony Fauci lied about masks. Fauci didn’t.

But more to my point, CDC officials thought that their shut down and isolation mandates would be more effective than allowing individuals to determine how best to protect themselves and others. The subsequent evidence suggested that they were wrong. Any benefits were outweighed by very substantial costs. Read the following articles and studies for examples.

Scott Atlas on Lies

“I explore the association between the severity of lockdown policies in the first half of 2020 and mortality rates. Using two indices from the Blavatnik Centre’s COVID-19 policy measures and comparing weekly mortality rates from 24 European countries in the first halves of 2017–2020, addressing policy endogeneity in two different ways, and taking timing into account, I find no clear association between lockdown policies and mortality development.” https://academic.oup.com/cesifo/article/67/3/318/6199605?login=false  

“The most restrictive nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) for controlling the spread of COVID-19 are mandatory stay-at-home and business closures. The most restrictive nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) for controlling the spread of COVID-19 are mandatory stay-at-home and business closures. Given the consequences of these policies, it is important to assess their effects. We evaluate the effects on epidemic case growth of more restrictive NPIs (mrNPIs), above and beyond those of less-restrictive NPIs (lrNPIs)….

“After subtracting the epidemic and lrNPI effects, we find no clear, significant beneficial effect of mrNPIs on case growth in any country…. While small benefits cannot be excluded, we do not find significant benefits on case growth of more restrictive NPIs. Similar reductions in case growth may be achievable with less-restrictive interventions.”  January 2021 study

Worrying About Mandates and Lockdowns as Delta Variant Hits Unvaccinated Californians

Econ 101: The Value of Money

During a discussion of Bitcoin with friends, it became clear to me that it might be helpful if I explained some fundamentals of how the value of money is determined. Like most everything else, money’s value is ultimately determined by its supply and demand.

Demand for money reflects the public’s need to keep an inventory of it in order to use it for making payments.  Bitcoin are generally held as a speculative asset rather than for payments as almost no one will accept them in payment. “Cryptocurrencies-the bitcoin phenomena”

The supply of money is determined by those who created it, generally central banks. Generally central banks issue their currency, thus increasing its supply, by lending it (generally to banks) or by buying assets, generally their government’s debt.  When anyone holding that currency no longer wants it and has the right to redeem it, the central bank takes it back in exchange for the asset it purchased in the first place, thus reducing the money supply.  Under the gold standard, currency was redeemed for gold.  The rules governing a central bank’s issuing and redeeming its currency defines the nature of its monetary regime.  That is the topic of this econ 101 lesson.

As none of us has ever redeemed our currency, it is understandable that my friends confused spending their money with redeeming it.  Spending it transfers it to someone else without changing its supply, while redeeming it reduces its supply.  Cryptocurrencies add a new category to our discussion of money.  As noted by “a billionaire hedge-fund manager… cryptocurrencies are a ‘limited supply of nothing.’”  “Crypto skeptics growing”

As discussed further below, the supply of Bitcoin increases slowly and steadily over time as determined by an unchangeable formula and Bitcoin cannot be redeemed for anything.  The U.S. dollar and virtually every other national currency in the world grow at more erratic rates as determined by their issuing central banks.  So what makes the value of the dollar relatively stable over long periods of time?  The fall in its value by about 8% over the last month is nothing compared to bitcoin’s fall of 23% over the same period and over 50% over the last half year.  Over the past 15 years the dollar’s value has declined less than 2% each year.  Unlike Bitcoin, dollars are widely accepted for payments that are denominated in dollars, including our taxes, and thus held (demanded) to make such payments.  Almost no Bitcoins are held to make payments as almost no one will accept them for payments.  But I want to focus on a currency’s supply.

There are fundamentally three broad approaches to determining the supply of a currency.  Historically, the supply of most currencies were determined by fixing their price to what they could be redeemed for, such as gold or silver. I have called such a system for regulating money’s supply, a hard anchor. “Real SDR Currency Board”  The value of a currency can be fixed (the price set) to something real such as gold or a basket of goods.  A country with a strict gold standard, which the U.S. never really had, issues its currency (dollars) whenever anyone wants to pay the fixed gold price for more of them.  If the dollar price of gold in the market rises above its official price, there would be an arbitrage profit from buying gold from the central bank at its lower official price.  Such gold could be resold in the market at the higher price.  But the key point is that this mechanism (what I call currency board rules) of redeeming currency reduces its supply and thus reduces prices in this currency in the market (deflation).  Several of the monetary systems I helped establish, work in this way (Bulgaria and Bosnia and Herzegovina). “One Currency for Bosnia”

The most common system of monetary control today is for the central bank to determine its currency’s supply by buying or selling it in the market (the Federal Reserve can buy treasury bills, etc. to increase the supply of dollars).  Most central banks today adjust their money supplies in an effort to achieve an inflation target (a much more complicated subject). “Czech National Bank: Inflation Targeting in Transition Economies”  Generally they do so by setting an intermediate target for a short-term interest at which market participants (banks) can borrow from the central bank.  Such fiat currencies, such as the U.S. dollar, are not redeemable but are widely accepted in payment for goods, services and debts.

This brings us to Bitcoin.  The supply of Bitcoin is determined by a formula that predetermines its gradual growth to 21 million by 2140.  There are currently about 19 million in existence.  The supply is increased by giving them to successful miners for verifying the legitimacy of each transaction (another complicated subject).  Thus, the issuer (the formula) received services (protection against double spending the same coin) but no assets such as gold or treasury bills for creating and issuing new Bitcoins.  Once created, an issued bitcoin can never be redeemed (i.e. the outstanding supply can never be reduced).  When you spend or give away your Bitcoins you are circulating them to other holders, not redeeming them.

When my imaginary aunt Sally discusses Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies more generally, she tends to mix up the marvelous new payment technologies for paying my dollars all over the world with private money such as Bitcoin and Tether.  She also doesn’t seem to quite understand that most money has always been privately produced including the U.S. dollars that we spend in various ways (occasionally even by handing over cash).  “A shift in monetary regimes”

But these distinctions are critical when considering what role the government should play in our monetary system.  The truly amazing technical progress we have experienced and the dramatic increase in the standard of living of the average person it has delivered over the last century was made possible by a government that provided a general framework in which we, the consuming beneficiaries of this progress, could make informed choices.  Our government, wisely, generally did not make such decisions for us.

With that in mind consider “a letter addressed to Senate Majority Leader Charles E. Schumer (D-N.Y.), Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) and other congressional leaders, [from 26 influential technology personalities that] outlined what it described as potentially grave dangers of cryptocurrencies.” They are absolutely correct to expose and condemn the technical and economic weaknesses of blockchain technology—the distributed ledger with which Bitcoin claims to avoid the need for trusted third parties to record and document payment transaction (as happens on a centralized ledger when you pay from your bank deposit). 

But the fact that foolish people invest in Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies does not justify our government prohibiting and restricting them from doing so.  The government requires the banks in which we put our money to publish properly audited financial statements of the assets backing our deposits and to set minimum capital requirements to protect against the possible loss of bank asset value (e.g., loan defaults).  Cryptocurrencies claiming redeemability at a stable value (so called stable coins) should similarly be required to disclose the rules by which they operate and the composition and value of the assets backing their digital coins.  In short, government regulations should help us decide what we want to buy and/or hold without restricting the ability of fintech pioneers to explore and innovate products to offer.

Overly restrictive regulations create incentives for incumbents to create barriers to competition.  Large and intrusive governments tend toward corruption.  The Federal Reserve System seems quite aware of these risks as it cautiously explores whether to compete with the private sector in developing a central bank digital currency.  “Econ 101-Central  Bank digital currency-CBDC”

So when considering the government’s role in money and payments be sure to clearly distinguish money from payment technology and limit government to setting the rules of the game that maximize the ability of private consumers to make wise choices. But perhaps the biggest policy decision of all is how the government should determine/regulate the supply of its currency, most of which is privately created.  I support a currency whose value is fixed to something real (a hard anchor) and whose supply is determined by the market via currency board rules.  “A libertarian money”  

Judy Shelton’s monetary policy

I share Judy Shelton’s support for monetary policy with a hard anchor. Following currency board rules, the public should determine the money supply they want to hold at its fixed price. Historically, gold was the most common hard anchor. It worked well for centuries. However, it had two problems.

The first is that central banks actually bought and stored gold, which distorted its market supply and thus price. Widespread adoption of a gold anchor combined with central banks buying up much of it would be an even more serious problem today. But gold can anchor the price of a currency without the central bank actually hoarding gold. It would instead issue its currency against other safe assets, such as government debt securities, as fixed gold price. It would fully back its currency with such assets so that it could redeem it all if the public chose to return it. This would ensure that the gold price in the market in the central banks currency was always very close to its official (anchor) price.

This system of indirect redeemability, as Leland Yeager called it, would ensure a more stable market price for gold relative to other goods and services and thus a more stable purchasing power of a currency fixed to it. However, choosing a single commodity as the anchor (its second problem) would result in a less stable value of the currency than would choosing a small basket of widely traded commodities. https://www.adamsmith.org/blog/returning-to-currencies-with-hard-anchors

Given the discretion to manage their currency supplies, central banks have historically tended to undermine its value as the result of over issuing it (inflation). Judy is right to want to limit that discretion. The Federal Reserve Act mandates that the Federal Reserve should aim for price stability (and full employment). This is an important constraint on the Fed’s behavior, but we can do better.

The order to reopen–who gives it?

Like all of us, President Trump is eager to reopen the economy. Does he have the authority to do so or do state governors? Fortunately, neither can force us to start eating out again, or return to our offices. We remain a country where those decisions rest with each of us individually (or jointly with your boss with regard to returning to your office, shop or factory). That means that those parts of the economy that have shut down will get going again when the affected businesses have taken measures to protect their customers and employees sufficient to regain their customers’ trust that they are safe places to visit. But as I argued last month, that should always have been the basis of social interactions.  “Beating-covid-19: Compulsion-or-Persuasion-and-guidance”

The broad-based, blunt instrument of sheltering at home unless your activities are vital (says who?) is imposing staggering damage to the economy.  The best way to minimize that damage is to restore public trust as quickly as possible that those with it are being isolated and treated.  A blanket shut down of non-essential activities is not the best approach. Each of us in our personal situation can better determine where we feel safe to go than can a government agency.  However, some of us will not give sufficient weight to the dangers of exposing our friends and the general public to the disease if we might have it.  Public policy should educate the public to the dangers of covid-19 and how best to protect ourselves and should minimize the financial incentive to continue working when sick. State coercion (mandatory quarantines) should only be applied to those testing positive for the virus.  This approach will allow all firms and stores to operate whose employees and customers judge them to be safe and will give businesses maximum incentive to make themselves safe.

Covid-19 will be around for at least another year or two until an effective vaccine is available and then distributed to more than 60 percent of the world population. The most effective way to contain its spread in the interim is to undertake widespread, quick, and accurate testing and to quarantine those who test positive with efficient contact tracing.  Adding the newly available tests for antibodies indicating immunity to the virus will identify those who are no longer susceptible to acquiring or spreading the disease. They should be safe in public.  Other corona viruses have created immunity in those who have had them and SARS-CoV-2 is expected to do the same, though this has not yet been established.

The U.S. has belatedly increased its testing for the virus. Initially it impeded the development and supply of test kits. As of April 16, the U.S. has tested 10,266 people per million while Germany has tested twice that. The U.S. by that date had 105 deaths per million while Germany had less than half that.  The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) should get out of the way and allow profit seeking entrepreneurs to flood the market with test kits.  The government should focus its (our) money on a large increase in testing for the virus and quarantining those testing positive and those they contacted and should offer significant financial prizes for an effective vaccine and for the development (or discovery) of effective treatments. Unlike patents as an incentive, this will encourage collaboration and knowledge sharing among those attempting to develop treatments.

On April 16 President Trump outlined guidance for the phased reopening of closed businesses and activities that is consistent with the approach outline above.  The government’s traditional public health role is important. But much more discretion should be given to individual case by case judgements about risks and entrepreneurial initiatives about remedies rather than broad based government edicts.

We will not return and cannot be required to return to the public square until we believe it is safe to do so. Individual shops and firms have a financial incentive to find convincing approaches to being safe and will get there quicker than even the best-intentioned government official issuing instructions and mandates. The government has an important role to play in fighting this virus and facilitating our return to normal life, but it should remove impediments it often creates to the private sector’s management of the related risks and the huge and unnecessary damage it imposes on the economy.

Paul Volcker, RIP

Paul Volcker was a man of strong convictions, including a commitment to sound money https://wcoats.blog/2017/10/14/sound-money/.  It surprises me that in 1971 he urged President Nixon to end the United States’ commitment to maintaining the price of gold to which most countries had fixed the exchange rates of their currencies. However, he led the Federal Reserve in ending the inflation that followed.

I first met Paul Volcker while seconded by the International Monetary Fund to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve in Washington. During that year (1979) I reported to my former U of Chicago classmate, David Lindsey, while working with another UC classmate, Tom Simpson, in the Capital Markets Department in the Research and Statistics Division (it’s a small world).

At the time Mr. Volcker was President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The New York Fed conducted the monetary operations for the entire system (open market operations buying and selling government securities with Federal Reserve member banks–all of whom had offices in New York). Thus, the FRBNY was the most important and powerful of the twelve Federal Reserve Bank making the Board of Governors in Washington a bit jealous. NY Fed President Volcker had recently taken some decision with regard to “offshore” banking located in New York. The Board of Governors in Washington thought that Volcker had not properly consulted them, so they ordered him to come to Washington and explain himself (and get slapped on the wrists).  My boss, David Lindsey, allowed me to attend that board meeting, sitting quietly at the back of the room.

Cigar smoking Volcker stands 6’7”.  G. William Miller, Chairman of the Board of Governors at that time was a nonsmoker standing something like 5’6”.  Miller had banned smoking in the Board Room during his tenure, driving smoking governors like Nancy Teeters nuts.  Ms. Teeters was the first female Governor on the Board of Governors. The image of the diminutive Miller trying to dress down the towering Paul Volcker is seared into my memory.

As luck would have it (for Ms. Teeters and for the nation), Paul return a few months later (Aug 6, 1979) to replace Miller as Chairman, cigar in hand. Smoking, and firm monetary policy had returned to the Board of Governors. I was again privileged to sit at the back of the Board room on several more occasions.

Paul immediately changed how monetary policy was conducted. He reigned in the rate of growth of the money supply, focusing on Net Borrowed Reserves rather than the federal funds rate, which shot up to almost 20% for a few months.  Inflation had risen from around 4% when Nixon closed the gold window unevenly to almost 15% (percent increase from a year earlier) in April 1980 before plunging to 2.5% in Aug 1983. It took nerves of steel to allow short term interest rates to climb to almost 20% before turning inflation around.