Tag: Currency

Stable Coins

Digitizing our bank deposits (digital dollars—stable coins) would (will) represent another step forward in the ease and efficiency with which we can make payments and will enhance bank stability. Most of the US supply of money (US dollars) is in the form of our dollar deposits at our banks and most of our payments these days are already made by electronically transferring bank deposits from me to you via my bank to yours. I have discussed all of this in more detail earlier: “Econ 101-Money”

Developing the rails for paying with stable coins is a further improvement on our existing payment options. It is not revolutionary. The payment of cash (currency) requires no infrastructure (e.g. Merchant contract with credit card issuer and card reader, etc.). You just hand it over and anyone can accept it (hopefully the person you intended to receive it). The electronic transfer of a bank deposit balance (e.g., Zelle, Venmo, e-wire) requires the enrollment of the recipient in that particular payment vehicle.  It took decades for credit cards to be widely accepted. Hundreds of companies now issue Visa cards (mine is issued by United Airlines) and all are accepted wherever any of them are accepted. But it took a lot of work to build that system.

What do stable coins issued by banks add that might be useful? From the bank side issuing stable coins from deposit balances simplifies the bank’s management of the assets that back them. When its customers withdraw cash these days, the bank must purchase it from the Federal Reserve in order to pass it on to you. It pays the Fed for the cash from its reserve deposits at the Fed, which reduces its ability to extend credit to businesses and households. If its reserves at the Fed are not sufficient, it will need to borrow from another bank or sell another asset.

The withdrawal of cash from bank deposits tends to follow seasonal patters. Thus the squeeze on its reserves at the Fed would tend to create seasonal fluctuations in bank credit hence in the money supply.  Thus the Fed attempts to offset the impact of currency fluctuations on bank reserves and thus credit with offsetting purchases and sales of government securities (so called open market operations) or with temporary loans to banks in its “lender of last resort” function. If a bank can issue its own currency (as they did in the old days) when a customer withdraws cash from its deposits, its asset backing (and reserve deposits at the Fed) will not be affected. Banks will now be able to do this by issuing their own stable coins. While the customer’s deposit balance will fall when withdrawing cash (or stable coins), its total of stable coins “cash” plus deposit balance will not change thus the bank assets backing them do not need to change. Thus, such fluctuations in the currency/deposit ratio would not product a fluctuation in the money supply.

From the customers side the stable coins are as good as traditional cash only to the extent that the infrastructure to accept them (e.g. phone wallets) has been designed and widely acquired/accepted. Just as it took many years for credit cards (Visa, Mastercard and American Express) to be widely adopted, the same will be true with stable coins. Just as you might now swap addresses via your respective mobile phones, you will be able to make payments.

If everyone can issue their own money it degenerates to barter, i.e. it would not be money at all. The essence of a successful means of payment is the certainty of its ultimate claim on the central bank’s official monetary liability (the dollar). When central banks were limited to issuing currency redeemable for “something” such as gold or silver, the amount they issued was limited by their holding of gold or silver, etc.  Today the Fed’s supply of money is limited by Congress’s mandate for price stability and full employment. And ultimately the government must accept such dollars in payment for our tax obligations stated in the same currency.

The Dollar (again)

Any country selling its goods abroad could price and collect payment for them in its own currency. Foreign purchasers would have to buy the sellers currency in the foreign exchange market (a whole nether story) in order to make such payments.

To communicate with each other they could also learn each other’s language. To communicate with everyone in their own language would require learning 7,000 languages. The economy of everyone adding English as a second language to their own is self-evident.

Rather than each trader dealing with several hundred currencies, there is huge economy in everyone dealing in one intermediary (so called vehicle) currency for pricing and payments of their cross-border transactions. But what currency?

When an exporter gives up pricing its products in the currency it pays its workers, it takes on a valuation risk. The choice of its invoicing currency and currency of payment needs to be attractive to potential buyers and of minimal risk to itself. The currency needs to have a relatively stable value for a large number of goods. The U.S. economy is large, and its goods are priced in dollars, which has a relatively good track record of price stability.

But to pay for imports with someone else’s currency the importer must have some of it. He must either take the risk of buying it in the foreign exchange market at whatever its current exchange rate might be or keeping some in reserve. Keeping a reserve of the international pricing and payment currency requires having safe assets with stable values in that currency, with deep and liquid markets in which they can be bought and sold. Currently the US dollar wins hands down. The Empire and the Dollar – Warren’s space (wcoats.blog)

The militarization of the dollar to serve U.S. foreign policy objectives increases the risk to others of holding and using dollars. How much that potentially undermines the dollar’s reserve currency status depends on how broadly the foreign policy objectives of the U.S. are shared and how well alternative currencies measure up to the value and market advantages of the dollar.

Whither Libra?

Every other day, it seems, we witness the launch of a new crypto (digital) currency.  Each combines a medium of exchange (a currency) and a means of payment (a technical process of delivering the currency—of making a payment with it). While many of us have watched the ups and downs of bitcoin and its imitators with amusement, none of us (hopefully) take it seriously as a currency. Bitcoin is a speculative vehicle for gambling.  Processing bitcoin payments is too slow, and its value is too volatile to succeed as a medium of exchange or as a means of payment. Only about 1% of bitcoin transactions are actual payments.  Many new means of payment do not involve a new currency.  Thus, debit and credit cards, checks, wire transfers, PayPal, Popmoney, Zelle, etc., are means of payment of US dollars, or Euros or other sovereign currencies.

Unlike the bitcoins of the world, Libra is a currency and means of payment that is designed to ensure that its tokens will have a stable value.  The legacy members of Facebook, Visa, Uber, and other partners in the Libra Association promise the possibility of rapid adoption. Libra’s value will be fixed to that of a basket of major currencies, its supply will be regulated by market demand at that fixed price (issued via currency board rules), and it will be fully backed by assets of the same value ensuring that holders of Libra can redeem them for the same value at any time.

Suddenly potential regulators are on high alert such as witnessed in the recent Congressional testimony of David Marcus, head of Facebook’s Calibra, to Congress.  By whom and how should Libra be regulated?  Obviously, it will need to comply with Anti Money Laundering (AML/CFT) requirements and whatever else each jurisdiction in which its participants reside (holders of “accounts” with Libra or of its tokens) require of money service providers. Banks take deposits and lend, so Libra would not be a bank. While its tokens might be treated as deposits, it will not lend (its purchases of government debt and other securities with the money paid to buy Libra are investments not loans).  In this short note I will explain why Libra—the coin/token/currency—is not a claim on a mutual fund and thus should not be regulated in the US by the Securities and Exchange Commission.  I will not, however, examine its claim to be a more efficient means of payment.

The nature of Libra’s claim of stability rests on how its value is determined.  Its value is to be fixed to the market value of a basket of currencies yet to be determined. But how does that work exactly?  The world already has an internationally determined and managed unit of account, the Special Drawing Right (SDR) of the International Monetary Fund.  Rather than introduce yet another, competitive unit the case for Libra to fix to the SDR is so overwhelming that I will illustrate the difference between a currency basket as a unit of account and as an investment portfolio with the SDR. The composition of the SDR’s valuation basket is established by international agreement following a well-specified and transparent process.  Fixing the value of a Libra to that of the SDR would remove any risk of its value being manipulated by Facebook or other Libra shareholders. That would strengthen the status of the Libra but also contribute to enhancing the IMF’s SDR as a supplement or substitute for the dollar in international reserves, as called for in the IMF’s Articles of Agreement.

The SDR’s value is determined by a basket of five currencies (the dollar, euro, pound sterling, yen and renminbi).  The IMF computes the dollar value of one SDR (and thus the value in every other currency) daily on the basis of the market exchange rate of each of the five currencies in the valuation basket into dollars.  The dollar values of each currency are added up to determine the dollar value of the basket.  By fixing the value of one Libra to one SDR it sets the price at which Libra can be purchased and the currency value that would be returned if Libra were redeemed.

This might seem similar to, but is in fact very different than, the value of one Libra being determined by the value of the portfolio of investments that back it.  The “Reserve” backing Libra would consist of SDR denominated assets (e.g., SDR bonds) or assets in each of the five basket currencies in the same proportion as in the SDRs valuation basket. Thus, it would bear no exchange rate risk.  However, the investment would have other risks, specifically interest rate and default risks.  To the extent that some of the Reserve’s investments are relatively long term (say ten-year Treasury bonds), changes in market interest rates would change the current market value of these investments. While Reserve investments would presumable be made only in the safest assets and would be limited to relatively short-term instruments, the risk of default or loss in value would not be zero.  So, if one Libra is a claim on its share of the Reserve, its value could differ from the daily dollar value of the SDR valuation basket.

Libra wishes to include the unbanked in its market, thus opening financial and payment services to this broad group now unable to enjoy them. If Libra’s value is fixed to the value of its Reserve, and thus regulated by the SEC (in the US), consumer protection investment regulations would likely exclude the very people Libra is most interested in serving. Thus, Libra should fix its value to that of a unit of account and not to the value of its Reserve.

 

The Hutchinson Lecture at the Universtiy of Delaware

Tuesday (April 17) I spent an enjoyable day in Newark, Delaware as the guest of the Economics Department of the University of Delaware. My afternoon, more technical, lecture to the graduate students and faculty covered my proposal for the reform of the international monetary system: http://works.bepress.com/warren_coats/25/

My evening lecture, this year’s Hutchinson Lecture, is reviewed here by the U. of Delaware newspaper (in which there is also a link providing background on the Hutchinson Lecture): http://www.udel.edu/udaily/2012/apr/HutchinsonLecture042012.html.